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Abstract 
This dissertation helps to determine the role of ownership and the ways in which firms 
interact in the food economy. The three essays in this dissertation show how ownership 
structure affects the decisions of entry and exit, the pricing of retail food products, and 
where and how to locate international food economy firm operations. The first essay 
examines the entry and exit decisions of cooperative and non-cooperative firms into the 
U.S. corn-ethanol industry. This essay finds that cooperatives enter the industry sooner 
and exit later. This was partly due to policy driven incentives. The second essay analyzes 
the differential impact of a food retail acquisition on national brand and store brand 
prices. This essay finds that the acquiring retailer is likely able to exert market power in 
branded product categories such as Ready-to-Eat cereal, but not in homogeneous product 
categories such as fluid milk. The third and final essay explores the impact of changing 
governance institutional ownership and how the quality of institutions affect foreign 
investment decisions of food economy firms interested in locating operations in a foreign 
country. The essay finds that new economic policies, LEAP zones, can reduce risks for 
food economy firms by improving governance institutions. However, a case study of its 
implementation in Honduras shows that they can be hard to execute in practice and may 
lose many of the potential benefits accordingly. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction: How do & how should firms compete in the food economy? 
The simple question in this chapter’s title is one in which a pressing need exists for an 
answer as the food economy changes over time. There are three important changes that 
have an impact on food economy firms: policy changes, higher concentration, and more 
coordination. Three important policy changes are the Renewable Fuels Standard, the 
Food Safety Modernization Act, and discussions of changes in antitrust policy with 
regard to buyer power as evidenced in the 2008 presidential campaign. Policy changes 
may make different relationships between food economy firms more beneficial and 
others more costly. Moreover, it may make some industries more profitable changing 
existing inter-firm relationships and creating new ones. 
Over the last twenty years or so, the food value chain has become more highly 
concentrated at each stage. For example, in the United States farmland has become more 
concentrated since the 1980s (MacDonald, Korb, & Hoppe, 2013), meat processing and 
fluid milk processing concentration ratios have increased (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture Economic Research Service, 2014a), and food retailers have become more 
concentrated with a nationwide reach since the early 1990s (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture Economic Research Service, 2014b). This creates a different setting in which 
firms interact. Today’s food economy transactions rarely take place in a setting of many 
potential buyers and many potential sellers. At least one side of this buyer-seller 
relationship is typically constrained to just a few firms or individuals potentially 
exhibiting oligopsony or oligopoly power. This is particular true for farm inputs, food 
retailing, and food manufacturing. As this concentration has moved the food economy 
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from the many-to-many to a few-to-few transaction system, studying the interactions 
between firms has become increasingly important. 
Finally, as the world population grows and the locations of major food demand 
shifts globally, more supply chain coordination across countries is required to produce 
and distribute food to those demand centers. The interactions between firms change and 
adapt as they work more closely together. As coordination increases in a new policy 
environment with higher concentration, the ways in which firms do and should interact 
requires analysis to ensure the food economy is meeting the dietary needs of the world. 
1.1 Background 
Although the question in the title is simple, the answer is immensely complex and 
nuanced. In this case, the economist’s favorite answer is the simplest one – it depends. 
The answer depends on the industry, the relevant policies, the interaction under study, the 
timing and location of the interaction, and the firms involved. Due to its complexity and 
importance, this question has received a tremendous amount of study. 
In a general setting, the theory of the firm literature is a core area of research. 
Nobel laureates Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson among others1 have made 
significant contributions to this field. In this literature, the focus is on how to organize 
production of a good or service: should it be made in-house or should it be bought from 
the market? This make-or-buy decision is critical in defining the vertical boundaries of 
the firm – the boundaries that define what a firm does. Moreover, it defines how firms 
interact vertically with others, including by interacting as a competitor (i.e., deciding to 
                                                 
1 These others include Armen Alchian, Michael Jensen, William Meckling, Nobel laureate Eugene Fama, 
Oliver Hart, John Moore, Sanford Grossman, Bengt Holmstrom, and John Roberts. 
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make). In the food economy, firms pursue several different strategies for this make-or-
buy decision even within the same industry. This dissertation helps to explain some of 
this make-or-buy behavior. 
The extensions of this make-or-buy decision permeate through many areas of 
inquiry. These extensions include entry-exit decisions, backward integration, and 
international location decisions. Each of these areas have several questions that can be 
analyzed. For example, under the backward integration topic, questions include the 
following. Should a firm integrate backwards, and if so, how should a firm integrate 
backwards? What are the effects on downstream buyers if a firm integrates backwards? 
What happens to the competitors of a newly integrated firm? This dissertation contributes 
to the literature on make-or-buy decisions in the U.S. corn-ethanol and food retailing 
industries (Chapters 2 and 3), and international location decisions for multinational food 
economy firms (Chapter 4). 
1.2 Objective 
The objective of this dissertation is to determine the importance of ownership and the 
ways in which firms interact in the food economy. The three essays in this dissertation 
show how ownership structure affects the decisions of entry and exit, the pricing of retail 
food products, and where and how to locate international food economy firm operations. 
The first essay examines the entry and exit decisions of cooperative and non-cooperative 
firms into a highly uncertain market. The second essay analyzes the differential impact of 
a food retail merger on national brand and store brand product prices. The third and final 
essay explores the impact of changing institutional ownership and how the quality of 
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institutions affect foreign investment decisions of food economy firms interested in 
locating operations in a foreign country. 
1.3 Essay Summaries 
1.3.1 Ethanol Plant Investment: Impacts of Policy, Real Options, and Ownership 
Structure 
Beginning in 2002 and continuing through subsequent Farm Bills in the Rural 
Development title, policymakers authorized and developed funds to encourage the 
development of a corn-based ethanol industry with producer ownership. By 2014, 14% of 
the corn-ethanol capacity was owned by producers through cooperatives or limited 
liability companies. Hundreds of millions of dollars were authorized and appropriated to 
encourage this development. In addition, state governments, land grant universities, and 
others made public-private investments to support this industry. The objective of this 
essay is to review these policies and describe the pattern of investment behavior in this 
industry using a real options analysis. The results suggest that encouraging the 
development of an industry through business development policies may lead to 
unintended outcomes. 
1.3.2 Impacts from a Retail Grocery Acquisition: Do National and Store Brand Prices 
Respond Differently? 
This essay investigates the extent to which a grocery retailer merger has different effects 
on the prices of national and store brands. Mergers and acquisitions could increase the 
market share of the acquiring retailer’s store brand relative to national brands in a food 
category. Studying the differential effects of the merger on national and store brand 
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prices is essential to understanding whether growth of store brands contribute to grocery 
retailer market power. Using retail scanner data, an ex-post analysis is performed of a 
food retail acquisition in a large United States city in 2012. This essay focuses on fluid 
milk and ready-to-eat (RTE) cereal categories, which represent a relatively homogenous 
and a relatively differentiated product category, respectively. Due to the unique nature of 
the acquisition, the effect of the acquisition on prices is identified for the acquiring 
retailer using a difference-in-difference estimation framework. The results indicate that 
on average the acquisition decreased fluid milk and RTE cereal prices by approximately 
0.3% and 0.6%, respectively. Milk prices decreased similarly across national brand and 
store brand products. However, in the RTE cereal category the national brand prices 
decreased, while store brand prices increased. These results provide evidence that the 
growth of store brands contributes to grocery retailer market power in differentiated 
product markets. 
1.3.3 Charter City Development: Benefits and Costs for Countries and Firm Decisions 
Special economic zones have boomed in popularity since the mid-1980s and the success 
of one of the most famous of such zones, Shenzhen, became apparent. However, not all 
special economic zones are successful, and they often fail due to underlying institutional 
problems rather than the changed economic policies. New LEAP zones or charter cities 
aim to solve this problem by allowing the zones to choose not just economic policies, but 
entire judicial, legal, administrative, and political systems. This essay finds that these new 
LEAP zones are unique and new geo-political zones. The LEAP zones have a governance 
institutional ownership structure unlike other areas like federalist states, colonies, or other 
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economic zones. The essay also finds that these LEAP zones and all economic zones 
create benefits and the costs. These benefits and costs imply that there are a hierarchy of 
economic zones with LEAP zones being prescribed when the country has poor economic 
policy and poor economic and governance institutions. Additionally, the essay describes 
the firm decision process in locating internationally, especially with regards to food 
economy firms. Location-specific risks play an important role in how and where 
multinational firms locate operations, and new LEAP zones may reduce these risks. 
Finally, the essay applies the results from the general analysis to Honduras’s 
LEAP zone-like economic areas called ZEDEs. Although ZEDEs are not true LEAP 
zones because the governance owners lack a direct feedback with the ZEDE’s 
stakeholders, multinational food economy firms are likely to be very interested in the 
creation of these ZEDEs as they potentially reduce important risks surrounding contract 
enforcement, property rights protection, and production.2 
 
  
                                                 
2 Note that this dissertation was withheld from the public domain, and the work herein reflects the analysis 
as of December 2015. Subsequent publications may contain updated discussion and results. 
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Chapter 2. Ethanol Plant Investment: Impacts of Policy, Real Options, and 
Ownership Structure 
In 2001, United States (U.S.) policymakers began the creation of favorable state and 
federal policies designed to encourage the development of producer-owned corn-ethanol 
plants.3 This was a response to states banning methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE) as a 
fuel oxidizer. The 2005 Energy Policy Act created the Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) 
which created a mandate for bio-based fuels such as ethanol. The corn-ethanol production 
industry increased capacity drastically with the prospects of high ethanol-corn margins 
(Urbanchuk, 2010).  
Land grant universities developed programs to assist with the business 
development of “value-added” agriculture. Boland, Crespi, and Oswald (2009, p. 108) 
described the response of agricultural and applied economics programs in endowments, 
faculty positions, and similar activities. Agricultural science programs responded with 
research, development, and education investments. States began their own business 
development programs to help support producer-owned corn-ethanol plants and value-
added activities.4 State legislatures changed incorporation statutes to redefine producer-
owned businesses to make them look more like a hybrid of traditional cooperatives and 
limited liability structures (Boland, Bosse & Brester, 2007). De Gorter and Just (2010) 
discussed the literature with regard to ethanol policy but none of their cited studies noted 
                                                 
3 In 2001, several of these programs were actually created and provided but they became institutionalized in 
the Rural Development title of the Farm Bill with hundreds of millions of appropriations since 2001. 
4 For example, state legislatures allowed non-producer equity in certain types of cooperatives, many land 
grant universities changed the names of historically departments of agricultural engineering to include 
words related to bio-based, and a number of states appropriated funds for rural business development 
initiatives. 
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the issue of producer-ownership or the topic of business development. 
The objective of this essay is to describe the creation and development of the 
corn-ethanol industry taking into account its ownership structure. An asset investment 
decision model for this industry is developed using a discounted cash flow approach (net 
present value approach or NPV) and a real options (RO) approach. Both of these methods 
are commonly used by firms in making asset investment decisions. The research 
contributes to the real options literature by better modeling the stochastic process of gross 
margins using capital cost data broken out by ownership type. 
Given the significant public-private investments, an orderly development of the 
U.S. corn-ethanol production industry might have been expected. However, this did not 
occur. By 2008 margins fell to pre-2005 levels due to corn price increases reflecting the 
increased demand for corn as investors began constructing new ethanol plants.5  This 
margin squeeze resulted in many ethanol producers going out of business, changing 
ownership structure, or not building announced plants. The corn-ethanol industry began 
with most plants owned by producers through cooperatives. However, in 2014, only 14% 
of the capacity was owned by producers (Renewable Fuels Association, 2014). 
Furthermore, this capacity was scattered in no clear economic pattern across the 
United States. This was in contrast to capacity owned by corporations (e.g., POET, 
Valero, ADM, etc.) which tended to be larger with regard to capacity and had economies 
of scope in production, transportation, and logistics (Boone & Özcan, 2014). It is 
important to understand why producer and non-producer investors entered and exited this 
                                                 
5 Although other factors impacted corn prices at this time, Wright (2014) notes that biofuel demand was, 
and continues to be, the most important driver in determining grain price changes since 2005. 
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industry. This understanding provides policymakers with insights into industry 
development and whether such policies achieve their purpose. 
2.1 Overview of the Corn-Ethanol Industry 
This is not the first time a food economy industry has seen large increases in processing 
plant capacity and increases in entry by new firms followed by a decrease in profitability 
and exit of firms. Schumpeter (1975) called this creative destruction. The beet sugar 
industry in 1967 to 1973 and corn sweetener industry in 1994 to 1998 are two examples 
of industries where this type of behavior has been observed. These two industries were 
impacted by changes in demand and government policy decisions. The beef slaughter 
industry and butter industry saw an increase in capacity and plants and exit of higher-cost 
plants in the 1978 to 1984 and 1919 to 1926 time periods, respectively, which was driven 
by introduction of boxed beef technology and butter-making technology. Similarly, 
milling of durum wheat into semolina flour for use in pasta manufacturing was driven by 
vertical integration of milling and manufacturing which led to the exit of non-vertically 
integrated plants in the mid-1990s. In all of these cases, there was rapid expansion in the 
number of plants and capacity followed by an exit of older plants and their capacity. 
Before the late 1990s, the corn-ethanol industry remained small. It grew in 
response to oil supply shocks (e.g., World War II, 1970s energy crisis) or low periods of 
corn prices. Any significant growth was not permanent (Solomon, Barnes, & Halvorsen, 
2007). The Rural Development title programs, MTBE bans, and RFS policy have created 
a sustained industry. Agricultural business development programs are administered 
through the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Rural Development office. These programs 
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include competitive grants, loans, and technical assistance to fund various aspects of 
business development for bioenergy plants and operations.  For example, Oswald (2008, 
p. 9, Table 1.1) lists almost $240 million in funds appropriated for bio-energy programs. 
Boland, Crespi, and Oswald (2009) note that 112 projects were funded through the Value 
Added Producer Grants program over the 2001 to 2006 time period with the vast majority 
going towards the development and construction of corn-ethanol plants. The U.S. 
Department of Energy assumed responsibility for additional grant, loan, and technical 
assistance programs for bioenergy in 2009. 
It is clear that policymakers encouraged the development of a corn-ethanol 
industry with producer ownership. However, the effectiveness of these funds at creating 
producer-owned firms in the corn-ethanol industry is less clear. The goal of policymakers 
by encouraging the development of an industry owned by producers was vertical 
integration.  Theoretically, this was to encourage forward integration from corn 
production into ethanol production so producers owned more of the marketing margin.6 
By the end of 2008, gross margins returned to pre-2005 levels. As a result, some 
corn-ethanol plants were never built, mothballed, or sold to new owners at a significant 
discount. For example, CHS, Inc., the world’s largest producer-owned cooperative based 
on sales volume, wrote off almost $74 million in its investments in US BioEnergy which 
later became part of VeraSun and exited the ethanol industry in 2008. Because the 
industry was not economically sustainable above the RFS, some of this valuation decline 
                                                 
6 It should be noted that the rhetoric used by some policymakers often confused the words “farmer’s share 
of the retail dollar” with the rationale for value-added activities or marketing margin. Atchley (1956) and 
Brester, Marsh, and Atwood (2009) show why this rhetoric is erroneous. 
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was likely due to economic obsolescence (Boland, Crespi, & Turner, 2014) or stranded 
capital (Wilen, 2009). 
The structure of the industry changed dramatically during this period. The corn-
ethanol industry shifted from 25% of capacity operated by producers in 2002 to a high of 
36% in 2007, and a low of 14% in 2014. As a share of the number of companies, a 
similar, but less dramatic pattern arises. In 2002, over half (52%) of firms producing 
ethanol were producer-owned. By 2005, 57% of firms were producer-owned. In 2014, 
less than one-third (29%) were producer-owned (Renewable Fuels Association, 2014). 
The size of the ethanol plants coming online were not trivial in 2008. The average size of 
a plant increased from 145.66 million liters per year in January 2002 to 279.67 million 
liters per year in January 2009 (Renewable Fuels Association, 2015). 
The over-expansion behavior seen in the corn-ethanol industry seems irrational. 
Sandmo (1971) shows that in an uncertain environment, risk averse producers will 
produce less in any industry. However, just the opposite occurred with regards to ethanol 
production. With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to see that corn-ethanol production 
capacity grew too quickly. The method of real options takes the value of waiting to gain 
further information into account when evaluating investment decisions. It is well known 
that the NPV approach underestimates the value of waiting to expand production because 
future input and output prices are uncertain. With perfect information, a RO approach to 
estimate the return on investment would have valued this wait option properly. 
2.2 Literature Review 
In January 2015, the University of Minnesota’s AgEcon Search shows 254 papers written 
  12 
since 1996 using the search words “real options” in their title or abstract. These papers 
show the methodology being applied in the late 1990s and early 2000s with increasing 
use in environmental and resource economics since 2004. The vast majority of these 
papers are professional society selected papers, working papers, and other similar types 
of research. In general, these papers tend to use the RO approach in two types of 
analyses. The most common type of analysis is to evaluate potential investments using 
the RO approach. Examples of this research include milking systems (Engel & Hyde, 
2003), pest populations (Saphores, 2000), German hog finishing systems (Odening, 
Musshoff, & Balmann, 2005), methane digesters (Stokes, Rajagopalan, & Stefanou, 
2008), alternative cropping systems (Song, Zhao, & Swinton, 2011), California farmer 
and water investments (Carey & Zilberman, 2002), and forest systems in Alberta (Duku-
Kaakyire & Nanang, 2004). The second type of research to use the RO approach is 
industry analyses using aggregated firm-level data. However, these studies do not do the 
aggregation themselves. For example, Stiegert and Hertel (1997), who were the first to 
introduce the Pindyck (1988) RO approach to the agricultural economics literature, use 
the RO approach to study anhydrous ammonia capacity. 
These studies are useful because they show that a RO approach tends to suggest 
that investors wait to invest relative to what an NPV analysis suggests. Simulated data 
help show why the RO model yields different results and are useful to explain why 
certain investments require a high hurdle rate. Industry data is useful because it helps 
explain why an industry evolved in the way it did. A missing piece in this literature is a 
study that uses firm-level data within the same industry to analyze the impact of 
  13 
individual firm behavior. This is especially important when using NPV and RO because 
the cost of capital is a critical input in these models. 
The ideal method is to calculate an individual firm’s weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC) rather than utilize a standard cost of capital for all firms. Such firm-level 
data can come from public databases such as Standard and Poor’s Compustat data which 
has been used to analyze industry and firm effects (Schumacher & Boland, 2005), firm 
diversification (Dorsey & Boland, 2009), and corporate effects (Chaddad & Mondelli, 
2013). However, this dataset lacks information on closely-held firms which include 
cooperatives, family-owned firms, and private firms.7 The food economy has the second 
greatest number (as a percentage) of closely-held firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Boland, 
Golden, & Tsoodle, 2008). Thus, studies using firm-level data should account for the 
food economy’s ownership structure. 
The corn-ethanol industry is widely studied with regard to capital investment 
decisions. Schmit, Luo, and Tauer (2009) calculated gross margins (ethanol price minus 
corn price) at which levels potential investors should build plants and when current plant 
owners should exit. These trigger margins are obtained by a RO analysis and compared to 
those obtained using a NPV analysis. They conclude that if margins continued to 
decrease in 2009, plants would exit and current construction plans would be delayed. 
Moreover, if margins become more variable, owners and investors would delay exiting or 
investing. 
Pederson and Zou (2009) modeled the decision of a representative firm to expand 
                                                 
7 A European dataset Amadeus by Bureau van Dijk has such data on some EU firms since 2004, and 
Compustat has data since early 1980s. 
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or not expand production capacity. The authors use Monte Carlo simulations to obtain the 
value of the option and the value of the expanded capacity. They report that as price 
volatility increases the value to wait increases, which explains lower plant investment in 
late-2007 and early-2008. Cai and Stiegert (2014) calculated optimal capacity levels and 
conclude that the corn-ethanol industry expanded above an optimal level. 
This essay contributes to this literature by incorporating firm heterogeneity into 
industry-level data and by better modeling gross margin changes over time. This paper 
expands on Pederson and Zou (2009) by finding trigger margins via dynamic 
programming techniques instead of using simulations. It extends Cai and Stiegert (2014) 
by incorporating ownership-linked WACC which accounts for differences across 
ownership structure. This research improves on Schmit, Luo, and Tauer (2009) by using 
an alternative stochastic process, Arithmetic Brownian motion, which appears to better 
explain the pattern of gross margins. This is conceptually different from the Geometric 
Brownian motion process used by most researchers. 
2.3 Formal Model 
The RO model is first described and advocated by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) in their 
seminal book, Investment Under Uncertainty. The basic premise of the RO approach is 
that when individuals or firms are presented with an investment opportunity, they have 
the option to invest in it, and this option has value. Once they decide to invest in the 
opportunity, the option is exercised. Therefore, when evaluating an investment 
opportunity, individuals and firms should take this option value into consideration. Using 
a RO framework takes this option value into account, but the more well-known NPV 
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approach does not value this option. As it pertains to ethanol plants, investors must 
account for the “real option” of investing at the current time in addition to the operating 
returns and potential scrap value of the plant. 
The investment decision problem facing investors and plant owners is inherently 
dynamic because, at a given moment, the investor or firm must decide a course of action 
which depends on future ethanol-corn gross margins (ethanol price less corn price).8 
Because of this, the investment problem can be solved using dynamic programming. 
Moreover, because future gross margins are uncertain, stochastic-dynamic programming 
methods are needed. 
Let 𝑓(𝜃, 𝑘) represent the current net profit (gross margins less other fixed and 
variable costs) per liter to the firm where the gross margin is 𝜃. The firm is in a life cycle 
stage, 𝑘, where there are three investment or operational stages: waiting (𝑤), mothball 
(𝑚), and operation (𝑜). Net profits are gross margins plus co-product sales (if any) less 
costs other than corn (e.g., labor, energy, and upkeep costs). 𝑉𝑘(𝜃) represents the value 
accruing to the investor or firm. The deterministic part of 𝜃 is 𝑔(𝜃, 𝑘), ℎ(𝜃, 𝑘) is the 
stochastic part of 𝜃, and 𝑑𝑧 is a basic Weiner process. Combining𝑔(⋅), ℎ(⋅), and 𝑑𝑧 
yields the following for 𝜃: 
(1) 𝑑𝜃 = 𝑔(𝜃, 𝑘)𝑑𝑡 + ℎ(𝜃, 𝑘)𝑑𝑧.  
   
The following Bellman equation represents the value of being in stage 𝑘 under the 
assumption of an infinite time horizon: 
                                                 
8 One can model corn and ethanol price uncertainty separately in this model instead of using the gross 
margin. This would account for changes in the relationship between these two price series. However, to 
keep with previous literature, this essay uses the gross margin. 
  16 
(2) 
𝑉𝑘(𝜃) = 𝑓(𝜃, 𝑘) + 𝐸[𝑉𝑘(𝜃 + 𝑑𝜃)𝑒
−𝜌𝑑𝑡] 
subject to: 𝑑𝜃 = 𝑔(𝜃, 𝑘)𝑑𝑡 + ℎ(𝜃, 𝑘)𝑑𝑧, 
 
   
where 𝜌 be is the discount rate and 𝐸[⋅] denotes the expected value operator. Because dθ 
is an Ito process, the Bellman equation can be rewritten using Ito’s Lemma as the 
following: 
(3) 
𝜌𝑉𝑘(𝜃) = 𝑓(𝜃, 𝑘) + 𝑔(𝜃, 𝑘)𝑉𝑘
′(𝜃) +
1
2
ℎ2(𝜃, 𝑘)𝑉𝑘
′′(𝜃) 
subject to: 𝑑𝜃 = 𝑔(𝜃, 𝑘)𝑑𝑡 + ℎ(𝜃, 𝑘)𝑑𝑧. 
 
   
Equations 2 and 3 show that the value of being in stage 𝑘 is based on the current net 
profit and the expected discounted value of future net profits of being in stage 𝑘. 
Moreover, Equations 2 and 3 show that the value of being in a particular stage 
depends on current gross margins and future gross margins, where future gross margins 
are determined by 𝑑𝜃. While this is interesting, it does not directly prescribe what action 
investors and plant owners should take. These value functions are used to derive trigger 
margins as the value of being in a particular stage depends on gross margins. Formally, 
these trigger margins indicate when the investors or plant owners should switch stages. 
Trigger margins are levels of gross margins that indicate when to invest in, mothball, 
reactivate, or close an ethanol plant. 
Two conditions must hold at each trigger margin: the value-matching and smooth-
pasting conditions. The value-matching condition requires that the value of being in the 
two alternative stages, including switching costs, be the same at the trigger margin. That 
is, the value functions must be continuous at the trigger margin. This is intuitive. If the 
value of entering is larger than the value of waiting at the trigger margin, then the 
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investor loses by not entering sooner when the margin was lower. Although smooth-
pasting is less intuitive, it is straightforward.  The smooth-pasting condition requires that 
the derivative of the value functions of being in two alternative stages be equal at the 
trigger margin. 
Suppose there is a trigger margin, 𝜃𝑘, between stages 𝑘0 and 𝑘1 and that it costs 𝑆 
to switch from stage 𝑘0 to 𝑘1. Then, the trigger margin must satisfy the value-matching 
and smooth pasting conditions. These are 
(4) 𝑉𝑘0(𝜃𝑘) = 𝑉𝑘1(𝜃𝑘) − 𝑆  
   
and 
(5) 𝑉𝑘0
′ (𝜃𝑘) = 𝑉𝑘1
′ (𝜃𝑘),  
   
where the first equation is the value-matching condition and the second equation is the 
smooth- pasting condition. 
2.3.1 Geometric Brownian Motion, Arithmetic Brownian Motion, and the Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck Process 
An assumption is needed about the particular Ito process that gross margins follow. Three 
alternative processes considered in this essay are Geometric Brownian motion (GBM), 
Arithmetic Brownian Motion (ABM), and the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck mean-reversion 
process (OUMR). 
Most RO analyses use the GBM process to model how the value of an investment 
opportunity changes over time. The GBM process is popular because many stock and 
commodity prices follow this process as Nobel laureate Eugene Fama (1965) notes. 
Moreover, this assumption provides an analytical solution to the value functions and the 
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associated trigger prices. An important property of the GBM process is that the value of 
an investment is never negative. This property is useful when studying the prices, but it is 
fundamentally problematic when analyzing margins. Clearly, margins can be, and often 
are, negative. This means that any analysis is flawed when using margins as the value of 
the investment under study and a GBM process. This fundamental shortcoming of the 
GBM process as it applies to margins implies that the derived trigger margins using it are 
incorrect. In the case of ethanol plant investment, the ethanol-corn margin is negative for 
several months between 1982 and 2014. 
A natural alternative to the GBM process that does not have the non-negativity 
property is the ABM process. It is easiest to see the differences between the two 
properties by looking at equations. Assuming ethanol-corn margins follow GBM implies 
that the Ito process takes the following form: 
(6) 𝑑𝜃 = 𝛼𝜃𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝜃𝑑𝑧,  
   
where 𝛼 is a drift parameter and 𝜎 is a volatility parameter. Alternatively, assuming 
ethanol-corn margins follow ABM implies that the Ito process takes the following form: 
(7) 𝑑𝜃 = 𝛼𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑧,  
   
This representation shows why the GBM process has the non-negativity property and the 
ABM process does not. The ABM process models the change in margins as changes in 
levels, while the GBM process models the change in margins as proportional changes. 
Proportional changes only make sense when the underlying values are always non-
negative or always non-positive. In contrast, changes in levels do not have this 
requirement. Therefore, because margins can be positive and negative, the ABM process 
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better models ethanol-corn margins than the GBM process. 
The OUMR process is the final process considered here. Assuming ethanol-corn 
margins follow an OUMR process implies that the Ito process takes the following form: 
(8) 𝑑𝜃 = 𝜂(𝜃 − 𝜃)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑧,  
   
where 𝜃 is the normal value of the gross margin to which it reverts and 𝜂 is the degree of 
mean reversion. The OUMR process can be seen as a mean-reverting ABM process. It is 
important to consider this process because margins typically will not continue to increase 
or decrease indefinitely due to market entry or exit. If margins were exceedingly high, 
new firms would enter the market. As the new firms enter the market, they increase the 
demand of the main input (corn), while simultaneously increase the supply of the output 
(ethanol). These changes in supply and demand will increase the price of the input (corn) 
and decrease the price of the output (ethanol), thus lowering margins. The opposite 
occurs when margins are exceedingly low and current firms exit the market. Therefore, 
this process must be explored as a potential way in which ethanol-corn margins change 
overtime. Note that no analytical solution can be obtained under this assumption, and so 
numerical methods are required. Under all three Ito processes, the parameters 𝛼, 𝜎, 𝜂, and 
𝜃 can be obtained from gross margin data. 
2.4 Empirical Model 
2.4.1 Plant Parameters 
As investors or plant owners switch investment or operational stages, they incur fixed 
costs of switching. To switch from waiting to operating, investors incur construction 
costs, 𝐼. To switch from operating to mothballing, plant owners incur mothballing costs, 
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𝑀; and, switching from mothballing to operating incur reactivation costs, 𝐴. To exit the 
market from mothballing, a switch from mothballing to waiting, plant owners incur exit 
costs of 𝑋. Note that exit costs should be non-positive because the plant can be sold for 
scrap. All other costs are non-negative. 
For each stage, the net profits are different. Under the waiting stage, the net 
profits are zero. Under the operating stage, the net profits are gross margins less constant, 
per-unit operating costs, 𝑜𝑐(𝐼). Under the mothballing stage, the net profits are constant, 
per-unit upkeep costs, 𝑢𝑐(𝐼), or 
(9) 
𝑓(𝜃, 𝑤) = 0 
𝑓(𝜃, 𝑜) = 𝜃 − 𝑜𝑐(𝐼) 
𝑓(𝜃, 𝑚) = −𝑢𝑐(𝐼) 
 
   
2.4.2 Trigger Margins, Revisited 
Below is a discussion of the entry trigger margin; the same discussion for mothballing, 
exit, and re-entry follow in a parallel fashion. The gross margin that sets the value of 
waiting equal to the value of the operating ethanol plant less any sunk costs (i.e., 
construction costs) is the RO entry trigger margin, 𝜃𝑒. The value of the operating ethanol 
plant is 
(10) 𝑉𝑜(𝜃; 𝐼) = 𝜃 − 𝑜𝑐(𝐼) + 𝐸[𝑉𝑜(𝜃 + 𝑑𝜃)𝑒
−𝜌𝑑𝑡].  
   
The value of waiting is the option value. This yields 
(11) 𝑉𝑤(𝜃; 𝐼) = 𝑂𝑉(𝜃; 𝐼) = 𝐸[𝑉𝑤(𝜃 + 𝑑𝜃)𝑒
−𝜌𝑑𝑡  
   
Including the investment switching costs, 𝐼, 𝜃𝑒 is the gross margin such that 
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(12) 𝑉𝑤(𝜃𝑒; 𝐼) = 𝑉𝑜(𝜃𝑒; 𝐼) − 𝐼  
   
(13) 𝑉𝑤
′ (𝜃𝑒; 𝐼) = 𝑉𝑜
′(𝜃𝑒; 𝐼).  
   
where 𝑉𝑤(⋅) and 𝑉𝑜(⋅) are the value of waiting and the value of operating, respectively. 
The gross margin that sets the value of the mothballed plant equal to the value of 
exiting the industry less any sunk costs associated with exit is the RO exit trigger margin, 
𝜃𝑥. The value of exiting the industry is the option value of re-entering or the value of 
waiting. Similar equations to those for the entry trigger margin can be obtained for the 
exit trigger margin. Re-entry and mothball trigger margins can be constructed in a similar 
way as the entry and exit trigger margins discussed above. The NPV entry trigger margin 
is the gross margin that sets the value of the operating ethanol plant equal to the 
discounted investment fixed costs. The gross margin that equates the value of the 
operating plant and its discounted scrap value is the NPV exit trigger margin. In general, 
the RO entry (exit) trigger margin is larger (smaller) than the respective NPV trigger 
margins. 
2.5 Empirical Strategy 
Prior to obtaining the numerical trigger margins, parameter estimates are needed for each 
of the parameters in the ABM and OUMR Ito process equations. Once these parameters 
are obtained, trigger margins are estimated for three representative ethanol plants: small, 
medium, and large.9 That is, a RO analysis is performed for a small, medium, and large 
plant, respectively, under the assumption that gross margins follow ABM. This is then 
                                                 
9Schmit, Luo, and Tauer (2009) defined a small plant as a plant with capacity of less than 95 million liters 
per year; a medium plant produces between 95 and 227 million liters per year; and, a large plant produces 
more than 227 million liters per year. 
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repeated under the assumption that gross margins follow OUMR. This is done using the 
rssolve solver program COMPECON toolbox in Matlab (Miranda and Fackler, 2002). 
This analysis is repeated using the WACC in place of the discount rate, obtaining 
trigger margins for small, medium, and large plants broken out by ownership type for the 
ABM and GBM processes.10 Additional analyses are performed updating ABM 
parameters each year using the ten previous years of data. The baseline and WACC 
analyses are repeated using data for January 1998 – December 2007, January 1999 – 
December 2008, and so on. This procedure refines the trigger margins, providing better 
explanations for observed market entry.11 
These trigger margins for the medium-sized plant are compared to observed 
margins to deter- mine if the behavior of investors and plant operators was consistent 
with the real options framework or the NPV approach during the mid-2000s. Finally, the 
analysis is redone for medium-sized plants under the ABM processes to determine how 
sensitive the results are to parameter values.12 The medium-sized plant for these analyses 
because it represents an “average” plant. It also allows for clarity of explanation.13 
2.6 Data 
The production, fixed costs, and operating cost parameters used in this study are identical 
to Schmit, Luo, and Tauer (2009, p. 1447, Table 2) and are shown in Table 2.1. These  
                                                 
10 This analysis is performed for the GBM process to compare it to the ABM process. This is not 
performed for the OUMR process because the OUMR process does not fit the ethanol-corn margin data 
well. 
11 A graph of the results from the repeated WACC analysis can be found in Figure 2.7. They follow 
the same pattern as the baseline. 
12 Sensitivity analyses for the medium-sized plant under the GBM assumption are available in Schmit, 
Luo, and Tauer (2009). 
13 These analyses can be extended for small- and large-sized, and farmer- and non-farmer-owned plants 
in a straightforward way. 
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Table 2.1. Assumptions for operating, upkeep, and fixed costs by plant size 
Cost (cent/liter) Small Medium Large 
Operating, oc (I) 11 9 9 
Upkeep, uc (I) 1.3 0.925 0.8 
Investment, I 52 37 32 
Mothball, M 2.6 1.85 1.6 
Reactivation, A 5.2 3.7 3.2 
Exit, X -13 -9.25 -8 
Discount Factor, ρa 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Corn:Ethanol Conversion Factorb 10.6 10.6 10.6 
Source: Table 2 of Schmit, Luo, and Tauer (2009). 
a. The discount factor of 0.08 is used in the baseline results only. 
b. Corn:Ethanol Conversion Factor is liters of ethanol per bushel of corn. 
parameters are derived from various regional corn-ethanol industry reports and papers, 
USDA cost of production surveys, and engineering studies. The same parameters are 
used so that the effect of the ABM process change is not confounded by other changes in 
the model. The conversion rate of corn into ethanol is assumed to be 10.6 liters per 
bushel. For the baseline analysis, the discount factor is equal to 0.08. The discount rate is 
set to the WACC in analyses where ownership type is differentiated. 
Data on capital costs are incorporated in the analysis. Specifically, WACC data is 
obtained at the industry level from Damodaran (2014, 2015). The WACC for the gas and 
oil distribution industry is used for 2007 to 2014, and adjusted for the oil (integrated) 
industry WACC for 1998 to 2006 time period by using the average difference between 
these two industries for 2007 to 2014 to obtain WACC data. To reflect the additional risk 
present in the ethanol industry due to its dependence upon government policy, the risk 
premium is increased by 25 percentage points. These data represent the WACC for non-
producer companies. To obtain the WACC for producer companies, the same risk  
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Table 2.2. Weighted average cost of capital (WACC) by plant size and ownership type 
Ownership Type Statistic All Small Medium Large 
Producer Average 10.13% 9.66% 9.62% 13.27% 
N 58 15 35 8 
Non-producer Average 17.44% 15.99% 17.27% 18.26% 
N 156 27 67 62 
All Average 15.46% 13.73% 14.64% 17.69% 
N 214 42 102 70 
Source: Damodaran (2015) and authors’ calculations 
premium is used, but the cost of equity is discounted by 20 percent.14 This agrees with 
cooperative theory because equity in a marketing cooperative does not appreciate over 
time (Sexton, 1986).15 
Companies that own ethanol plants are assigned a WACC in the following way. If 
they built the plant themselves, they are assigned a WACC of the third year prior to the 
first operating year. This delay reflects the three years needed to construct a plant. If they 
bought the plant, they are assigned the WACC of the year prior to them operating the 
plant. This data is summarized in Table 2.2. Medium (small) plants have the lowest 
WACCs, while large (large) plants have the highest WACCs for producer (non-producer) 
plants. The WACC is higher after 2005 when most large plants were built or purchased. 
As noted earlier there are significant economies of size and plant sizes were increasing 
during this period. It should be noted that most producer companies operated small or 
medium plants, while most non-producer companies operated medium or large plants. 
This again correlates with entry timing as most non-producer companies entered later 
with larger plants. 
                                                 
14 A sensitivity analysis on these assumptions reveals no significant difference in the results. 
15 These WACCs are likely to be overestimates of the actual WACCs faced by cooperatives. This is 
because cooperative investment in a corn-ethanol plant is a vertical extension of the farm and farms have 
lower WACCs. 
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Table 2.3. Nebraska ethanol and corn price summary statistics, 1998 – 2014 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Ethanol Price ($/liter) 0.493 0.162 
Corn Price ($/bushel) 3.365 1.657 
Corn Price ($/liter) 0.318 0.156 
Gross Margin ($/liter) 0.175 0.125 
Source: Nebraska Ethanol Board and Nebraska Energy Office (2015) and Gould (2015) 
The price data is a time series of monthly ethanol rack prices and corn cash 
market prices in Nebraska from 1998 to 2014. The ethanol rack prices come from the 
Nebraska Energy Office and the Nebraska Ethanol Board (Nebraska Ethanol Board and 
Nebraska Energy Office, 2015). The Nebraska corn cash market prices are USDA NASS 
Prices Received data from the University of Wisconsin Dairy Marketing and Risk 
Management program website (Gould, 2015). Nebraska has the second largest number of 
corn-ethanol plants and a strong basis for corn. These ethanol and corn price data reflect a 
large number of transactions and likely reflect true market prices and market price 
changes. Table 2.3 contains summary statistics of the price data. 
Figure 2.1 is a graph overlaying the number of plants under construction onto the 
ethanol corn gross margin between 1999 and 2014. The gross margin spike in 2006 is 
clearly evident as the impact of the MTBE ban, RFS implementation, and business 
development policies. After the spike, the margins returned to a lower level. 
Behaviorally, the number of ethanol plants under construction spikes during 2007 which 
is the year after the gross margin increase. This provides strong evidence that firms make 
investment decisions based on movements in the ethanol-corn gross margin, which in 
turn indicates that the suggested RO and NPV frameworks approximate reality. 
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Figure 2.1. Gross margins and plant construction 
Source: Gould (2015) and Renewable Fuels Association (2015) 
2.7 Results 
The results section is broken down into three subsections. The first subsection presents 
the firm Ito process parameter values under GBM, ABM, and OUMR processes for the 
period January 1998 – June 2008. The second subsection presents the baseline trigger 
margin results from the dynamic programming problem under each of the Ito processes. 
The third subsection presents the results from using the WACC data and differentiating 
between ownership types. 
2.7.1 Ito Process Parameter Values 
Table 2.4 presents the parameter values used for each of the Ito processes. This essay  
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Table 2.4. Baseline parameter values for Ito processes 
Parameter GBMa ABMb OUMRc 
𝛼  0 1.267 - 
𝜎  0.799 18.11 3.682 
𝜂  - - 0.080 
𝜃(¢)  - - 21.84 
a. The GBM parameter values come from Schmit, Luo, and Tauer (2009). 
b. The ABM parameter values are calculated using 1998-2014 data. 
c The OUMR parameter values are calculated using 1998-2008 data. 
presents the parameters found by Schmit, Luo, and Tauer (2009) in the first column. 
Separate parameters are not calculated. The second and third columns contain the 
parameter estimates for the ABM and OUMR processes, respectively. These are 
calculated with the corn and ethanol price data discussed above. Because these processes 
are so different conceptually, three figures (Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4) of simulations 
comparing each of the Ito processes to the actual gross margins from 1998 – 2008 are 
presented. 16 Each graph has 25 simulations of monthly margins over 10 years. 
Upon visual inspection of Figure 2.2, the OURM process does not fit the data 
well. The small volatility parameter makes the simulated margin paths too stable. This 
lack of fit matches with the regression estimates where the R2 from the raw regression is 
only 0.04. This simulation shows that although mean-reversion may be present in 
economic theory, this type of mean-reversion does not fit the data empirically for this 
time period. 
Figure 2.3 presents the simulations of the GBM process, and the non-negativity of 
the GBM process is evident. All GBM simulated paths are non-negative, and some paths 
match the actual margins well through the seventh year. However, nearly all of the  
                                                 
16 For these simulations, margin data from 1998 to 2008 are used to calculate ABM parameters. The drift 
and volatility parameters are 1.215 and 17.629, respectively. 
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Figure 2.2. OUMR simulations 
Source: Gould (2015) and author calculations 
simulated paths become extremely close to zero and stay there. In contrast, the ABM 
process simulations in Figure 2.4 are much more widely spread, with actual margins 
being somewhere near the middle. These simulations indicate that the ABM process is 
not only conceptually more correct than the GBM process for modelling gross margin 
changes, but also seems to empirically fit the actual gross margins better than the GBM 
process during this time period. 
2.7.2 Baseline Trigger Margin Results 
Table 2.5 presents the trigger margin results from the dynamic programming problem 
under the GBM, ABM, and OUMR assumptions in the first three columns. The final 
column presents the results of the NPV entry and exit trigger margins. 
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Figure 2.3. GBM simulations 
Source: Gould (2015) and author calculations 
Under each process, the trigger margins for medium and large plants are fairly 
similar, while the trigger margins for small plants are quite different. Consider the ABM 
process as an example and break down the behavior across plants. Because the large 
plants entry margins are lowest, the large plants will enter first, followed by medium and 
then small plants. The same pattern produces the opposite results with the exit trigger 
margins – small plants will exit first, followed by medium and then large plants. In fact, 
these same patterns emerge for the GBM and OUMR Ito processes, too. This seems to 
indicate that small plants fill demand at the margin while medium and large plants are 
more mainstay producers. This follows the intuition of market entry and exit. 
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Figure 2.4. ABM simulations 
Source: Gould (2015) and author calculations 
Now, consider the ABM and OUMR trigger margins in comparison to the GBM 
trigger margins. The ABM entry, mothball, and exit trigger margins are smaller than the 
respective GBM trigger margins. The ABM reactivation trigger margins are larger, but 
very similar to, the GBM reactivation trigger margins which is intuitive when considering 
Figures 2.3 and 2.4. The GBM process tended toward zero, while the ABM process 
moved much more freely. Therefore, investors will enter later and exit sooner if they 
think margins follow a GBM process because the margins will eventually go to zero. 
The OUMR entry, reactivation, and exit trigger margins are all much smaller than 
the corresponding GBM trigger margins. The mothball trigger margins are all slightly  
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Table 2.5. Baseline trigger margins under GBM, ABM, and OUMR processes (¢/liter) 
Plant Size Trigger margin Ito Process 
GBM ABM OUMR NPV 
Small Entry 48.4 33.6 15.2 15.2 
Reactivate 21.7 22.0 10.1 - 
Mothball 5.1 -3.1 5.6 - 
Exit 4.7 -40.4 2.0 12.0 
Medium Entry 36.7 28.3 12.0 12.0 
Reactivate 17.3 19.0 8.4 - 
Mothball 4.4 -3.3 4.4 - 
Exit 3.6 -44.5 -3.3 9.7 
Large Entry 34.1 27.1 11.6 11.6 
Reactivate 16.9 18.6 8.5 - 
Mothball 4.6 -2.7 4.8 - 
Exit 3.4 -45.4 -3.7 9.6 
      
larger under the OUMR process, but approximately the same size. These results are 
intuitive in the context of the simulations. Under the OUMR process, the margins were 
climbing steadily to the normal level. Therefore, investors are willing to enter very early 
and exit very late because they know margins will return to the normal level.17 
Interestingly, the ABM mothball and exit trigger margins are negative. This 
implies that these plants will continue to operate at a loss, even before operating costs are 
considered. This occurs because the expectation of where gross margins may go next is 
very uncertain in the ABM process. This occurs because the drift will “pull” the margins 
up slowly, but it is dominated by the very high volatility. However, ethanol-corn margins 
were never close to that.18 Therefore, under the ABM process, no one should have exited 
the industry. However, many firms exited the industry. Because of this, the GBM process 
                                                 
17 Because the OUMR process does not fit the data particularly well, the discussion of the results from 
the OUMR process are limited. 
18 Between 1982 and 2014 the smallest margin in the data was -6.9¢/liter in July 1996. 
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may better match the data because exits are observed. However, due to its conceptual and 
empirical flaws, this match is more correlation than causation. 
At this stage, it is important to note that the RO and the NPV framework leave out 
important considerations. For example, these frameworks do not account for how the 
investment capital is raised, just how much it cost; they do not know exactly when loan 
payments are due, just how much they are; they do not account for shifts in government 
policy, just that margins may change because of it. These factors play an important part 
in entry and exit decisions, which may not be well-reflected in the trigger margins. 
In the case of the corn-ethanol industry many of the investments in plants were 
highly leveraged. As the margin bubble burst, this leverage would not allow plant owners 
the opportunity to wait out the rough times. Approximately 13 of the exits in the corn-
ethanol industry were due to bankruptcy. This shows that exits were due to factors 
unrelated to operating profit – things that are not taken into account by the RO and NPV 
frameworks. Due to this limitation, the structural nature of firm exits in the industry, and 
a lack of reliable data on mothballing, future discussion is on the entry decisions. 
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 present actual gross margins (1998 – 2014) and GBM, ABM, 
and NPV trigger margins for a medium-sized plant. The higher (lower) dashed line is the 
real options entry (exit) trigger margin. The higher (lower) dot-dashed line is the real 
options reactivation (mothball) trigger margin. The higher (lower) dotted line is the NPV 
entry (exit) trigger margin. 
These figures show first that investors and plant owners seem to have valued the 
option to wait. This result follows because for nearly all of 2000 to 2011, the actual  
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Figure 2.5. GBM and NPV baseline trigger margin results, actual gross margins, and the 
number of plants under construction, 1998-2014 
Source: Gould (2015), Renewable Fuels Association (2015), and author calculations 
margin was above the NPV entry trigger margins, but there is an increase in plant 
construction in 2002 and 2006 to 2008 when there should also be construction increases 
in 2010 to 2012 if investors were following NPV margins. In contrast, the RO approach, 
which values the option to wait, predicts the construction increases in 2002, 2006 to 
2008, while also predicting the lack of increases in 2010 to 2012. Although, they may not 
explicitly be using real options, this indicates that potential investors valued the option to 
wait. Moreover, it seems that ethanol investors may have followed an ABM model when 
entering the market. 
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Figure 2.6. ABM and NPV baseline trigger margin results, actual gross margins, and the 
number of plants under construction, 1998-2014 
Source: Gould (2015), Renewable Fuels Association (2015), and author calculations 
These results also indicate that investors followed the ABM model for entering 
the ethanol market because the actual gross margins exceed the ABM entry trigger 
margin in late 2001, early 2005, 2006, and 2007. However, the GBM trigger margins are 
too high in 2001, thus missing the construction increase in 2002. This means that 
investors took into account that gross margins could be negative.19 
2.7.3 Trigger Margin Results by Ownership Type 
                                                 
19 These results are further supported when the ABM process parameters are updated yearly. The entry 
margins are clearly below the actual margins in 2001, parts of 2005, and most of 2006 – 2007. These 
correspond directly to construction increases. A graph of these results is found in Figure 2.7. 
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
Ja
n
-9
8
Se
p
-9
8
M
ay
-9
9
Ja
n
-0
0
Se
p
-0
0
M
ay
-0
1
Ja
n
-0
2
Se
p
-0
2
M
ay
-0
3
Ja
n
-0
4
Se
p
-0
4
M
ay
-0
5
Ja
n
-0
6
Se
p
-0
6
M
ay
-0
7
Ja
n
-0
8
Se
p
-0
8
M
ay
-0
9
Ja
n
-1
0
Se
p
-1
0
M
ay
-1
1
Ja
n
-1
2
Se
p
-1
2
M
ay
-1
3
Ja
n
-1
4
Se
p
-1
4
G
ro
ss
 M
ar
gi
n
 (
¢/
lit
er
) 
an
d
 N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
P
la
n
ts
 U
n
d
er
 C
o
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
Month - Year
Actual Gross Margin ABM Entry Margin ABM Exit Margin
ABM Reactivation Margin ABM Mothball Margin NPV Entry Margin
NPV Exit Margin Plants Under Construction
  35 
 
Figure 2.7. ABM baseline trigger margin results, actual gross margins, and the number 
of plants under construction – yearly updating, 1998-2014 
Source: Gould (2015), Renewable Fuels Association (2015), and author calculations 
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 present the results from changing the discount rate from 8% to the 
WACC for each plant size and changing the ownership type. When the WACC is used as 
the discount rate, nearly all of the trigger margins across both Ito processes increase. The 
mothballing trigger margin decreases, but only slightly. The same pattern emerges for 
differences between non-producer and producer trigger margins. This near universal 
increase in trigger margins occurs because all of the WACCs are larger than the baseline 
discount rate and all non-producer WACCs are larger than producer WACCs except for 
small plants. An increase in the discount rate means that investors require a higher return  
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Table 2.6. Trigger margins under GBM by ownership type (¢/liter) 
Plant 
Size 
Trigger 
Margin 
Baseline Ownership Type Differencea 
Producer Non-producer P - B NP - B NP - P 
Small Entry 47.0 49.5 53.8 2.5 6.8 4.3 
Reactivate 21.0 21.8 22.0 0.8 1.0 0.2 
Mothball 5.0 5.1 5.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Exit 4.0 5.1 6.5 1.1 2.5 1.4 
NPV – Entry 15.0 16.0 19.3 1.0 4.3 3.3 
NPV – Exit 11.0 12.3 13.1 1.3 2.1 0.8 
Medium Entry 17.0 37.5 41.2 20.5 24.2 3.6 
Reactivate 17.0 17.4 17.5 0.4 0.5 0.2 
Mothball 4.0 4.4 4.3 0.4 0.3 0.0 
Exit 3.0 3.9 5.2 0.9 2.2 1.3 
NPV – Entry 12.0 12.6 15.4 0.6 3.4 2.8 
NPV – Exit 10.0 9.9 10.6 -0.1 0.6 0.7 
Large Entry 35.0 36.3 38.3 1.3 3.3 2.0 
Reactivate 17.0 17.0 17.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Mothball 5.0 4.6 4.5 -0.4 -0.5 0.0 
Exit 3.0 4.3 5.1 1.3 2.1 0.8 
NPV – Entry 12.0 13.2 14.8 1.2 2.8 1.6 
NPV – Exit 10.0 10.1 10.5 0.1 0.5 0.4 
a. P – B, NP – B and NP – P is the difference between the producer and the baseline, non-producer and the 
baseline, and non-producer and producer trigger margins. 
(higher margins) for the investment and have a lower tolerance for low profitability (low 
margins). Therefore, producers invest sooner and exit later than non-farmers. 
This difference in entry and exit timing across ownership type is supported by 
previous theoretical work and data on firm survivorship. Holland and King (2004) 
develop a conceptual model of firm entry and exit in the ethanol industry using a RO 
framework. They find that new generation or closed membership cooperatives enter the 
ethanol industry sooner than typical investors.20 From the data, the average age of a 
producer-owned firm at the time of exit is approximately 5.5 years, while the age of a  
                                                 
20 Holland and King (2004) also find that non-producers may buy producer-owned plants if the producers 
are risk-averse. 
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Table 2.7. Trigger margins under ABM by ownership type (¢/liter) 
Plant 
Size 
Trigger 
Margin 
Baseline Ownership Type Differencea 
Producer Non-producer P - B NP - B NP - P 
Small Entry 33.6 34.4 37.6 0.9 4.0 3.1 
Reactivate 22.0 22.0 22.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 
Mothball -3.1 -3.1 -3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Exit -40.4 -36.2 -24.5 4.2 15.9 11.7 
NPV – Entry 15.2 16.0 19.3 0.9 4.2 3.3 
NPV – Exit 12.0 12.3 13.1 0.2 1.0 0.8 
Medium Entry 28.3 29.0 31.8 0.7 3.5 2.9 
Reactivate 19.0 19.1 19.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 
Mothball -3.3 -3.4 -3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Exit -44.5 -40.5 -27.3 4.0 17.2 13.2 
NPV – Entry 12.0 12.6 15.4 0.6 3.4 2.8 
NPV – Exit 9.7 9.9 10.6 0.1 0.9 0.7 
Large Entry 27.1 28.9 30.5 1.9 3.5 1.6 
Reactivate 18.6 18.7 18.8 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Mothball -2.7 -2.7 -2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Exit -45.4 -34.3 -27.1 11.1 18.3 7.2 
NPV – Entry 11.6 13.2 14.8 1.7 3.3 1.6 
NPV – Exit 9.6 10.1 10.5 0.4 0.8 0.4 
a. P – B, NP – B and NP – P is the difference between the producer and the baseline, non-producer and the 
baseline, and non-producer and producer trigger margins. 
non-producer-owned firm at the time of exit is 3 years. These ages are calculated 
following the entry and exit of ethanol companies from the list of ethanol plants from the 
Renewable Fuels Association (2014) annual industry outlook reports.21 
Finally, the results across ownership types are very different. Even small 
differences in gross margins are economically significant due to the volume of 
production. A difference in gross margins of $0.01 per liter for the entire year results in a 
                                                 
21 The differences between non-producer and producer trigger margins are highest for entry trigger margins 
under the GBM process and for exit trigger margins under the ABM process. This difference is likely due 
to the non-negativity property of the GBM process. Because margins will not be negative under the GBM 
process there is only room for the entry margin to change. Under the ABM process, the margins are 
unbounded, so exit trigger margins increase much more as the discount rate increases compared to the 
GBM process. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the entry trigger margin differences are similar 
for both the GBM and ABM processes. 
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$1.61 million difference in full-year plant gross margins for an average medium-sized 
plant (161 million liters/year capacity). This indicates that using industry-level data 
without accounting for firm ownership heterogeneity is advised when performing 
industry analyses. 
The quick entry reaction and lower WACCs in 2006 by producer firms was made 
possible, in part, by the business development programs created by Congress in 2001 and 
2002. Without the programs, producer firms would not have been able to react quickly 
due to the structure of collective action and a lag for cooperative creation. However, these 
programs were started well before the margin spike. In fact, between 2002 and 2005, 
nearly $125 million were disbursed through these programs (Oswald, 2008, p. 9, Table 
1.1). Certainly not all of these funds went to ethanol plant development, but a large share 
were towards producer-owned plants. These programs allowed producers to have 
feasibility studies finished, sites selected, and business plans available for lenders when 
margins spiked in 2006. This, in turn, allowed producer plants to enter at the same time 
as non-producer plants. 
2.8 Conclusions 
This essay has extended current research on ethanol plant investment in three ways. First, 
this essay finds that margins are better modeled conceptually using Arithmetic Brownian 
Motion (ABM) compared to Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) because the latter 
requires margins to be strictly positive. Moreover, the ABM process is found to better 
model ethanol-corn gross margins empirically than the GBM process. The trigger 
margins inducing a change between waiting and investing, operating and mothballing, 
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and mothballing and exiting are smaller under the Arithmetic Brownian Motion process 
than under the Geometric Brownian Motion process. 
Second, the results contradict the hypothesis that investors did not value the 
option to wait. The trigger margins under the ABM process fit the data on plant 
construction better than NPV trigger margins. Although it may be unlikely that investors 
explicitly used a real options analysis, they implicitly valued the option to wait properly 
when evaluating their investment decisions. Additionally, because the ABM process best 
fits the data, it is inferred that investors did not believe that gross margins would remain 
strictly positive or revert to some normal level. 
Third, the capital cost differences across ownership type led to different entry and 
exit behavior. Specifically, using a unique dataset of weighted average cost of capital 
data, the results indicate that farmer-owned firms enter earlier and exit later than non-
farmer-owned firms. This result is supported by previous theoretical work and is 
confirmed with company survivorship data which finds that farmer-owned firms are older 
than non-farmer-owned firms when they exit the industry. Additionally, this shows the 
importance of using firm-level data and accounting for heterogeneity in ethanol plant 
operations. The results indicate that even in industry-level analyses, firm-level data 
should be used and differences across plants should be accounted for properly. 
Hundreds of millions of dollars were appropriated to encourage the development 
of corn-ethanol plants. These funds were used to pay for business development costs, 
underwrite producer loans to buy stock in cooperatives, underwrite operating loans for 
plants, and many other aspects of business development. Clearly, much public-private 
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investment helped the corn-ethanol industry develop as a substitute for MTBE and 
fulfillment of the RFS requirement. Many of these business development programs were 
designed to encourage the development of an industry where producer-owned plants were 
dominant. As of January 2014, however, producer-owned plants account for less than 
15% of the total industry capacity. Could something have been done differently? 
Few, if any, investment models could have prevented the boom and bust from 
occurring; even the RO framework indicated to enter during the boom time. Most 
investment evaluation models provide benefits and costs on average, and what occurred 
was far from average. These models do not account for the actions of other potential 
investors and do not reliably predict the effects from structural changes, both of which 
played significant roles in the corn-ethanol industry at this time. 
It is also unlikely that any action from public agencies could have prevented the 
boom and bust given the policies that were in place. Land grant universities could have 
provided more information about where to build ethanol plants or how to hedge corn and 
ethanol prices. Perhaps they could have developed a web-based tool to evaluate the 
ethanol plant investment with an updating process using RO. However, extension 
economists at Iowa State and Kansas State universities and private firms were providing 
such information by providing corn basis maps, ethanol plant enterprise budgets, and 
education. Six of the ten Agricultural Innovation Centers with $1 million each were based 
in departments of agricultural economics and many worked with corn-ethanol plants. 
Moreover, if a web-based evaluation tool was offered, it could have encouraged 
investment based on the trigger margin results described earlier. 
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It could be argued that the business development programs present in business 
development legislation designed to create a corn-ethanol industry dominated by 
producer-owned plants incentivized early entry by producers which normally would have 
enabled them to gain first-mover advantage. However, producer-owned ethanol plants 
that were constructed in reaction to the RFS fared the worst when gross margins later 
shrank. Many producer-owned plants built during this time were closed or sold to non-
producer owners. However, after record corn prices, producers may have been the best 
placed potential investors after margins shrank and initial investors wanted out had they 
not already built ethanol plants. This provides the counter-intuitive result that the policy 
incentivizing producer participation in the corn-ethanol industry unintentionally kept 
them from maintaining their place as major capacity controllers as the industry evolved 
and matured. 
One future area of research is to incorporate the ability of investors and owners to 
use futures markets to take away price uncertainty in major input and output markets in 
the short run. This would mitigate some of the problems of making assumptions about 
future price movements in the short run. However, this has shifted uncertainty about the 
future spot price to uncertainty about the future futures prices. This issue of shifting risk 
is especially important because one cannot hedge in the long run using futures and 
investments are evaluated by looking at their long run payoffs. 
Further research should also be done linking price movements and investment 
evaluation methods with game theory. As gross margins increased, more ethanol plants 
were built and each in- creased the market quantity. However, this in turn, lowered the 
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gross margin, decreasing the number of new ethanol plants being constructed. This type 
of behavior will result in a mean-reverting gross margin process, but its empirical merits 
are limited. Linking the theory with a particular margin movement process will provide 
stronger conclusions for what was actually occurring in the market. Moreover, linking the 
theory on entry and exit to investment evaluation methods will help potential investors 
better evaluate their opportunities. 
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Chapter 3. Impacts from a Retail Grocery Acquisition: Do National and Store 
Brand Prices Respond Differently? 
The U.S. food-retailing industry is marked with increasing consolidation and 
concentration. The industry’s national four firm market concentration ratio (CR4) was 
36.4% in 2013, up from 16.8% in 1993. Additionally, the industry’s national twenty firm 
market concentration ratio (CR20) was 63.8% in 2013, up from 39.9% in 1993 (U.S. 
Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service, 2014b).22 Consolidation through 
mergers and acquisitions in the industry in recent years has been an important factor that 
contributes to increasing concentration in the food-retailing industry. Some of the recent 
merger and acquisitions include Kroger & Harris Teeter in 2013, Safeway & Albertsons 
in 2014, and Ahold & Delhaize in 2015. This increase in consolidation may allow food 
retailers to exert a degree of market power. 
An additional feature of the industry is that store brands (also known as private 
labels) have become an increasingly important player in the food-retailing marketplace. 23 
Recent trends reported by the Private Label Manufacturer Association show that sales of 
store brands have grown at an annual rate of more than 4% since 2012. Meanwhile, 
average growth for national brands was at 2%. As for total expenditures, in 2014, U.S. 
consumers spent about $62.1 billion on store brands in supermarkets, comprising 19.5% 
                                                 
22 Much of this growth was organic in nature as firms like Wal-Mart, CostCo, Target, and other retailers 
built so-called ‘greenfield’ stores. There was some consolidation (ex., SuperValu bought Albertsons and 
other stores but later divested them, several large chains in the South divested themselves of retail stores 
which were bought by local retailers), but this, by itself, did not lead to the increase in concentration. 
23 Store brands are those products that are produced, distributed, and marketed entirely by the retailer. They 
may be produced directly or through contracts. 
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of the dollar share of total supermarket sales. Accordingly, research pertaining to store 
brands has garnered substantial interest from economists and food industry professionals. 
The growth of store brands and the increased industry concentration are 
inherently related. For example, while an acquisition would contribute to industry 
concentration it could also allow the acquiring firm to increase market share of its store 
brand relative to market share of national brands. The latter effect would occur if small 
and medium size national brands cannot compete with store brands for shelf space and 
exit the market. However, the extant literature on the effects of store brand growth on 
prices and welfare does not account for the interplay between increasing grocery retailer 
concentration and the growth store brands. This essay addresses this issue by 
investigating whether increased grocery retailer concentration has differential effects on 
prices of national and store brand food products. 
Specifically, this essay investigates the following question: do store brand prices 
change more or less than national brand prices after a merger or acquisition? The answer 
to this question helps improve the understanding of the implications of growth store 
brands for food prices and welfare. Furthermore, it sheds new light on concentrated 
retailers’ store brand pricing strategy and its effect on different consumer types. For 
example, on the consumer side, store brand and national brand products serve different 
types of consumers. Low-income consumers often purchase store brand products to 
economize on their food budget (Leibtag & Kaufman, 2003). Therefore, a differential 
impact of acquisition on prices would imply differential impact on consumer types. On 
the retailer side, store brand and national brand products provide different margins for 
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retailers. Typically, retailer margins are larger for store brand products than for national 
brand products (Ailawadi & Harlam, 2004). Therefore, differential price changes 
differentially impact profits and could inform food retail managers how potential benefits 
of a merger may accrue to their business. Typically, benefits would stem from economies 
of scale or scope, better bargaining power with national brands, or exerting market power 
at the retail level. 
This study fits into two literature streams. The first stream is that of store brands. 
Much of the literature studies why retailers introduce store brands and the effects of their 
introduction on price and welfare. Recent research has begun to analyze policy and other 
structural effects on the retail grocery industry while explicitly accounting for the 
existence of store brands (Bonnet & Requillart, 2013; Jaenicke & Carlson, 2015). An 
emerging area of research analyzes price changes in national brand and store brands after 
some structural change in the market (Volpe & Lavoie, 2008; Volpe, 2014). The current 
study builds on these areas of research by analyzing the effect of a merger on store brand 
and national brand prices. 
The second stream is that of ex-post horizontal merger analyses. Several studies 
have analyzed the impact of horizontal mergers on consumer prices. Ashenfelter, Hosken, 
and Weinberg (2014) provide a brief summary of the most influential studies. However, 
only a few studies have accounted for the vertical relationships that exist between 
retailers and manufacturers. Additionally, although there is a substantial literature 
analyzing the pricing decisions made by retail food stores as discussed by Volpe, Risch, 
and Boland (2015), there has been little work done on pricing decision changes around a 
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merger event in the food retailing sector. Recent research indicates that the impact of 
mergers in this sector may be significant as noted by the studies by Hosken, Olson, and 
Smith (2012) and Allain, Chambolle, Turolloa, and Villas-Boas (2013). The current essay 
builds on this literature in two ways. First, it causally measures price changes for national 
brands and store brands after a food retailer acquisition thereby accounting for the 
vertical nature of each product. Second, due to the nature of the acquisition under study, 
price changes are identified for the acquiring retailer, not just competing retailers. 
To estimate the differential price changes this essay performs an ex-post analysis 
of a food retail acquisition in a large United States city in 2012. Nielsen scanner data at 
the UPC level is used in a difference-in-differences (DID) estimation of the differential 
impact of the acquisition in two product categories – fluid milk and Ready-To-Eat (RTE) 
cereal. These product categories are selected because they represent typical high volume, 
fast-moving product categories with different competitive environments. The acquisition 
is unique because it is a nearly complete acquisition in which the acquired retailer sold 
most of its stores and exited the market but is limited to a small geographic area. Because 
of this feature, the acquisition effects are causally identified for the acquiring retailer. 
The results show that, for the acquisition under study, prices decreased around 
0.3% for fluid milk and 0.6% for RTE cereal per unit. The overall decrease in prices 
points to significant retailer cost savings or increased competition after the acquisition. 
Furthermore, the results provide important insights into the effects of the acquisition on 
national and store brand prices in different categories. The results show that in a highly 
differentiated product category (i.e., RTE cereal) national brand prices decreased, while 
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store brand prices increased after the acquisition. Whereas in a relatively homogeneous 
product category (i.e., fluid milk), the differential effect of the acquisition on national and 
store brand prices is found to be insignificant. These results indicate that store brands can 
be an important instrument for retailers to exert market power in a wide range of 
differentiated product categories. That is, grocery retailer merger analyses should more 
directly account for the growth of store brands and other close vertical relationships in the 
market. 
The following section reviews the relevant literature. The third section first 
discusses pricing strategies in food retailing sector, and then provides an analytical 
framework for price changes after a food retail merger or acquisition. The fourth section 
describes the acquisition under study and the data used in the empirical analysis. The fifth 
section presents the methods used to obtain the estimates of price changes. The final two 
sections discuss the results and their implications, respectively. 
3.1 Literature Review 
3.1.1 Private Label Literature 
Early research on private labels examined why they are sold and where and when they 
succeed. Hoch and Banerji (1993) analyze private label market share across grocery 
categories. They find that private labels gain more market share in categories that are 
large and have high margins, fewer manufacturers, less advertising, and higher quality 
private labels (Hoch & Banerji, 1993). Mills (1995) states that the fundamental reason 
why private labels are sold by retailers is to obtain some of the profit potential from the 
vertical chain that is unavailable due to double marginalization. Double marginalization 
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occurs when successive firms in a vertical supply chain exert market power.24 This results 
in the lower quantity and higher prices for consumers in addition to lower channel profits. 
Mills (1995) further argues that as retailers introduce private labels their profits increase 
while the manufacturer’s profit decreases. Total profit of the supply chain increases. 
Private labels also reduce double marginalization from the consumer’s perspective 
resulting in a reduction in retail prices and an increase in quantity offered. 
Next, quality and price relationships between store brands and national brands 
was explored. Bontems, Monier-Dilhan, and Requillart (1999) build on Mills’ (1995) 
model by incorporating cost of quality. They find that there is an upper bound on quality 
at which the national brand manufacturer can deter the private labels entry. Additionally, 
the authors find that wholesale prices follow a U-shape curve across quality of the private 
label product implying that national brand manufacturers respond by differentiating or 
directly competing with the private label depending on its quality. Cotterill, Putsis, and 
Dhar (2000) use a demand system model to estimate how private label and national 
brands respond to each other’s pricing strategies. They find that private labels cannot gain 
market share as easily as national brands by cutting prices. Moreover, they find that 
national brand prices are not very responsive to price changes of private labels, however 
the opposite is true for private label prices responding to national brand price changes. 
Similarly, Villas-Boas (2007) estimates a simultaneous demand and supply model of the 
                                                 
24 An implicit assumption in this idea of retailers capturing profits is that these economic profits are above 
the accounting profit norm or the retailer can increase the current economic profits made by the 
manufacturer. If either assumption is not correct, the value of the retailer will not change and may decrease 
due to increased risk under integration. In the theory of the firm literature, this discussion falls under the 
make-or-buy decision made by a firm. This decision is discussed in detail in the following chapter for 
multinational food economy firms. 
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yogurt market in Chicago to investigate manufacturer-retailer pricing interactions. The 
author tests between alternative pricing interactions and finds that the market is best 
characterized by non-linear pricing by the manufacturers or significant retailer bargaining 
power. This and the earlier research show that private labels and national brands use 
different quality and pricing strategies in the food retail sector. 
As part of the research on the store brand-national brand relationship, many 
studies focused on the impact of store brand presence on prices, profits, and consumer 
welfare. Mills (1995) discussed these issues early on from a theoretical perspective. 
However, the body of literature below performed more rigorous empirical studies to 
determine price, profit, and consumer welfare impacts. An early study by Putsis (1997) 
finds that national brand prices decrease as private labels increase. This ex post analysis 
is later supported by a structural simulation analysis by Cohen and Cotterill (2011). 
Cohen and Cotterill find that prices decrease when private labels are introduced. 
Additionally, the authors find that retailer profits increase and consumer welfare 
increases. In contrast to these studies, Ward, Shimshack, Perloff, and Harris (2002) find 
that national brand prices actually increase in an ex post study of retail prices. The 
findings of Ward, Shimshack, Perloff, and Harris (2002) is also supported by Cotterill 
and Putsis (2000). More recent work has looked at breaking these effects out by category 
or type of product. In a study on determinants of organic premiums Jaenicke and Carlson 
(2015) find that private label products have a smaller organic premium than branded 
products. Additionally, the private label market share size does not decrease this organic 
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premium because there is no significant national brand pricing response to private label 
penetration in organic products. 
Recently, research has begun to analyze policy, macroeconomic, and other 
structural impacts on the retail grocery industry while explicitly accounting for the store 
brands’ competition. Bonnet and Requillart (2013) study the impact of sugar tax reform 
and an excise tax on soda prices and cost pass-through. The authors find that pass-
through of cost changes by private labels are lower in percentage terms, but the price 
changes are greater in percentage terms compared to national brands (Bonnet & 
Requillart, 2013). Turning to the impacts of macroeconomic changes, Volpe (2014) finds 
that inflationary pressure on food prices affects private label products more than national 
brands. This leads to a smaller difference between national brand and private label prices. 
Importantly, Volpe states that price increases affect low-income households more 
because they purchase private label products more. These are the households that are hurt 
most by increasing food prices because they spend more of their income on food, so the 
finding that private labels increase more than the average adds to their issues (Volpe, 
2014). 
Finally, in a closely related study, Volpe and Lavoie (2008) find that private label 
and national brand prices respond differently to a change in local food retail market 
structure. Specifically, they find that national brand prices decrease more than private 
label prices when a Wal-Mart Supercenter enters the local market. The current study 
builds on this research by looking at price changes of national brands and store brands 
after a food retail acquisition. 
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3.1.2 Horizontal Merger Literature 
There is a large empirical literature on the effects of horizontal mergers on market prices. 
In theory, the effect of a merger on prices is ambiguous due to two opposing factors. For 
concreteness, consider a merger between two close competitors in a differentiated 
product market. After the merger, the new firm would be able to set prices by taking into 
account the substitution effect between products of the merged firms.25 This would result 
in reduced competition between the products and put an upward pressure on product 
prices. Mitigating or even overriding this upward price pressure is the second factor of 
lower costs through efficiencies of scale and scope that may materialize in the larger, 
merged firm. These lower costs are passed through to the consumer to some degree. If 
costs decrease sufficiently, retail prices may actually decrease. 
Merger studies can be broken into two categories: ex-ante and ex-post studies. 
Ex-ante horizontal merger studies use simulation or structural models to predict the 
impact of mergers. For example, in a seminal article in this area, Nevo (2000) estimates 
demand for RTE cereal and then uses the estimated price elasticities of demand in a 
supply-side model of differentiated product competition. Nevo simulates two mergers 
using the supply-side model to determine the effect on prices and finds that in both cases 
prices increase but to different degrees. Smith (2004) uses this method to simulate the 
effect of various mergers in the British retail grocery industry. The author estimates 
demand for groceries at each grocery store. These stores vary by store characteristics, the 
distance from a customer to a store, and the average price for a basket of goods at each 
                                                 
25 In a homogeneous good market, a pure market share increase allows the merged firm to increase prices. 
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store. Smith finds that mergers increase retail prices in all cases and that the degree of 
price increase varies by location. Smith’s study points to the very regional and local 
nature of retail food competition (2004). 
Ex-ante analysis of mergers has a number of limitations. First, ex-ante analyses 
rely on structural assumptions of the model. Second, to measure the change in prices for 
several products across several stores creates an incredible dimensionality problem 
because the product is defined as the combination of store and brand. Finally, only 
hypothetical mergers may be studied. Ex-post analyses overcome these limitations. 
Several studies have analyzed the impact of horizontal mergers on consumer 
prices using an ex-post framework. Ashenfelter, Hosken, and Weinberg (2014) provide a 
brief summary of many of the most important studies to try to draw conclusions about the 
efficacy of anti-trust regulation of mergers. Few of these studies account for the vertical 
relationship between retailer and manufacturer. For example, research on mergers in 
gasoline sector shows the importance vertical relationships play in affecting retail prices. 
Hastings (2004) finds that increasing the presence of vertically integrated, branded gas 
stations increases gas prices, and Houde (2012) finds that prices increase after a merger 
in the Quebec City gasoline market increased the number of vertically integrated stations. 
Current ex-post food retail merger research has not taken these important vertical 
interactions into account. 
In the food retailing sector, Hosken, Olson, and Smith (2012) use an ex-post 
reduced-form analysis to estimate the effects of several mergers in major U.S. 
metropolitan areas using market level price indices. The study finds that mergers in 
  53 
already concentrated markets increase prices, while mergers in less concentrated markets 
decrease prices or have no effect. Similarly, Davis (2010) measures price changes around 
several mergers using firm-level scanner data from 1997-1999 and finds that national and 
store brand prices increase by approximately 4% and 6% on average, respectively. Allain, 
Chambolle, Turolloa, and Villas-Boas (2013) use a DID method with household purchase 
data to measure price changes after a nationwide merger between two French food 
retailers. They find that prices increase significantly for those stores in the same market 
as merging stores. The authors are unable to find causal evidence of price increases at 
merging stores, but find price increases at merging stores are correlated with the merger. 
This essay contributes to the literature first by causally measuring price changes 
for national brands and store brands after an acquisition using a dataset of grocery store 
scanner prices. In particular, using retail scanner data a difference-in-differences analysis 
is performed to measure the price effects of an acquisition ex-post. In the analysis, the 
treatment and control groups are carefully specified for the acquisition under study. The 
analysis controls for many factors that could simultaneously affect prices and include 
fixed effects for products and store locations to control for other potentially confounding 
factors that are unobserved. Furthermore, because of the unique nature of the acquisition, 
the results causally identify the effects of the acquisition on the acquiring retailer prices. 
Whereas, previous studies analyzing a nationwide merger or acquisition were able to 
causally identify the effects only on the competing retailer prices or overall food retail 
prices in affected markets. 
3.2 Food Retail Pricing Background and Merger Framework 
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3.2.1 Food Retail Pricing 
Volpe, Risch, and Boland (2015) provide an extensive review of why food retailers adjust 
prices. They categorize the reasons into four groups: input price changes, competitor 
pricing, consumer demand, and promotional pricing. Food retailers pass through input 
price changes to consumers to some degree. The rate at which input price changes pass 
through to consumers could be different depending on whether it is a price increase or 
decrease. Also, in imperfectly competitive markets each store accounts for competitor 
prices in determining its own prices. The strength of the competitor price effect depends 
on the underlying market structure and market power of competing stores. Additionally, 
retailers adjust prices in response to changing consumer demand over time. Aggregate 
changes in consumer demand across types of product categories are often slow. However, 
in the case of seasonal products, demand shifts can be sharp and regular. Finally, retailers 
heavily use promotions as a tool for adjusting prices. Promotional pricing is often short-
term in nature and is likely used in response to external changes that will likely have a 
short-term impact. Because of this, promotional price changes are qualitatively different 
than shelf price changes. In this study, shelf prices are used in the analysis because an 
acquisition reflects a long-term, structural shift in the market. As such, promotional 
pricing would be an ineffective measure to respond to such a change. 
3.2.2 Theoretical Framework 
Ashenfelter, Hosken, and Weinberg (2014) describe how antitrust enforcement policy has 
changed since the 1960s. Historically, antitrust regulators were interested solely in 
market concentration. If a proposed merger or acquisition would result in a significant 
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increase in market concentration, measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), 
then antitrust regulators would not allow it to proceed. This perspective accounted for the 
mutual dependence effects of mergers and acquisitions. Mutual dependence effects stem 
from inter-firm strategic behavior. Today, antitrust regulators use HHI changes as a 
useful indicator rather than the main measure of a proposed merger’s anticompetitive 
effects. Regulators focus more on unilateral effects of mergers and acquisitions. 
Unilateral effects are the effects that result from intra-firm strategic behavior. These latter 
effects are the focus of the following Bertrand price competition model. 
Suppose there are 𝑁 firms, each producing a subset, 𝛾𝑛, of 𝐽 differentiated goods. 
The subset, 𝛾𝑛 contains 𝑔𝑛 goods. The short-run profit of firm 𝑛 is the following: 
(14) Π𝑛 = ∑ (𝑝𝑗 − 𝑚𝑐𝑗)𝑀𝑠𝑗(𝑝) − 𝐶𝑛
𝑗∈𝛾𝑛
  
   
where 𝑝𝑗 is the price for the 𝑗
𝑡ℎ product, 𝑚𝑐𝑗 is the marginal cost of product 𝑗, 𝑀 is the 
size of the market, 𝑝 is the vector of prices for all 𝐽 goods, 𝑠𝑗(𝑝) is the market share of 
good 𝑗, and 𝐶𝑛 is firm 𝑛’s fixed cost of production. The first order conditions that solve 
the short-run profit maximization problem for firm 𝑛 are a set of 𝑔𝑛 equations with the 
following form: 
(15) 𝑠𝑗(𝑝) + ∑ (𝑝𝑘 − 𝑚𝑐𝑘)
𝜕𝑠𝑘(𝑝)
𝜕𝑝𝑗
𝑘∈𝛾𝑛
= 0        ∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝛾𝑛, 𝑜𝑟  
   
(16) 𝑝𝑗 = − [𝑠𝑗(𝑝) + ∑ (𝑝𝑟 − 𝑚𝑐𝑟)
𝜕𝑠𝑟(𝑝)
𝜕𝑝𝑗
𝑟∈𝛾𝑛,𝑟≠𝑗
]
𝜕𝑝𝑗
𝜕𝑠𝑗(𝑝)
+ 𝑚𝑐𝑗         ∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝛾𝑛.  
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Each of the 𝑁 firms have the same first-order conditions over their respective subset of 
goods. Taken together, the first-order conditions for the 𝑁 firms provide 𝐽 pricing 
equations, one for each of the 𝐽 differentiated goods. 
Equation 15 shows that a short-run profit maximizing firm accounts for all cross-
price effects across all of its products in setting its prices. That is, the firm takes into 
account the substitution effects that occur as consumers shift between its products. The 
internalization of substitution effects in optimal pricing decision often called the portfolio 
effect. 
Equation 16, a rearrangement of Equation 15, illustrates how prices change when 
a merger occurs. When two firms merge, more products are under one firm’s control. 
This increases the number of products that are being summed over. If the products are 
substitutes (
𝜕𝑠𝑟(𝑝)
𝜕𝑝𝑗
< 0), the summation term becomes more negative in Equation 16. 
This, in turn, increases the right-hand side of Equation 16. Therefore, prices for products 
offered by the merged firm increase when the products are substitutes, ceteris paribus. 
The basic model of firm competition in prices predicts that a merger increases 
prices when holding marginal costs constant. However, it is possible that marginal costs 
can be reduced through efficiency gains from economies of scale or scope.26 The 
marginal costs (𝑚𝑐𝑗) may decrease sufficiently to override any price (𝑝𝑗) increases that 
would result from capturing more of the market and internalizing substitution effects. The 
                                                 
26 Economies of scope gains from the merger in this context means that the per-unit cost of producing the 
𝑗𝑡ℎ good decreases as the firm has additional goods in its portfolio that it produces. 
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following subsection develops a framework that applies these general principles of price 
changes after a merger in the food retailing sector. 
3.2.3 Food Retail Merger Framework 
After a retail merger, retail prices change due to changes in costs and changes in market 
structure. In a food retail merger (ignoring private labels for the moment), two factors put 
pressure on prices to change in the merged firm: cost reduction and substitution effect 
internalization, respectively.27 For the merged firm, costs may decrease for two reasons. 
First, costs may decrease through typical efficiency gains through economies of scale or 
scope. Second, costs may decrease through a better bargaining position with suppliers. 
This distinction becomes important when relative price changes are discussed as each 
likely affects national brand and private label products differently. These lower costs 
could be passed through to consumers to some degree. However, as the merged firm now 
controls more stores, it will take into account more substitution effects that price changes 
have on the products it sells. This puts upward pressure on prices at the merged firm’s 
stores because they are substitutes. 
For competing firms, the story changes. Costs may increase because of a negative 
externality effect from the merging firm’s better bargaining position. This effect 
incorporates the idea that suppliers receive worse terms from large retailers, and to make 
up for this, provide worse terms to smaller retailers. The higher costs in competing firms 
may be passed onto consumers in the form of higher retail prices. Also, the competing  
 
                                                 
27 Costs may increase due to higher monitoring and coordination problems. However, mergers are often 
rationalized with expected cost efficiencies. Therefore, this theoretical discussion focuses on potential cost 
savings. 
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Table 3.1. Price pressures from a merger on merged and competing firms 
 Merged firm Competing firms 
Cost changes – Efficiency Decrease No effect 
Cost changes – Bargaining power Decrease Increase 
Substitution effect internalization Increase Follow net price change 
of merged firm 
   
firms respond to the price changes that the merged firm makes. For example, if products 
are substitutes, competing firms would raise their prices if the merged firm raises its 
prices, potentially due to the portfolio effect. Similarly, if the merged firm decreases its 
prices, potentially from efficiency gains through merger, the competing firms would 
respond by decreasing their prices. Table 3.1 summarizes the merger effects on the 
merged and competing firms’ prices. The table shows that the net price effect from the 
merger is unclear a priori for the merged and competing firms. Thus, price effects from a 
merger are suitable for empirical study. 
To extend the framework to relative price changes, the following discussion 
analyzes the portfolio effect and cost changes with respect to private labels and national 
brands. The portfolio effect impacts both private labels and national brands, but the 
magnitude of the effect is unknown and may be different for each type of product. 
Cost changes for store brand and national brand products may continue to accrue 
due to efficiency and bargaining power changes. Cost changes due to efficiency may 
accrue to the retailer across private labels and national brands differently. Some 
efficiency gains that accrue to the retailer likely accrue evenly across brands such as 
those efficiencies in headquarter functions like accounting, human resources, and retailer 
advertising. Efficiency gains from bulk discounts and better bargaining power may 
accrue to private labels and national brands to different degrees. Since there are more 
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stores, there may be significant discounts or scale economies in purchasing that the 
retailer can capture. These may be in production, distribution, storage, or other parts of 
the value chain. Bulk discounts for private labels are more likely going to be different 
from bulk discounts for national brands because the retailer is producing or contracting 
for private labels. Additionally, the proportional increase in sales of private labels for the 
private label manufacturer is likely to be more than the proportional increase in sales of 
national brands for the national brand manufacturer. Therefore, to the extent that they 
exist, cost changes due to bargaining power would likely have differential effects on 
national and store brands. 
There are six price change scenarios of interest to this study. These are 
summarized in Table 3.2. Each scenario implies something different about the relative 
magnitude of the economic forces (cost savings or the portfolio effect) at play for each 
product. 
When store brand and national brand prices both decrease, cost savings dominate 
the portfolio effect. For the reasons that are mentioned above, it is possible that store and 
national brand prices may not decrease at the same proportion. Suppose that national 
brand prices decrease more than store brand prices; this is scenario A in Table 3.2. In this 
scenario, there are two cases that may cause this. One case is that the store brand 
portfolio effect may be larger than that of national brand. This would be possible if the 
market share of store brands increases relative to share of national brands. The second 
case is that the cost savings on the national brand products may be larger than the savings 
on the store brand products. Now suppose that store brand prices decrease more than  
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Table 3.2. Relative price change scenarios and dominant economic forces 
Scenario Labels Price Change Scenario Ranking of economic forces 
A Δ𝑃𝑁𝐵 < Δ𝑃𝑃𝐿 < 0 (𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐵 + 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝐵) < (𝑃𝐸𝑃𝐿 + 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐿) < 0 
B Δ𝑃𝑃𝐿 < Δ𝑃𝑁𝐵 < 0 (𝑃𝐸𝑃𝐿 + 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐿) < (𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐵 + 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝐵) < 0 
C 0 < Δ𝑃𝑁𝐵 < Δ𝑃𝑃𝐿 0 < (𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐵 + 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝐵) < (𝑃𝐸𝑃𝐿 + 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐿) 
D 0 < Δ𝑃𝑃𝐿 < Δ𝑃𝑁𝐵 0 < (𝑃𝐸𝑃𝐿 + 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐿) < (𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐵 + 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝐵) 
E Δ𝑃𝑃𝐿 < 0 < Δ𝑃𝑁𝐵 (𝑃𝐸𝑃𝐿 + 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐿) < 0 < (𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐵 + 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝐵) 
F Δ𝑃𝑁𝐵 < 0 < Δ𝑃𝑃𝐿 (𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐵 + 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝐵) < 0 < (𝑃𝐸𝑃𝐿 + 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐿) 
   
national brand prices; this is scenario B in Table 3.2. Again there are two cases in which 
this occurs. First, the national brand portfolio effect may be larger than the store brand 
portfolio effect; or, second, the store brand products experience more cost savings than 
national brand products. The larger efficiency gains may be obtained through store brand 
production, distribution, or marketing. 
When store brand and national brand prices both increase, the portfolio effect 
dominates any efficiency gains. Again, there are two possible scenarios. In each, the 
arguments parallel the situation when both prices decrease. First, store brand prices 
increase more than national brand prices, scenario C. In this scenario the arguments are 
the same as when the national brand prices decrease more than store brand prices. 
Second, national brand prices increase more than store brand prices, scenario D. In this 
scenario the stories are the same as when store brand prices decrease more than national 
brand prices. 
Another scenario is that national brand prices increase and private label prices 
decrease after the merger, scenario E. In this case, the dominant force is likely to be the 
economies of scale in production, distribution, or marketing of private labels. The 
increase in national brand prices would indicate that portfolio effect is important. 
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However, the decrease in private label prices would indicate that gains from scale 
economies outweighs the portfolio effect for private label products. 
Lastly, it is possible that private label prices increase and national brand prices 
decrease due to the merger. In this scenario, scenario F in Table 3.2, the dominant force is 
the increased retailer market power exerted on private label products. Suppose there were 
no efficiency gains. Then, the retailer might have shrunk its margins on national brands to 
increase foot traffic (i.e., demand) and more sales in the category. Simultaneously, it 
could increase the margin on the private label generating more profit on the higher 
margin product. For example, the acquiring firm can exert more market power on the 
private label product if the number of competing store brands decreases due to the 
acquisition and/or acquiring firm’s store brand market share increases relative to national 
brand market share due to extended shelf space. The argument for the exertion of retailer 
market power in this case would be reinforced if efficiency gains exist. 
3.3 Acquisition Background and Data 
3.3.1 Large U.S. Metropolitan Food Retail Market 
In 2012, the large U.S. metropolitan area (LUSMA) where the acquisition took place was 
one of the ten largest metropolitan areas in the U.S. (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015).28 
Notably the market is very fragmented with several national and regional chains. Before 
the acquisition in 2011, the market leader had less than 20% market share, followed by 
the runner-up with less than 15% market share and the other three top five market share 
leaders each with less than 10% market share. In addition to these large chains, smaller 
                                                 
28 In order to maintain the confidentiality of the retailer, the name of the market where the acquisition took 
place is withheld. 
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grocery stores serving only the LUSMA market had a significant share of the market in 
2011 (Metro Market Studies, 2012). By 2013, after the acquisition, the market share 
leader runner-up in 2011 became the market leader with still under 20% of the market 
share, followed by the 2011 leader less than a percentage point behind. Each of the three 
other top five retailers had less than a 10% market share with two of them not in the top 
five in 2011 (Metro Market Studies, 2014). Most regional and national retailers that serve 
the LUSMA market vary prices by location which reflects spatial differences in demand 
and costs. 
3.3.2 The Acquisition 
In 2012, a large, regional supermarket chain, RA, announced it was acquiring 
approximately 60% of the stores from a small supermarket chain, RB, which served only 
the LUSMA market. In 2011, RA had nearly a quarter of its stores that were located in 
the state in the LUSMA market. Later in 2012, RA completed the purchase of all but one 
of the stores and reopened them that same month. These stores were rebranded under the 
RA brand. Of the remaining RB stores, most were sold to minor chains and the rest were 
closed. 
Before the acquisition, RA and RB pursued different pricing strategies with RB 
prices typically higher. However, both retailers followed similar macro-shifts and trends, 
such as higher milk and food prices during the 2008-2009 recession, across the time 
period of study. The acquisition did not greatly change the concentration of the top 4 
firms during the period of study. The CR4 dropped in 2013 by approximately 2 
percentage points from 2011. This decrease in CR4 looks to be attributable to the market 
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leader losing market share and the third place retailer in 2011 dropping out of the top 5. 
However, the acquisition represents a large number of stores for a single retailer in a 
single market. RA increased the number of its stores in the LUSMA market by more than 
a 25% with the acquisition. This increased its market share in the LUSMA market. 
3.3.3 Data Sources 
The current study uses Nielsen scanner data available through the Kilts Marketing Center 
at the University of Chicago to analyze product-level price changes. The scanner data 
consists of a panel of stores across the United States that has provided data to Nielsen and 
has agreed to release it to the Kilts Marketing Center. Each store has a store code that 
remains constant across time and a parent code tracking which retailer owns the store. 
These parent codes do not directly identify the retailers by name. At the store level, the 
dataset provides information on a store’s location at the county level. 
The key information in the dataset are weekly price and sales observations for 
each store from 2009-2013 at the Universal Product Code (UPC) level. For a given week, 
weighted average weekly price and total sales are recorded for all UPC. That is, a single 
unit of observation provides price and sales information for a particular week and 
product. These are referred to as a product-week observation. 
The data allows for the identification of the identical products in two different 
stores by matching UPCs. National brand products can also be identified through a brand 
description variable. To maintain anonymity of the retailer, all private label products are 
coded under a single brand, CTL BR. Because private labels are associated with the 
stores and retailers that sell them, private label products can be linked to a store’s parent 
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code. By making this link, the analysis can measure price differences across stores for the 
same retailer. That is, despite entire store brands in a product category being bundled 
together, the data differentiates between them by associating the product with the retailer 
for the product-week observations. 
The analysis focuses on two product categories – fluid milk and RTE cereal. 
These products are selected because they are typical examples of high volume, fast-
moving product categories. The product markets also exhibit different competitive 
structures. For example, milk is a relatively homogeneous product with private labels 
having a majority of sales. In contrast, RTE cereal is dominated by national brands and is 
a highly differentiated product. Additionally, these are well-studied products in the 
literature. A Google Scholar search of “fluid milk economics” and “Ready-to-Eat cereal 
economics” returns over 14,000 and over 4,000 results since 2011, respectively. Notable 
studies related to this essay include Cohen and Cotterill (2011) for fluid milk and Nevo 
(2000) for RTE cereal. 
The Nielsen scanner data is supplemented with U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) data by county to describe the market conditions for each store. These 
include variables such as per capita income, total population, and total county income. 
Table 3.3 contains the Nielsen scanner data variables and BEA market variables and their 
definitions. 
3.4 Methods 
A naïve approach to measure price changes for national brand and store brand products 
due to RA acquiring RB is to measure the average difference in the prices for RA stores  
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Table 3.3. Nielsen Retail Scanner dataset and market characteristics variables 
Variable Definition Source 
store_id Unique store identifier number Nielsen 
parent_code Unique code for the retailer who owns a store Nielsen 
fips_county Code identifying the county a store is located in Nielsen 
DMA Code identifying the Nielsen market the store is located in Nielsen 
UPC UPC code for the product Nielsen 
week Identifies the week during which transaction data was 
collected  
Nielsen 
price Weighted average price of the product for the week Nielsen 
units Number of units sold during the week Nielsen 
stores Number of food stores present in the county in Nielsen 
dataset 
Nielsen 
county_pop Population of a county BEA 
county_PCinc County per capita income BEA 
   
in the LUSMA before and after the acquisition. However, this assumes that the 
counterfactual price change is zero, which is unlikely to be accurate as prices may also 
change due to other factors that affect demand or supply conditions in the market. A more 
plausible counterfactual is constructed by using price changes in RA stores not in the 
LUSMA market. Specifically, the counterfactual in this essay uses price changes in a 
similar market that is unaffected from the acquisition to account for changes in the 
economic environment. This approach is commonly referred to as the difference-in-
difference (DID) identification strategy. 
There are a number of advantages in using the DID identification strategy to study 
the acquisition in the LUSMA market. First, the only major change occurring in the 
LUSMA grocery market during the study is the acquisition, which suggests, to the extent 
that they exist, the confounding effects of other changes in the LUSMA market are 
potentially small. For example, no other major shocks to the competitive environment 
such as entry by a new store or an exit are observed. Additionally, the geographic price 
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variation allows for the use of price changes in other locations as counterfactual to price 
changes in the LUSMA. By using the DID identification strategy and controlling for 
other market factors that may be changing between the LUSMA and non-LUSMA 
markets in the same state and before and after the acquisition, the analysis obtains a 
causal estimate of national brand and private label price changes due to the acquisition. 
In general, the DID identification strategy begins with a treatment, observations 
before and after treatment, and groups that received and did not receive the treatment. In 
the case of this study, the treatment is the acquisition (𝑇), the observations before the 
treatment are prices for product 𝑗 at store 𝑖 before the acquisition (𝑝𝑖𝑗0), and the 
observations after the treatment are prices for product 𝑗 at store 𝑖 after the acquisition 
(𝑝𝑖𝑗1). For the basic DID estimate, the treatment group consists of stores in a market that 
was affected by the acquisition (𝑇 = 1), and the control group consists of stores in nearby 
markets that were not affected by the acquisition (𝑇 = 0). The pure DID estimate of the 
effect of the acquisition is the following: 
(17) 𝐸[𝑝𝑖𝑗1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑗0|𝑇 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑝𝑖𝑗1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑗0|𝑇 = 0].  
   
In the pure DID identification strategy, an important assumption is that the 
assignment to treatment, being a store in the LUSMA, is uncorrelated with price changes. 
This assumption is tenuous for the case of retail acquisitions if store locations are 
determined based on current and expected local demand and other market factors. For 
example, stores located in rural areas may provide a different product-price mix over time 
than stores in urban areas. In other words, the acquisition decision can be based on the 
location characteristics. To account for this endogenous acquisition decision the analysis 
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uses a regression DID model which includes store, product, and market characteristics in 
the analysis to control for the differences between locations. The following subsections 
detail the implementation of the DID identification strategy to the current study. 
3.4.1 Treatment and Control Group Selection Framework 
The practical delineation of stores into treatment and control groups is important for 
ensuring that the control group is a good representation of the treatment group’s 
counterfactual. The treatment group should include all stores that were affected, directly 
or indirectly, from the acquisition. The control group should include only those stores 
that are not affected by the acquisition. 
A conceptual division of the net price effects from a food retailer acquisition by 
market and store type can be useful in determining appropriate treatment and control 
groups for empirical work. The first division is by market. There are within market 
effects and across market spillovers. The within market effects are composed of cost 
changes and substitution effect internalization.29 These affect stores in the markets where 
the acquisition occurred. There are direct, within market effects that affect the acquiring 
firm’s stores, and there are indirect, within market effects that affect competing firms’ 
stores in the markets where the acquisition occurred. The across market spillovers are 
benefits and costs accruing to retailers’ stores in other markets because they compete 
with the acquiring retailer. Assuming efficiency gains or losses in these stores because of 
the acquisition complicates the problem while the argument or evidence is weak. To 
avoid confusion, only direct effects of the acquisition are analyzed. 
                                                 
29 See the Food Retail Merger Framework sub-section for more detail about these channels. 
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In the LUSMA acquisition case, direct acquisition effects are felt by RA stores in 
the LUSMA. Stores in the LUSMA competing with RA experience indirect acquisition 
effects. RA stores and other retailers’ stores not in the LUSMA may experience across 
market spillovers.  
The following is an example to provide concreteness to the above discussion. 
Suppose there are four retailers, retailers A, B, C, and D, and two markets, market 1 and 
2. Suppose, as is the case in this study, retailer A acquires retailer B. Furthermore, 
suppose retailer B has stores only in market 1 and retailer A has stores in markets 1 and 
2. Additionally, suppose retailer C has stores in market 1 and 2, and retailer D has stores 
only in market 2. Then, retailer A is the only retailer to experience direct within market 
effects. Retailer C is the only retailer to experience indirect within market effects. 
Retailer A and retailer C also experience across market spillovers because they are the 
acquiring store and compete with the acquiring store in market 1, respectively. Finally, 
retailer D experiences across market spillovers also because it competes with retailers A 
and C only in market 2. 
These conceptual effects delineate treatment from control groups by illustrating 
which stores may be affected (treated) by the acquisition. In general, all of these effects 
and spillovers may be non-zero. However, different acquisitions and mergers have 
different magnitudes on each of the effects. In the LUSMA acquisition under study, the 
baseline analysis assumes that the across market spillovers are zero. Therefore, the 
treatment effects obtained from the DID method are composed of within-market effects 
only. 
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Previous research has not been able to maintain the assumption that across market 
spillovers are zero within the merging or acquiring firms (Allain, Chambolle, Turolloa, & 
Villas-Boas, 2013). This acquisition is unique in that the acquiring firm makes a near 
complete acquisition of the acquired firm, but the acquisition is isolated geographically 
and is relatively small compared to the overall size of the retailer and the national market. 
These characteristics of the acquisition imply that across market spillovers will be very 
small if present. 
3.4.2 Market Definition 
Market definitions are a combination of the county and the Nielsen market delineation. 
Specifically, the LUSMA market (the treated market) is defined as the Nielsen LUSMA 
market. Other food retail merger studies have used similar, traditional market level 
definitions (Hosken, Olson, & Smith, 2012). To define the non-LUSMA market, a one 
county buffer around each county in the Nielsen LUSMA market is used and define all 
other counties in the same state as the non-LUSMA market. The reasoning for using 
buffer counties is as follows. Because the store location is given at the county level in the 
Nielsen dataset, the store’s location within the county is unknown. Therefore, the data 
does not reveal how geographically close two stores are to one another even if they are in 
different, but adjacent counties. Therefore, the analysis conservatively uses a buffer 
county between the LUSMA and non-LUSMA counties.30 Control stores must be in a 
non-buffer county outside of the LUSMA. Those stores in buffer counties are not used in 
the analysis. 
                                                 
30 Robustness checks include dropping this buffer. 
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3.4.3 Empirical Model and Treatment Effects 
The analysis provides average treatment effects of the acquisition (acquisition effects) for 
national brand and store brand milk and RTE cereal products in RA stores.3132 The 
treatment group are RA stores in the LUSMA, and the control group are RA stores not in 
the LUSMA.33 These control groups are valid under the assumption that there are no 
across market spillovers. The average treatment effect of the acquisition on all products is 
the weighted average of the separate private label and national brand acquisition effects. 
Specifically, the control variables are product-store-quarter fixed effects and time-
varying, county-level market characteristics. Product-quarter-store fixed effects control 
for a number of unobserved confounding factors. First, consider just product-store fixed 
effects; these control for time-invariant product and store characteristics like product 
loyalty and store location. Including quarter fixed effects into the product-store fixed 
effects now controls for time-variant product and store characteristics in addition to time-
invariant characteristics. Time-variant product characteristics include recipe or quality 
changes and time-variant store characteristics include store expansions, renovations, or 
changes in services (e.g., deli counters, wine advisor, etc.). Time-variant county 
characteristics such as per-capita income and population are included to control for 
changes in market demand and the number of food stores to control for changes in 
competition.34 The following equation provides the DID treatment effects: 
                                                 
31 The following empirical models are run separately for milk and RTE cereal. 
32 The effect on store prices for retailers with stores only in (outside of) the LUSMA cannot be identified 
because a counterfactual cannot be created with stores outside of (in) the LUSMA market. 
33 No acquired stores are used in the baseline analysis because of a structural change between retailer 
management would confound the effects of pure market power changes. 
34 The analysis can additionally control for potential significant differences across the LUSMA and non-
LUSMA stores by estimating pre-acquisition price trends for the control and treatment groups. This allows 
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(18) 
ln(𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐴𝑡 + 𝛾(𝐴𝑡 × 𝑆𝐵𝑗) + 𝛿1(𝐴𝑡 × 𝑇𝑖) + 𝛿2(𝐴𝑡 × 𝑇𝑖 × 𝑆𝐵𝑗)
+ 𝜃′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜆𝑘𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐾=𝑖×𝑗×𝑡
𝑘=1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡. 
 
   
where ln(𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡) is the natural log price for product 𝑗 at store 𝑖 in time period 𝑡, 𝑆𝐵𝑗 equals 
1 if product 𝑗 is a store brand and 0 if not,  𝑇𝑖 equals 1 if store 𝑖 is in the LUSMA and 0 if 
not, and  𝐴𝑡 equals 1 if the observation is after the acquisition period and 0 otherwise. 𝑿𝒊𝒕 
is a vector of market characteristics for store 𝑖. 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 are product-quarter-store fixed 
effects.  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the error term that is assumed to be normally distributed. The terms, 𝑿𝒊𝒕 
and 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 are used to control for market characteristics, and product and store 
characteristics that may change overtime. 
The parameter 𝛽 measures the average change in national brand prices after the 
acquisition in RA stores outside the LUSMA. Similarly, 𝛾 measures the difference in the 
average change in prices after the acquisition between national brands and store brands in 
RA stores outside the LUSMA. 
The estimates of acquisition effects are obtained from 𝛿𝑘 (𝑘 = 1,2). The 
acquisition effect on national brand prices (Δ𝑃𝑁𝐵) is measured by parameter 𝛿1 because 
national brands are the reference group for the 𝑆𝐵𝑗 dummy variable. The difference in 
store brand and national brand acquisition effects is measured by parameter 𝛿2. 
Therefore, the acquisition effect on store brand prices (Δ𝑃𝑃𝐿) is obtained by summing 
parameters 𝛿1 and 𝛿2. The overall acquisition effect is the weighted average of 𝛿1 and 
                                                 
for time-varying price trends that are not controlled for by product-quarter-store fixed effects and market 
characteristics. However, this imposes an additional assumption that these are long-run, structural trends 
which is unlikely to hold. Therefore, the analysis does not include these additional controls in the analysis. 
Results from alternative model specifications are available upon request. 
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𝛿1 + 𝛿2 with the weights being the share of national brand price-week observations and 
store brand price-week observations, respectively. This estimate is obtained by running 
the following regression: 
(19) ln(𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐴𝑡 + 𝛿(𝐴𝑡 × 𝑇𝑖) + 𝜃
′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜆𝑘𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐾=𝑖×𝑗×𝑡
𝑘=1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡.  
   
The estimate of the overall acquisition effect is 𝛿. 
3.4.4 Data Implementation 
To maintain a consistent and representative sample across time, products with infrequent 
observations are removed. Specifically, the analysis only includes UPCs that have sales 
in every month. This is important because the DID method requires price observations for 
the same UPC-store combination before and after the acquisition. Moreover, this ensures 
that the results are not driven by outliers and unpopular products. Also, in order to have a 
balanced dataset, the final dataset includes the same number of months before and after 
the acquired stores reopen. Finally, to maintain a consistent sample across the treatment 
and control groups, products that are not sold in both the treatment and control areas are 
removed. This ensures that only those products that are directly comparable across 
groups are included. 
Leading up to the stores changing ownership, RA and RB store prices may change 
in ways that would bias the true acquisition effect. These are anticipation effects. These 
include RB reducing prices on products to clear inventory before the stores are officially 
sold. Alternatively, RA stores may reduce prices after negotiations to indicate to anti-trust 
regulators that the acquisition will not negatively affect consumers. These distortions 
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would distort the price difference before the acquisition and bias the acquisition effect 
estimates from the DID analysis. In order to keep the data clean from anticipation effects, 
the final dataset removes observations leading up to the acquisition. Also, to ensure 
transition effects after the acquisition are not included, the data cleaning procedure drops 
observations immediately after the RB stores re-open. 
Four buffer windows are considered. In this discussion, “the acquisition” refers to 
the month in which the stores close and reopen. The first buffer removes two months of 
data prior to the acquisition and two months after the acquisition. The second buffer 
removes four months prior to and after the acquisition. The third buffer removes six 
months of data on each side of the acquisition. Finally, the fourth buffer removes eight 
months on before and eight months after the acquisition. These buffer windows leave 
approximately a year of data after the merger, so these acquisition effects are short-term 
effects. This means that other long-run structural changes that occur in the market will 
not confound the estimates. 
3.4.5 Testing the Significance and Equivalence of Relative Price Changes 
Tests on 𝛿, 𝛿1, and 𝛿1 + 𝛿2 are performed to determine if the overall, national brand, and 
store brand acquisition effects are significant, respectively. These tests determine if the 
acquisition had a significant effect on prices. Table 3.1 of the analytical framework 
provides no clear predictions of the treatment effects’ qualitative signs. To determine if 
national brand and private label prices change differently the analysis tests if 𝛿2 is 
significantly different from zero. Here again, the theory does not provide any predictions 
a priori about the results from this test. 
  74 
Table 3.4. Empirical tests and their descriptions 
Empirical 
test 
Description 
𝛿1 = 0 
𝛿1 + 𝛿2 = 0 
Tests if the acquisition had an effect on any of the prices individually 
𝛿 = 0 Tests if the acquisition affected prices at RA stores on average 
𝛿2 = 0 Tests if store brand price changes are the same as national brand price 
changes 
  
Table 3.4 presents description of empirical tests performed on interaction 
parameters and the corresponding insights they reveal. In Table 3.4, the first two sets of 
tests determine if the acquisition had a significant impact on prices in RA stores in the 
LUSMA. The first set determines if it had any effect on store brands or national brands 
individually, while the second test determines if it had an overall impact on prices. The 
third test determines if store brand and national brand prices changed differently. 
For concreteness, consider the following example. Let 𝛿1 < 0, 𝛿2 > 0, and 𝛿1 +
𝛿2 > 0. This means that Δ𝑃𝑃𝐿 > 0 > Δ𝑃𝑁𝐵 in RA stores in the LUSMA, which 
corresponds to sixth row of Table 3.2. The story is then retailer market power as 
described in detail in the food retailing framework section. 
3.4.6 Robustness Checks 
To analyze how results of the baseline model change by altering some of the maintained 
hypotheses, five robustness checks are performed. First, the robustness check analysis 
determines if removing one-county buffer around the LUSMA from baseline analysis 
makes any difference on the results. Second, the analysis checks if the results 
significantly change when acquired stores are included in the treatment group. Adding 
the data from acquired stores might affect the results significantly because the stores 
changed format. Third, the robustness check analysis determines if using weighted prices 
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changes the acquisition effects where the weights are each UPC’s share of sales. 
Weighting will reduce the impact of less popular products. Finally, three robustness 
checks investigate how sensitive the results are to the buffer around the time of 
acquisition. These check the effects from excluding data two, four, and six months before 
and after the acquired stores reopen. The baseline case excludes data for the 8 months 
before and after the acquired stores reopen.35 
3.4.7 Summary Statistics 
The key identifying assumption of the DID approach is that the price trends for the 
treatment and control groups would have been the same in the absence of the acquisition. 
This assumption implies that a common price trend exists in the pre-acquisition period 
for the treatment and control groups. Figure 3.1 contains graphs for average milk and 
RTE cereal prices weighted by sales for the balanced dataset by market (the LUSMA or 
non-LUSMA) and brand type (national brand and store brand).36 The top two panels 
contain milk prices, and the bottom two panels contain RTE cereal prices. The two left 
panels contain national brand prices, and the right two panels contain store brand prices. 
This figure shows that national brand and store brand milk prices track each other closely 
between the LUSMA and non-LUSMA stores. Also, there is much more volatility after 
the acquisition in store brand milk prices in the LUSMA. For RTE cereal, both national 
brand and store brand prices seem to follow each other well across markets. However, 
RTE cereal prices are more volatile than milk prices. This may be due to more  
                                                 
35 See the Data section for more details on the acquisition buffers. 
36 Data from the acquisition buffer period has been excluded. The straight line links the last pre-acquisition 
price before the buffer to the first post-acquisition price after the buffer. 
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Figure 3.1. Average milk and RTE cereal prices by market and brand type, Balanced 
dataset 
promotions being run on these products or because milk is more of a commodity. Overall, 
store brands and national brands follow each other closely across the LUSMA and non-
LUSMA for both products in the pre-acquisition time period. These trends provide strong 
evidence that the common trend assumption holds. 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 contain summary statistics of data for milk and RTE cereal, 
respectively. In the top panel, summary statistics for all stores, just the treated stores, and 
just the control stores are presented in the first three columns, respectively.37 
                                                 
37 The bottom panel contains raw difference-in-difference estimates of the acquisition effect. These 
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Table 3.5. Summary statistics by treatment type – Milk 
County 
Characteristics 
Overall Treatment Control 
Population 279,739 
(34,760) 
639,458 
(78,174) 
135,852 
(14,089) 
Per Capita Income 41,642 
(993) 
51,257 
(2,192) 
37,796 
(562) 
Food Stores 9.7 
(1.36) 
25.1 
(2.73) 
3.6 
(.50) 
Store 
Characteristics 
Overall Treatment Control 
RA Stores 121 66 55 
Product 
Characteristics 
Overall Treatment Control 
Product Type Total NBa SBb Total NB SB Total NB SB 
Products 85 68 17 85 68 17 85 68 17 
Observations 
(1,000s) 
407.7 269.9 137.8 240.0 164.2 75.8 167.8 105.8 62.0 
Units Sold (Mill) 29.7 9.6 20.1 18.0 6.5 11.5 11.8 3.2 8.6 
Sales (Mill $) 85.9 30.8 55.1 51.9 20.4 31.6 34.0 10.4 23.5 
Units Sold 2013 
(Mill) 
13.4 4.3 9.1 8.0 2.9 5.2 5.4 1.4 4.0 
Share of units sold 100% 32.3% 67.7% 60.3% 35.9% 64.1% 39.7% 26.8% 73.2% 
Share of sales 100% 35.9% 64.1% 60.5% 39.3% 60.7% 39.5% 30.7% 69.3% 
Price Statistics Overall Treatment Control 
Product Type Total NB SB Total NB SB Total NB SB 
Pre-merger Price 
per unit ($) 
3.28 
(.003) 
3.64 
(.003) 
2.57 
(.004) 
3.29 
(.004) 
3.62 
(.004) 
2.58 
(.005) 
3.26 
(.004) 
3.67 
(.005) 
2.57 
(.006) 
Post-merger Price 
per unit ($) 
3.39 
(.003) 
3.72 
(.003) 
2.75 
(.005) 
3.40 
(.004) 
3.69 
(.004) 
2.76 
(.007) 
3.38 
(.004) 
3.75 
(.005) 
2.74 
(.008) 
Price Change per 
unit ($) 
.11*** 
(.004) 
.08*** 
(.005) 
.18*** 
(.007) 
.11*** 
(.005) 
.08*** 
(.006) 
.18*** 
(.009) 
.12*** 
(.006) 
.09*** 
(.007) 
.17*** 
(.010) 
Difference-in-
Difference 
Total NB SB 
DID ($) -.008 
(.008) 
-.010 
(.008) 
.011 
(.015) 
DID (Log Price) -.005*** 
(.002) 
-.005** 
(.002) 
-.005 
(.004) 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Numbers not in parentheses are averages if there is a 
corresponding standard error underneath it, while those without standard errors are totals or shares as 
indicated by the row name. Asterisks indicate statistical significance only in the price change row. ***, **, 
and * means there was a significant price change at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The data 
used for these statistics are observations in the balanced dataset with an 8-month acquisition buffer, buffer 
counties excluded from the treatment and control, and acquired stores are excluded from the treatment and 
control. 
a. NB stands for national brands. 
b. SB stands for store brands. 
  
                                                 
estimates will be discussed in the results section. 
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Table 3.6. Summary statistics by treatment type – RTE Cereal 
County 
Characteristics 
Overall Treatment Control 
Population 279,739 
(34,760) 
639,458 
(78,174) 
135,852 
(14,089) 
Per Capita 
Income 
41,642 
(993) 
51,257 
(2,192) 
37,796 
(562) 
Retail Stores 9.7 
(1.36) 
25.1 
(2.73) 
3.6 
(.50) 
Store 
Characteristics 
Overall Treatment Control 
RA Stores 119 66 53 
Product 
Characteristics 
Overall Treatment Control 
Product Type Total NB SB Total NB SB Total NB SB 
Products 154 121 33 154 121 33 154 121 33 
Observations 
(1,000s) 
1,005.7 754.2 251.5 563.5 425.2 138.3 442.2 329.0 113.2 
Units Sold 
(Mill) 
14.1 11.9 2.2 7.9 6.8 1.2 6.1 5.1 1.0 
Sales (Mill $) 41.5 36.8 4.7 23.7 21.1 2.6 17.9 15.7 2.2 
Units Sold 2013 
(Mill) 
6.4 5.4 1.0 3.6 3.1 0.5 2.8 2.3 0.4 
Share of units 
sold 
100% 84.5% 15.5% 56.3% 85.4% 14.6% 43.7% 83.5% 16.5% 
Share of sales 100% 88.6% 11.4% 57.0% 89.2% 10.8% 43.0% 87.8% 12.2% 
Price Statistics Overall Treatment Control 
Product Type Total NB SB Total NB SB Total NB SB 
Pre-merger Price 
per unit ($) 
3.08 
(.001) 
3.38 
(.001) 
2.19 
(.002) 
3.12 
(.002) 
3.42 
(.001) 
2.20 
(.003) 
3.03 
(.002) 
3.32 
(.001) 
2.18 
(.003) 
Post-merger 
Price per unit ($) 
3.11 
(.001) 
3.39 
(.001) 
2.26 
(.002) 
3.14 
(.002) 
3.42 
(.001) 
2.27 
(.003) 
3.07 
(.002) 
3.35 
(.001) 
2.24 
(.003) 
Price Change 
per unit ($) 
.03*** 
(.002) 
.01*** 
(.001) 
.07*** 
(.003) 
.03*** 
(.002) 
.00* 
(.002) 
.08*** 
(.004) 
.04*** 
(.002) 
.03*** 
(.002) 
.06*** 
(.004) 
Difference-in-
Difference 
Total NB SB 
DID ($) -.012*** 
(.003) 
-.024*** 
(.003) 
.017*** 
(.006) 
DID (Log Price) -.003*** 
(.001) 
-.008*** 
(.001) 
.009*** 
(.003) 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Numbers not in parentheses are averages if there is a 
corresponding standard error underneath it, while those without standard errors are totals or shares as 
indicated by the row name. Asterisks indicate statistical significance only in the price change row. ***, **, 
and * means there was a significant price change at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The data 
used for these statistics are observations in the balanced dataset with an 8-month acquisition buffer, buffer 
counties excluded from the treatment and control, and acquired stores are excluded from the treatment and 
control. 
a. NB stands for national brands. 
b. SB stands for store brands. 
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The county characteristics, summarized in the first three statistics, are the same 
across both tables. The statistics show that the average treated county has a much larger 
population, higher per capita income, and more food stores. This is expected because the 
treated counties are around the LUSMA metropolitan area. It also clearly shows that the 
country characteristics should be included in the econometric model because they display 
variation across time and treatment status. Note that there are similar shares of 
observations across treatment and control with slightly more data coming from treated 
areas. 
A close inspection of Table 3.5 reveals a number of important aspects of the milk 
category. First, the table shows that milk is a large and important segment. There are 85 
products that had sales every month in the balanced dataset excluding the buffer time 
period with just under 30 million units being sold totaling nearly $86 million in sales. 
Next, note that a majority of the units sold and sales come from private labels. 
Additionally, these shares are fairly similar across the treatment and control stores. 
Finally, the table shows that milk prices increased after the acquisition and more so for 
store brands than for national brands. Store brand milk prices increased more in treatment 
stores, while national brand milk prices increased more in the control stores. 
Similarly, Table 3.6 reveals important aspects of the RTE cereal category. First, 
RTE cereal is a large and important segment. There are nearly 120 products that had sales 
every month in the balanced dataset excluding the buffer time period. Approximately 14 
million units were sold bringing in sales of $41.5 million. Second, the RTE cereal 
category is dominated by national brands. Approximately 85% of the units sold are 
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national brands, and nearly 90% of sales are from national brands. These shares are 
similar across both treatment and control stores. Finally, prices have increased after the 
acquisition with store brands increasing more than national brands. Like milk prices, RTE 
cereal national brand prices increased more in control stores than treatment stores, and 
store brand prices increased more in treatment stores than in control stores. 
3.5 Results 
The differences in price changes discussed in the summary statistics section above are 
precisely the pure DID estimates. These are contained in the bottom panels of Table 3.5 
and Table 3.6. The pure DID estimates indicate that the acquisition decreased prices 
overall for both milk and RTE cereal. However, this decrease was only significant for 
RTE cereal prices. Moreover, the prices changed differently for national brands and 
private labels in the RTE cereal category, while price changes were the same for national 
brand and private label milk. 
Specifically, the results show that the acquisition lowered the average price per 
unit of milk and RTE cereal products by just under and just over one cent, respectively. 
The second row of the bottom panel provides DID estimates of the logged prices which 
can be interpreted as percentage changes. These indicate that the prices decreased by 
0.5% for milk and 0.3% for RTE cereal. For milk, both the national brand and private 
label prices decrease by 0.5%. These are very similar price drops, so the acquisition 
seems to affect national brand and private label milk products similarly. RTE cereal 
provides a stark contrast to the milk. For RTE cereal products, the national brand and 
private label products change in different directions. The national brand prices decrease 
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by 0.8% and the private label products increase by 0.9 %. While these differences imply 
that the acquisition affected national brand and private label prices differently in the RTE 
cereal category, it should be noted that the pure DID estimates are not controlling for any 
confounding factors that could be happening at the same time as the acquisition. That is, 
these pure DID estimates are likely to be biased because they do not account for any 
market characteristics, time buffers, fixed effects, or other controls. The regression DID 
analysis incorporates these controls. 
Table 3.7 contains the estimated acquisition effects for milk and RTE cereal from 
the empirical DID regression model specifications. The top panel contains results for 
milk and the bottom panel contains results for RTE cereal. Odd numbered models obtain 
overall acquisition effects and even numbered models provide acquisition effects by 
brand type. Moving from left to right more fixed effects are added to the model. Once 
fixed effects are included, the R2 drops dramatically because it is now a within-R2. This 
measures the amount of price variation explained within each of the fixed effects rather 
than the overall fit. The overall R2 is likely to be very high because of the number of 
observations. The final two specifications have all controls and fixed effects added to the 
model. These last two specifications are the preferred models. 
For milk, the overall acquisition effect is somewhere around a 0.3% price 
decrease. There is no significant difference between store brand and national brand 
acquisition effects as seen by the SB-NB difference parameter being insignificant. This 
puts the milk changes in scenarios A or B from Table 3.2. These price changes are not 
extremely important in magnitude economically. For 2013, approximately 8.0 million  
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Table 3.7. Results from the DID specification 
Modela 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Acquisition Effects – Milk 
Overall -.001 
(.0035) 
 -.003 
(.0025) 
 -.003 
(.0023) 
 
NB  .004 
(.0034) 
 -.002 
(.0027) 
 -.002 
(.0027) 
SB  .004 
(.0045) 
 -.002 
(.0039) 
 -.002 
(.0039) 
SB-NB 
difference 
 -.000 
(.0042) 
 -.000 
(.0042) 
 -.000 
(.0042) 
Model Statistics 
R2b .002 .144 .029 .031 .038 .040 
Obs 407,743 407,743 407,743 407,743 407,743 407,743 
Acquisition Effects – RTE Cereal 
Overall -.004*** 
(.0016) 
 -.006*** 
(.0013) 
 -.006*** 
(.0013) 
 
NB  -.000 
(.0013) 
 -.010*** 
(.0013) 
 -.010*** 
(.0013) 
SB  .017*** 
(.0027) 
 .004 
(.0025) 
 .004 
(.0025) 
SB-NB 
difference 
 .017*** 
(.0028) 
 .013*** 
(.0025) 
 .013*** 
(.0025) 
Model Statistics 
R2b .0045 0.402 .0017 .0037 .0049 .0068 
Obs 1,005,683 1,005,683 1,005,683 1,005,683 1,005,683 1,005,683 
Controls & Fixed Effects 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Unit FE - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE - - - - Yes Yes 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered at the store-product level. All analyses use an eight month buffer around the acquisition. 
a. Odd numbered models provide overall effects of the acquisition. Even numbered models provide effects 
of the acquisition by product type. 
b. The R2 for regressions including fixed-effects are within R2. They do not account for overall fit of the 
model. Therefore, these within R2 can only be compared with other within R2. They cannot be compared 
with the R2 from the regressions without fixed-effects. 
units of milk were sold in RA LUSMA stores. From the pre-merger average price of 
$3.29, this price decrease amounts to around a $78,960 reduction in sales just for milk 
products ignoring changes in unit sales. 
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For RTE cereal, the overall acquisition effect is around a 0.6% price decrease. In 
contrast to milk, the acquisition effects are significantly different for national brands and 
store brands. National brand prices decrease by approximately 1%, but store brand prices 
increase by approximately 0.4% and is insignificant. The difference between these 
acquisition effects of 1.3% is economically and statistically significant. These results put 
the RTE cereal price changes in scenario F from Table 3.2. In 2013, treated stores sold 
3.6 million units of RTE cereal with 3.1 million being national brand products and 0.5 
million being store brand products. From the overall pre-merger price of $3.12, the 
overall acquisition effect price decrease amounts to around a $67,392 reduction in sales 
just for RTE cereal. For national brands, the reduction in sales is even larger; from the 
pre-merger price of $3.42, this price decrease amounts to around a $106,020 reduction in 
sales. However, this reduction in sales is partially offset by the increase in price for store 
brand products. From the pre-merger price of $2.20, the price increase results in around a 
$4,400 sales increase. 
Table 3.8 contains the results from robustness checks to determine how the results 
change with different assumptions. Under all model specifications the analysis includes 
product-quarter-store and estimates acquisition effects by product type. The first column 
of results contains the final specification from the main results in Table 3.7. Subsequent 
columns check the one county buffer around the LUSMA, the exclusion of acquired store 
observations, weighting prices by their sales share, and altering the buffer around the 
acquisition time period, respectively. These results indicate that the final baseline 
specification is fairly robust to these changes. For milk, the most notable result is that the  
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Table 3.8. Acquisition effects under various robustness checks 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Acquisition Effects – Milk 
NB -..002 
(.0027) 
-.002 
(.0025) 
-.003 
(.0028) 
-.002 
(.0027) 
.000 
(.0021) 
-.001 
(.0023) 
-.001 
(.0026) 
SB -.002 
(.0039) 
-.005 
(.0037) 
-.011** 
(.0044) 
-.002 
(.0039) 
-.004 
(.0033) 
-.003 
(.0038) 
-.002 
(.0041) 
SB-NB 
difference 
-.000 
(.0042) 
-.002 
(.0040) 
-.007 
(.0048) 
-.000 
(.0044) 
-.004 
(.0038) 
-.003 
(.0043) 
-.000 
(.0046) 
Model Statistics 
R2 .040 .042 .027 .040 .036 .032 .034 
Observations 407,743 450,988 433,961 407,743 559,975 483,107 400,640 
Acquisition Effects – RTE Cereal 
NB -.010*** 
(.0013) 
-.009*** 
(.0012) 
-.011*** 
(.0013) 
-.010*** 
(.0013) 
-.009*** 
(.0010) 
-.010*** 
(.0011) 
-.012*** 
(.0012) 
SB .004 
(.0025) 
.002 
(.0023) 
.011*** 
(.0026) 
.004 
(.0025) 
.005*** 
(.0018) 
.006*** 
(.0021) 
.004* 
(.0025) 
SB-NB 
difference 
.013*** 
(.0025) 
.010*** 
(.0023) 
.022*** 
(.0026) 
.013*** 
(.0025) 
.014*** 
(.0020) 
.016*** 
(.0023) 
.017*** 
(.0026) 
Model Statistics 
R2 .0068 .0071 .0070 .0068 .0043 .0043 .0069 
Observations 1,005,683 1,124,025 1.086,073 1,005,683 1,326,662 1,163,571 975,034 
Robustness Checks 
County 
Buffer 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exclude 
Acquired 
Stores 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dependent 
Variablea 
𝑙(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) 𝑙(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) 𝑙(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) 𝑙(𝑤𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) 𝑙(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) 𝑙(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) 𝑙(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) 
Acquisition 
Bufferb 
8 Mo. 8 Mo. 8 Mo. 8 Mo. 2 Mo. 4 Mo. 6 Mo. 
Notes:  *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered at the store-product level. 
a. The dependent variable, 𝑙(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒), is the natural log of a price for a UPC, store, and week. The dependent 
variable, 𝑙(𝑤𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒), is the natural log of the weighted price for a UPC, store, and week. The weighted price 
is the price for a UPC, store, and week multiplied by its average share of weekly sales in that product 
module for the pre-merger period. 
b. Acquisition buffer refers to the number of months removed from analysis before and after the acquired 
stores were converted to RA store formats. 2 Mo. indicates that the two months before and the two months 
after this conversion were removed, and so on. 
difference in acquisition effects changes slightly, but remains statistically and 
economically insignificant. Additionally, when acquired stores enter, the store brand 
price effect is negative and significant. Due to the change in format, the results using this 
do not make sense logically. For RTE cereal, the most notable result is that the increase 
in store brand prices becomes significant when changing the buffer around the 
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acquisition. However, the difference between the national brand and store brand 
acquisition effects remains very robust. 
These results provide insights into the relative importance of the economic forces 
during and just after the acquisition under study. First, the results indicate that cost 
savings potentially outweigh market power price increases on average in this acquisition 
given the theoretical models because overall acquisition effects are negative. Second, the 
results show that it is important to break down price changes into national brand and store 
brand categories. This is apparent especially from the RTE cereal results where the 
national brand and store brand acquisition effects are significantly different. 
Finally, the results suggest that the competitive environment of the product affects 
the size and direction of the acquisition effect when broken down by national brands and 
store brands. A plausible explanation to why the difference in estimated acquisition 
effects on store and national brand milk prices is not different is that milk is a relatively 
homogeneous product. There is very little market power and brand competition involved 
in the fluid milk category. In contrast, the estimated acquisition effects on national and 
store brand RTE cereal prices are significantly different, possibly because RTE cereal 
category is marked with product differentiation and branding. 
This final result provides important insights on market power. The data reveal that 
the market share of RA store brand products increased in the acquired stores after the 
acquisition relative to the RB store brands, thus increasing its market share in the RTE 
cereal category. However, the data also show that store brands of fluid milk decrease 
their market share after the acquisition relative to the RB store brands, thus decreasing its 
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market share in the milk category. As such, the evidence shows that RA has improved its 
markup more on their store brand products while actually increasing the market share of 
its store brands in the RTE cereal category. This demonstrates that RA has some market 
power in the RTE cereal category. This is consistent with the discussion of scenario F in 
Table 3.2 in the Food Retail Merger Framework section. However, because RA lost 
market share in the milk category while also decreasing prices, the results indicate that 
RA does not have market power in the milk category. This matches the discussion of 
scenarios A and B in the Food Retail Merger Framework section about the cost savings 
cases. 
3.6 Conclusions 
The U.S. food-retailing sector has been marked by two recent trends over the past two 
decades. First is an increase in concentration. Mergers and acquisitions have been a 
driver of some of this increase, particularly in the past several years. The second trend is 
the private label growth and staying power. Private labels have continued to grow since 
the recession of 2008-2009. This essay explores the relationship between these two trends 
because they are intrinsically linked. Private labels, controlled by the retailer, may be 
used as an instrument to exert retailer market power. To explore the connection between 
retailer concentration and private labels, this essay analyzes the following question: do 
store brand prices change more or less than national brand prices after a merger or 
acquisition? The answer to this question will improve the understanding of the 
implications of growth store brands for food prices and welfare. Furthermore, it would 
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shed new light on concentrated retailers store brand pricing strategy and its effect on 
different consumer types. 
To answer this question, this essay performs an ex-post analysis of a food retail 
acquisition in a large United States city in 2012. Nielsen scanner data at the UPC level is 
used in a difference-in-differences (DID) estimation of the differential impact of the 
acquisition in two product categories – fluid milk and ready-to-eat (RTE) cereal. These 
product categories are selected because they represent typical high volume, fast-moving 
product categories with different competitive environments. The acquisition is unique 
because the acquired retailer only had stores in the large U.S. city and sold most of its 
stores to one retailer, the acquiring retailer. Because of this feature, the price effects of 
the acquisition are causally identified for the acquiring retailer. 
The results show that, for the acquisition under study, prices decreased around 
0.3% for fluid milk and 0.6% for RTE cereal per unit. The overall decrease in prices 
points to significant retailer cost savings or increased competition after the acquisition. 
Furthermore, the results provide important insights into the effects of the acquisition on 
national and store brand prices in different categories. 
The overall price decrease due to the acquisition speaks to firm behavior. Two 
alternative interpretations exist. In a direct interpretation, this price decrease suggests that 
the acquisition might have provided the retailer important cost savings for milk products 
and national brand RTE cereals. From the framework presented earlier, the price 
reductions likely did not occur without at least as large cost savings from either 
economies of scale or scope gains or from a better bargaining position. More 
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interestingly, because the estimated parameters break out the acquisition effects by 
national brand and store brand for two different products, they provide important insights 
into the RA’s use of market power. 
The results show that RA reduced prices across the board for the more 
homogeneous product category which would indicate that the acquisition may have 
created cost efficiencies for RA stores in the LUSMA. However, in the more 
differentiated product category the results indicate that RA decreased prices only for 
highly brand competitive, national brand RTE cereal products, whereas RA did not 
change prices or even increased them for store brand RTE cereal products indicating it 
gained significant store brand market power. If aggregate price changes were used, the 
overall cost savings would have masked this market power effect. That is, the results 
provide evidence that the growth of store brands contributes to retailer market power, 
which should be accounted for more directly in merger analyses. 
The alternative interpretation of the price decrease is that competition intensified 
requiring RA to reduce prices. This would occur if competitors reduced prices in 
response to the acquisition. A competitor that is similar to RA, and dissimilar to RB, may 
respond to the acquisition by lowering prices because RA now has a larger market share 
and represents a larger threat to their own market share. In turn RA would need to reduce 
its prices. Moreover, RA would respond more in product categories and with products 
that are more substitutable across retailers, that is milk products and national brand RTE 
cereal, not store brand RTE cereal. This interpretation may hold as it explains both the 
differential price changes, the decrease in the CR4 after the acquisition, and the change in 
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RA’s market shares across milk and RTE cereal. More research should be done to 
determine which and when each mechanism is at play when prices change after an 
acquisition. 
The overall results also indicate that the consumer benefitted from the acquisition 
under study. On the whole, RA consumers in the LUSMA saved just under $200,000 on 
milk and RTE cereal in 2013 alone. These savings are not insignificant. Moreover, these 
results affected consumers differentially. For milk drinkers, savings were similar across 
the brand types in percentage terms. For RTE cereal consumers, however, store brand 
consumers were hurt, while national brand consumers were helped. As national brand 
consumers typically have higher incomes, the acquisition under study disproportionately 
helped those with higher incomes. This study provides a first glimpse into how mergers 
and acquisitions may impact different types of consumers in different ways. More 
research should be done to analyze more product categories and more mergers and 
acquisitions. 
The conclusions of this essay are limited by the empirical assumptions and by the 
empirical analysis’s scope. If the common trend assumption does not hold the empirical 
results cannot be interpreted as the causal effect of the acquisition. If the assumption of 
no across market spillovers is incorrect, the results will be biased. If the prices in the 
control group decreased (increased) due to the acquisition, then the results are an 
underestimate (overestimate) of the true acquisition effect. This would mean that the true 
acquisition effects in the LUSMA would be more negative (less negative). 
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The limited scope of the analysis affects its external validity. This essay analyzes 
only one acquisition, and as a result, the results may change when analyzing another 
acquisition. Additionally, this essay analyzes two product categories, while there are 
hundreds of product categories in a grocery store. Therefore, these results may change 
when looking at additional product categories. Future research on other acquisitions and 
products should be done to explore the robustness of the results. 
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Chapter 4. Charter City Development: Benefits and Costs for Countries and Firm 
Decisions 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) have increased in popularity, and they continue to be 
popular despite uncertain economic benefits. SEZs are “… demarcated geographic areas 
contained with a country’s national boundaries where the rules of business are different 
from those that prevail in the national territory” (Farole, 2011, p. 23). A new type of zone 
tries to fix underlying institutional problems present in SEZs that prevent them, and the 
country at large, from growing. These LEAP zones allow for the zone itself to make and 
implement fiscal, judicial, and social policies. However, implementing any SEZ is not 
costless, and the new LEAP zones present additional tradeoffs. Policymakers want to 
know if the costs associated with creating a new zone are outweighed by its benefits. 
Honduras is creating the world’s first economic zone using the LEAP zone 
concept. Honduras’s weak political and legal systems and its central location in Central 
America make it a prime location to implement this new structure. A current proposal put 
forward by the Korean International Cooperation Agency and approved by the 
government of Honduras is creating a LEAP zone-like area (called a ZEDE in Honduras) 
on Honduras’s Pacific coast. This implementation points to an immediate need to 
investigate the difference between LEAP zones and SEZs and the potential benefits and 
costs of implementing a LEAP zone. 
The objective of this essay is to describe the LEAP zone concept in the context of 
other economic zones, provide policymakers with information on the benefits and costs 
of each economic zone, show how these benefits may accrue by describing multinational 
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firm location behavior especially as it relates to food economy firms, and apply these 
findings to the Honduran ZEDEs. 
Agriculture, and the food economy more generally, is a potentially integral player 
in the success of these LEAP zones. Honduras is no exception as their plan creates an 
agricultural research and development area near a new proposed port on the Pacific coast 
and a dry canal linking this new port with the major Atlantic port near San Pedro Sula. 
More specifics of the logistics corridor will come out in summer 2016, but food economy 
firms’ reception and use of a LEAP zone in a country like Honduras is important. This is 
also critical for U.S. food economy firms as the full terms of the Food Safety 
Modernization Act (FSMA) are implemented. 
FSMA affects the food economy in five ways. First, it requires firms to put in 
place prevention- and risk-based procedures to reduce food-borne illness. Second, the 
U.S. Federal Drug Administration inspection and compliance ability is enhanced. Third, 
the FDA is allowed to institute mandatory food recalls. Fourth, it promotes collaboration 
between different food safety agencies within the U.S. and internationally. Finally, 
international partners of U.S. firms have to meet the same environmental, labor, safety, 
and other food safety standards that U.S. farmers, processors, and other firms meet (U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration, 2015). This is important to U.S. food economy firms 
because their supply chains are immense and global. This changes the risks that these 
U.S. firms face and thus changes their operational decisions around who to partner with 
and how. 
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Farole and Akinci (2011) provide a description of other SEZs.38 They also present 
several case studies that provide lessons that can be learned from the implementation of 
SEZs. However, there has been little work analyzing LEAP zones. One exception is 
Romer (2010) which discusses the potential benefits of a charter city which is a type of 
LEAP zone. Romer alludes to the work that has found that institutions and their quality 
greatly affect economic growth, trade, and foreign investment from a macro-economic 
perspective as potential benefits (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001; Globerman & 
Shapiro, 2002). Other literature on clusters, agglomeration, and trade also points to how 
benefits from these charter cities and other SEZs might accrue (Krugman, 1991; Porter, 
1998; Romer, 1994). However, the literature on how and why LEAP zones and SEZs are 
created has only recently been explored from a political economy perspective (Moberg, 
2014). The Moberg (2014) study and the literature reviews by Oates (1999) and Faguet 
(2014) on federalism and decentralization provide a jumping off point to discuss when a 
country should create a LEAP zone or SEZ. 
This essay’s contribution is fivefold. First, it lays out the differences between this 
new economic entity, the LEAP zone, its establishing country, and other SEZs, providing 
a structure around SEZs and LEAP zones. Second, using literature on how these 
differences may provide differential benefits between different zones, this essay describes 
when LEAP zones should be implemented relative to other SEZs. Third, this essay 
analyzes how the governance differences affect business level decisions through the 
                                                 
38 One alternative to a typical SEZ is an Export Processing Zone (EPZ) which focuses on facilitating trade 
through small changes in economic policies such as lower taxes or subsidized credit. Another important 
alternative is an Early Reform Zone (ERZ) which is a far reaching zone similar to a LEAP zone without the 
degree of autonomy that a LEAP has. These are discussed more fully in this essay. 
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different level of risks present for each location using a theory of the firm perspective. 
Fourth, this research looks specifically at the LEAP zone’s impact on multinational food 
economy firms as much of the other literature focuses on the manufacturing sector and 
many of the benefits may accrue through this sector as firms in the food economy 
develop global supply chains. Fifth, this essay applies these general analyses to the 
Honduran ZEDEs. 
The next section describes SEZs and LEAP zones in more detail, including the 
background of the LEAP zone concept. Following that, economic geography and theory 
of the firm literatures are reviewed in order to determine the potential benefits from 
implementing SEZs and LEAP zones. In the fourth section, the federalism and 
decentralization literature is reviewed in order to determine if and how the benefits may 
accrue from implementing SEZs and LEAP zones. After that, the LEAP zone is placed in 
context with other geo-political structures by analyzing it governance institutional 
structure. The fifth section builds on this by discussing the benefits and costs of each 
economic zone and provides a prescription for when each should be used. Following that, 
a conceptual framework of a multinational firm location decision-making process 
centering on risks is provided and applied to multinational food economy firms. After 
this, these insights are applied to analyze the Honduran ZEDE case study. This discussion 
describes the political economy of the proposed ZEDE and the potential interest of 
multinational food economy firms in locating there. The eighth section concludes the 
essay. 
4.1 SEZ and LEAP Descriptions 
  95 
The number of SEZs has increased dramatically since the 1980s. In 1986, 6 years after 
Shenzhen was named the first SEZ in China, there were 176 SEZs worldwide. By 2002, 
there were 3,000 (Boyenge, 2007). Many of these have been created in developing 
countries as they seek to boost economic growth and trade. Asian countries, such as 
China, India, Bangladesh, South Korea, and Vietnam, have been major implementers 
because of their high trade potentials. All SEZs have the goal of promoting foreign 
investment, while some have additional objectives like reducing unemployment and 
experimenting with economic reforms (Farole & Akinci, 2011). Over time, policymakers 
have shifted from classic SEZs with financial incentives to more far-reaching reforms in 
more modern SEZs and even now to the nearly all-encompassing LEAP zones. This shift 
has been in response to lackluster performance of many more-traditional zones formed 
prior to modern SEZs. 
Not all SEZs are successful. As noted by Farole and Akinci (2011), many SEZs 
have failed from a lack of good governance institutions and supporting industries and 
infrastructure, not because of poor economic policy. Farole (2011) states that the quality 
of institutions inside and outside of an SEZ is significantly correlated with the 
performance of the zone, while low wages and economic incentives are not. Anecdotal 
evidence from a 2015 article in The Economist states that a majority of companies located 
in Indian SEZs made “irregular” payments to Indian officials in charge of the zones (The 
Economist, 2015). This literature on poor governance points to the obstacles faced by 
traditional SEZs. 
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Because of the failure of more traditional SEZs and the importance of supporting 
institutions in promoting economic growth, a new type of zone aims to alter not just 
economic policy, but legal and political institutions. In the late 2000s, Paul Romer put 
forward the idea of creating charter cities in developing countries to overcome the 
obstacles that poor institutions pose to economic growth (Romer, 2010). Charter cities 
have three elements: 1) a charter that lays out the new rules of the game, 2) people and 
land providing individuals and firms with choices, and 3) partnerships with other nations 
helping to provide credibility and expertise to the country’s leaders. Romer’s idea is that 
charter cities become reform zones that test out new policies that spread to the rest of the 
country if successful. Cities such as Hong Kong and Singapore (colonized by the United 
Kingdom) are frequently used examples of successful charter type cities while Goa and 
Macau (Portugal) and Ceuta and the Spanish enclaves in North Africa are used as 
examples of less successful charter cities. Another similar, more recent charter city type 
area was the Panama Canal Zone when it was run by the United States. Romer argues 
that countries such as Honduras, Mozambique, and Tanzania have governments and port 
cities located fortuitously for logistics and transportation purposes that would lend 
themselves to a 21st century charter city. Agriculture is often cited as a prime example of 
an industry that would benefit from such institutional arrangements as firms in the food 
economy develop global supply chains. 
Using the body of literature from economic geography and governance 
institutions, Romer argues that these charter cities are needed in order to circumvent 
current institutional stumbling blocks and create new institutions that provide the 
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necessary environment for development to take place. This can be seen as Romer’s 
supply side argument for charter cities. Romer’s demand side argument uses a Tiebout 
(1956) argument concerning local public good provisions. The reforms that Romer 
envisions do not just attract businesses, but citizens, as well. Two important charter city 
characteristics, the opportunity to opt-in and its creation by the establishing country, are 
critical in distinguishing a charter city from a colony. Moreover, the demand side reforms 
are important so that labor will flow into the charter city. These demand side reforms 
create a competitive environment for all localities (Romer, 2010). 
The charter city idea is best captured by the LEAP zone concept. These zones 
have the opportunity to change the legal, economic, administrative, and political systems 
and policies from those of the establishing country. A direct measure of success for 
LEAP zones is increasing foreign direct investment in the short-run. However, in the 
long-run, additional goals may include spurring domestic industry, spreading reforms 
throughout the country, and improving economic opportunities throughout the country 
through linkages with the LEAP zone. SEZs change the economic environment and 
sometimes the administrative system, but leave the legal and political systems 
unchanged. Farole and Akinci (2011) provide a useful breakdown of different SEZ types. 
In that study an important distinction is drawn between SEZs like that of Shenzhen in 
China and EPZs like those in Bangladesh and Vietnam. These EPZs typically focus on 
manufacturing sectors for export that may reduce the bureaucracy and provide financial 
incentives for locating there. 
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SEZs are broader without a focus on a particular sector and broad reaching 
economic reforms (Farole & Akinci, 2011). Auty (2011) discusses early reform zones 
(ERZs) as potential far-reaching SEZs that are similar to charter cities and LEAP zones. 
He discusses the important characteristics, and why and where they might succeed. Each 
zone differs in who controls the governance institutions in the zone. This control 
arrangement is called the governance institutional ownership structure. The differences 
between each of these zones creates choices for a country’s policymakers on which zone 
(if any) they should implement. 
4.2 Economic Reasons for SEZs and LEAP Zones 
4.2.1 Economic Geography and International Institutional Economics Literature 
The theoretical literature lagged the initial practical implementation of SEZs. It was not 
until the late-1980s and early-1990s that the economic geography and development 
literature fully developed reasons for differential economic development and solutions for 
economic growth and development. This literature provided some initial support for 
creating SEZs because it showed the importance of history and agglomeration. Prior to 
this literature, the link between geography and economic development was largely 
ignored (Krugman, 1995). McCombie (1988) provides an excellent overview of the 
neoclassical view of differences in economic growth between regions. The growth rate, 
wage, capital rents, and unemployment differences across regions merely reallocate 
resources and labor. Essentially, the economy is in a disequilibrium, and it is adjusting to 
reach a common growth rate. This body of literature gave rise to the idea of convergence. 
Sala-i-Martin (1996) and other empirical studies test the convergence hypotheses and 
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provided initial support for convergence, but subsequent research has questioned its 
validity (Jones, 1995; Quah, 1996). 
The incongruence between basic neoclassical growth theory and the empirical 
evidence on convergence led to the development of new growth theories. In contrast to 
the neoclassical view, these new growth theories are fundamentally based on reinforcing 
mechanisms. Krugman’s groundbreaking work used increasing returns to scale and 
imperfect markets to show that economic activity, growth, and trade become 
concentrated and depend on the history and economic path taken (Krugman, 1979, 1991). 
Other, more macroeconomic, growth theories rely on endogenous growth which comes 
about through spillovers and leads to concentrations of economic activity (Romer, 1994). 
Important to the economic zone concept is that trade is very beneficial to each location. 
Therefore, economic zones nearly always have some sort of trade facilitation component. 
Additionally, these new growth theories point to policies that would begin the reinforcing 
cycle of economic growth. 
Porter (1998) provides several broad recommendations for the development of 
economic clusters based on the idea of spillovers and economic history. Drawing on the 
endogenous growth, economic geography, and other literatures, Porter lays out the 
importance of clusters, their function, their value creation for the area, and the role of 
policy. In a specific section on developing economies, Porter recommends starting with 
improvements in areas like education, infrastructure, capital markets, and institutions 
(1998, p. 86). These recommendations for developing industry clusters are intimately 
linked to the development of new SEZs. Traditional SEZs are intended to foster growth 
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in its area through the improvement of economic policies and capital markets that often 
attract specific industries. New LEAP zones are intended to improve not just economic 
policy, but infrastructure, education systems, and governance institutions. 
The importance of good governance institutions in promoting economic growth, 
international trade, and foreign investment is not a new idea as noted by the early 
contribution of Wolf Jr. (1955). It has not been until recently that institutions have come 
under scrutiny again. One of the early contributors is Nobel laureate Douglass North 
(1989). North takes an economic history perspective to analyze the role of British and 
Spanish institutions on the different economic growth between North and South 
American countries over the past 200 years. The body of empirical studies linking 
institutions and economic growth is now large. Seminal studies in this area are 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) and Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004). 
These and subsequent studies show that institutions like the rule of law, political stability, 
and control of corruption are a significant driver of economic growth. 
More tightly related to the microeconomic contributions of this study is the 
literature studying the impacts of institutional quality on foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Globerman and Shapiro (2002) provide an early study measuring the impact of 
governance institutions on FDI, and find that these institutions’ quality plays a significant 
role in attracting FDI. This study is important in that it is one of the first to use 
quantitative governance institutional quality indicators. A study by Bénassy-Quéré, 
Coupet, and Mayer (2007) find that improving governance institutional quality can 
provide an improvement in FDI aside from its effects on GDP. Moreover, the impacts are 
  101 
as large as being a source country neighbor. This study uses this literature as a jumping 
off point for the potential benefits and ways in which a LEAP zone may provide an 
establishing country with benefits. 
4.2.2 Theory of the Firm and the Make-or-Buy Decision 
The theory of the firm literature is integral in this case because it lays the microeconomic 
foundations linking governance institutional quality with a firm’s make-or-buy and 
location decisions (i.e., how much and where to make FDI). This literature begins with 
Nobel laureate Ronald Coase (1937) and involves the simple question of whether a firm 
should make or buy a product. Coase finds that firms exist because there are lower 
transaction costs of making a product within the firm structure than buying it on the open 
market. 
Nobel laureate Oliver Williamson shed new light on this theory in the 1970s and 
1980s through his work on transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1971, 1979, 2002). 
In his work, Williamson points out that a transaction goes under a “fundamental 
transformation” when the transaction moves from trading between many potential buyers 
and sellers to just one buyer and one seller. This fundamental transformation creates 
relationship-specific assets that create quasi-rents that each party wants to obtain. This, in 
turn, creates the holdup problem in which haggling ensues after the contract has been 
made and production has taken place. This theory of the firm implies that transactions 
with highly relationship-specific assets will be performed within the firm to avoid the 
holdup problem. 
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Transaction cost theories of the firm were quickly rivaled by other theories of the 
firm. Two predominant alternatives have arisen. The first alternative is the property rights 
theory of the firm. This theory’s seminal works include Grossman and Hart (1986) and 
Hart and Moore (1990). This theory begins with the idea that a firm owns something 
when it controls the residual rights of an asset. The firm decides what happens when 
something occurs that was not contracted for or was inherently uncontactable. The 
theory’s most basic setup is that two parties may gain from joint production and must 
each make ex-ante investments in assets for production. After production, efficient 
bargaining over the gains from the production is performed with the split being based on 
the party’s ex-ante investments. Because of this efficient bargaining, the party whose 
assets more affect the outcome has the higher incentive to invest, ex-ante. 
This relates to the theory of the firm because it implies when one firm should buy 
another and when they should remain separate firms. As a loose example, suppose firm 1 
is the firm whose assets affect production more than firm 2’s. Then, firm 1 should buy 
out the other firm when the increase in production that results from the buyout outweighs 
the loss of firm 2’s control over its assets. If the loss that results from integration is 
greater, the two firms should not integrate. 
The second alternative to the transaction cost theory of the firm is the incentive 
system or agency theory of the firm. This theory applies principal-agent models to 
analyze the inner-workings of the firm and the broader incentives related to ownership. 
The seminal paper in this area is Jensen and Meckling (1976). This body of modelling 
shows that the incentive system theory of the firm focuses on aligning incentives to 
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achieve better payoffs. Nobel laureate Eugene Fama (1980) contributed significantly to 
this field by describing that ownership and management can be performed by different 
entities by compensating managers with stock options. This aligns their incentives with 
those of the firm’s owners. 
Holmstrom and Roberts (1998) provide a review of the essential ideas of each 
theory of the firm perspective presented above. In this paper, the authors describe each 
theory as focusing on different aspects with the incentive system theory as an extension 
of sorts to both the transaction cost and property rights theories of the firm. Along these 
lines, Gibbons (2005) shows that there are two elemental theories of the firm after 
discussing four typical theories of the firm.39 First, ex-post governance structure theory 
describes a setting in which ex-post decisions are non-contractible, and so the ex-post 
structure of how to determine these decisions will be made must be constructed properly 
ex-ante. The transaction cost or rent-seeking theory of the firm is a special case of this 
theory. Second, an ex-ante incentive alignment theory suggests that ex-ante actions and 
ex-post decisions can be contracted, which affect payoffs, so that incentives can be 
aligned, affecting the ex-ante and ex-post actions taken, to maximize these payoffs. 
Empirical work in the theory of the firm area shows that transaction costs, 
property rights, and principal-agent relationships matter. In the transaction cost area, 
much of the research began with several case studies finding that relationship-specific 
assets increased integration (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). More recently empirical studies 
have found that relationship specific assets increase the length of contracts and the degree 
                                                 
39 The fourth theory of the firm is the adaptation theory. This is a minor theory with little relevance for this 
essay, so it is not discussed.  
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of integration (Joskow, 1987; Leffler & Rucker, 1991). Property rights theory is difficult 
to test directly because of its fairly unrealistic setup. However, Grossman and Hart (1986) 
apply this perspective to explain client list ownership patterns in insurance sales. They 
find that individual agents, rather than insurance companies, own the customer lists when 
insurance plans are renegotiated more frequently and the costs of shirking by the agents 
are high. The incentive system theory has been applied empirically to several different 
settings in the food economy including poultry production (Knoeber, 1989) and 
processing tomatoes (Goodhue, Mohapatra, & Rausser, 2010). 
John Dunning’s body of work provides a business literature perspective of 
multinational firm behavior including what they are, their location decisions, and the pros 
and cons of having one from a country’s perspective. His seminal work is International 
Production and the Multinational Enterprise (Dunning, 1981). In the economics 
literature, the transaction cost theory is the most prominent perspective present in the 
literature on the multinational firm, their location decisions, and how they expand 
internationally. Teece (1986) laid out the transaction cost framework of the make-or-buy 
decision of a multinational enterprise (MNE), but does not look specifically into the 
impacts that institutions play in determining this decision. Gatignon and Anderson (1988) 
find that as the foreign country becomes more risky, the firms looking to invest in that 
country should maintain less control over their investment. In contrast, more recent 
research by Li and Filer (2007) who find that as a country develops more structured 
institutions, foreign investment shifts from direct investment to portfolio investment. This 
shows that as the country becomes less risky, investors will buy (invest in foreign 
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companies) instead of make (direct investment). This discrepancy in conclusions is likely 
due to the specific risks and transaction involved. In the first, Recently, Orellano, 
Azevedo, Sylvia, and Nascimento (2015) provide an empirical study of uncertain 
property rights to the food economy. In their study, the authors find that increased land 
invasions in Brazil are related to less perennial crop production and more annual crop 
production. This indicates that as property rights become less secure, the less fixed 
investments a farmer (or firm) will make in his or her enterprise. These studies point to 
the microeconomic foundations of where and how a firm expands internationally. 
Therefore, it describes how SEZs and LEAP zones may be successful in attracting firms’ 
investment by trying to improve property rights protection. 
The ex-ante incentive alignment perspective is less common in this literature 
because it does not have direct implications for the environment in which the transaction 
takes place except in how the payoffs may change across location. The incentives are 
inherent to the parties and the nature of the transaction. There is an area for future 
research to fully lay out how the environment interacts with the transaction in this setting. 
4.3 Political Economy of SEZs and LEAP zones 
In thinking of how LEAP zones and other SEZs create these improvements in governance 
and attract citizens, this essay draws a natural parallel with the ideas of federalism and 
decentralization. Much of the work on SEZs has ignored this connection. This paper 
defines federalism using the Oates (1999) definition for fiscal federalism which states 
that it is the study of the vertical relationships in the public sector in normative and 
positive terms (Oates, 1999, p. 1120). Faguet (2014, p. 4) defines decentralization as “… 
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the devolution by central (i.e., national) government of specific functions, with all of the 
administrative, political, and economic attributes that these entail, to regional and local 
(i.e., state/provincial and municipal) governments that are independent of the center 
within given geographic and functional domains.” This definition of decentralization is 
important to the study of SEZs because SEZs gain some independence from a central 
government, typically administratively. The LEAP zone concepts’ link to the idea of 
decentralization is clear because LEAP zones gain so much control over so many aspects 
of governance. 
4.3.1 Federalism 
Much of the literature on federalism describes why a central government may want to 
decentralize. The economics literature on federalism began from the normative 
perspective. Oates (1972) is a seminal book in this area. Others, including Musgrave 
(1959), discussed federalism in the context of public finance, but Oates brings these 
together, developing a cohesive study of it. This normative view of federalism purports 
the idea that each level of government should control the production of public goods that 
cover their geographic area (Oates, 1999).40 For example, national governments should 
control the military, interstate highways, and macroeconomic policy, while local 
governments should control local roads, fire departments, and potentially education. 
This prescription leaned on the Tiebout (1956) model of local public good 
demand. Consumer welfare is maximized by allowing local governments set the 
provision of local goods due to heterogeneous demand by a country’s citizens. The 
                                                 
40 In addition to national public goods, the central government should control income redistribution (Oates, 
1999). 
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federalism literature uses this result because local governments likely know local demand 
better than central governments. This informational advantage in providing local public 
goods is critical to a LEAP zones success.41 If LEAP zone administrators do not know the 
local demand for public goods, few if any citizens will decide to move to the new LEAP 
zone. Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom’s research on common property resource 
management supported much of this literature with regards to control of public goods like 
fisheries, air pollution, and water quality (Dietz, Ostrom, & Stern, 2003; Ostrom, 1990). 
There are two other main potential benefits for federalism which are particularly 
relevant for the LEAP zone concept. First, sub-national units may serve as policy 
laboratories (Oates, 1999). These laboratories allow policymakers to test out new policies 
in a kind of pilot setting. Successful policies may spread vertically to the national level or 
horizontally to other sub-national units. This “policy lab” conception of sub-national 
units has a direct link to LEAP zones, especially in Romer’s idea that charter cities may 
be reform zones. 
Romer’s contribution is that the policies the charter cities implement will spread 
to other areas of the country and may be introduced by the national government. So, these 
LEAP zones try out new policies that, if successful, hopefully spread. This horizontal 
spread of ideas alludes to the second potential benefit – sub-national units will compete 
with each other to attract businesses and residents (Oates, 1999). In order to retain and 
attract new residents and businesses many sub-national governments will implement 
                                                 
41 Much of the federalism literature is also concerned with distributional concerns. LEAP zones do not 
address these concerns as they are designed to have governance institutions that are insulated from the rest 
of the country. However, the mechanisms for successful local public goods provision and the ultimate goal 
of spreading successful reforms to the rest of the country from the LEAP zone unites these two literatures. 
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policies that were successful in other areas. However, competition between governments 
does not always create this “race-to-the-top”, and instead it may create a “race-to-the-
bottom”. The classic example of a race-to-the-bottom is in state-level environmental 
policies. In order to maintain and aid business development, a state would reduce 
environmental regulations. In order to compete with that state in business development, 
another state would reduce their own environmental regulations further. This continues 
until there are little or no environmental regulations. There is a large body of theoretical 
literature that deals with this, but the empirical work here is still limited (Oates, 1999). 
Much of this normative literature assumes that the national and sub-national 
governments are trying to maximize their constituents’ well-being. Recent literature 
departs from this seeking a more positive perspective of how a federalist system works. 
Weingast (2009) provides an overview of the literature in this area. Much of this research 
models each government seeking its own ends in a principal-agent model with the 
national government being a principal and the sub-national government being an agent. 
Chubb (1985) and Tirole (1994) are seminal studies in this area. Finally, research by 
Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) takes a transaction cost approach to describe why a national 
government would setup sub-national units. 
4.3.2 Decentralization 
The literature on decentralization leans on several of the arguments of the benefits of 
federalism. This literature is distinct from the federalism literature because 
decentralization is an active choice and transition from a current state of centralization 
rather than a theoretical construct from a point of no government. This literature has two 
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streams in outcome changes and two streams in contribution to the literature. The two 
streams in outcome changes are changes in local public goods and welfare and changes in 
governance quality. The two streams of the types of contributions are theoretical and 
empirical. 
The local public goods and welfare outcomes literature begins with Tiebout 
(1956). Local governments know local demand and so can provide residents with the 
higher welfare as they move to the areas that best fit their demand. More recent 
theoretical literature builds on this by accounting for spillovers and differences in tastes 
(Besley & Coate, 2003). From an empirical side, Faguet (2014) lists several empirical 
studies measuring these changes. For another example, Uchimura and Jutting (2009) 
measure the health outcomes from decentralization in China and find that 
decentralization improves health outcomes. Shifting to governance quality changes from 
decentralization, Faguet (2014) provides an excellent literature review of this literature. 
Other important articles include Bardhan (2002) which provides an overview in 
developing countries and Weingast (2014) from the perspective of market preservation 
and reputation. 
Faguet (2014) describes four ways in which decentralization may improve 
governance. First, it changes how politicians must compete. Researchers find that 
politicians have new ways of entering the political system allowing for more competition. 
It also provides incentives for politicians to do well at the local level to move up to the 
national level. Second, decentralization increases accountability and reduces corruption. 
Faguet reviews the literature and finds that recent empirical studies have shown that 
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decentralization increases government responsiveness, satisfaction with local services, 
and program delivery. However, information and incentives are key. In reviews of case 
studies in Argentina and China, Faguet finds that poor information transfer and 
misaligned incentives reduce these benefits. Third, it promotes political stability because 
sub-national units can better address the needs of the population sub-groups that are 
concentrated in particular regions. By meeting these needs, those that promote instability 
and radical changes do not receive as much attention. Another way in which this outcome 
occurs is by having political parties that must work together at all levels. Finally, 
decentralization limits the power of a national government that unimpeded by other 
institutions. This is also linked to political stability. 
This literature provides context for the Moberg (2014) study which performs a 
political economy analysis of SEZs. In her study, Moberg describes the political economy 
of creating an SEZ successfully as a two-fold problem. First is the informational problem 
– how will a central government best know how to setup an SEZ? Her solutions are to 
decentralize its creation through privatization or through local government intervention. 
Second is the incentive problem – how does one setup an SEZ so that it is beneficial to 
the economy knowing that those setting it up have their own set of motives? Moberg 
frames this as a rent-seeking minimization problem. She finds that democratic institutions 
or privatization controls corruption (rent-seeking). 
4.4 LEAP Zones in Context 
A LEAP zone creates a tradeoff between a country’s direct control over an area and 
potential economic growth that is unlike other SEZs and EPZs. A LEAP zone creates a 
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dynamic and largely independent process of policymaking that is not present in other 
SEZs and EPZs. These differences between economic zones represent the critical line 
along which geo-political constructs (e.g., countries, colonies, territories, SEZs, etc.) 
differ. Geo-political constructs differ by who controls the governance institutions. The 
governance institutional ownership structure describes this ownership pattern for several 
governance institutions. This institutional ownership structure describes what a LEAP 
zone is in the context of other types of economic zones and other geo-political constructs. 
This section analyzes the ownership structure of governance institutions for the new zone 
comparing it to EPZs, SEZs, “Banana Republics”, a colony, a federalist state, and the 
country. EPZs represent present-day industry areas like maquilas in Honduras, single 
enterprise zones like Foxconn in China, or free trade zones in Bangladesh. Maquilas and 
single enterprise zones are often structured more like a university campus with its own 
rules for residence eligibility and, often, its own security or police forces. Although the 
EPZ is its own category, they may operate within SEZs or LEAP zones. For example, 
Foxconn’s largest campus is in Shenzhen, one of China’s first SEZ. SEZs are unique in 
their focus on economic reform. 
Shenzhen is a classic SEZ in comparison to EPZs. SEZs are often large, multi-
industry areas with far reaching economic reforms. The Banana Republic ownership 
structure represents historical company-controlled areas like large plantations or 
company-towns. A classic example of a banana republic is the United Fruit Company’s 
operations in Central America during the late 1800s and the first half of the 20th century. 
The federalist state represents a country with multiple levels of government. At a local 
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level, one can think of counties or cities, while at the national level, one can think of a 
central government. Each level may control different policies and governance 
institutions. Finally, LEAP zones are like ZEDEs in Honduras with extreme amounts of 
autonomy. 
The World Bank Governance Indicators (WGI) are a starting point to choose the 
most important governance institutions, and this essay includes additional institutions to 
provide additional insights. The WGI database was developed by Kaufman, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2010) to create quantitative indicators to analyze the impacts of governance 
on development. The authors glean dozens of surveys of citizens, businesses, and experts 
to obtain hundreds of subjective measures of governance quality. These are then 
combined into six broad categories of governance quality. First, voice and accountability 
measures the ability of citizens to participate in the political process. Second, political 
stability and absence of violence measures the risk of political instability and violence. 
Third, government effectiveness measures the quality of government policies and their 
implementation. Fourth, regulatory quality measures the business environment for private 
sector growth. Fifth, rule of law encapsulates opinions about the effectiveness of a 
country’s judicial system. Sixth, control of corruption measures the prevalence and 
degree of corruption within a country (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010). These 
broad indicators provide the jumping off point while the sub-measures provide more 
detailed context and nuance to the ownership structure. 
Some additional assumptions and simplifications are needed. One assumption is 
that there is no federalist structure within the country category. This keeps the analysis 
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simple by assigning a single entity control in the base case. Within the federalist state 
category there is just a single division between the central, country government and 
several sub-national units. This is again for simplicity as certainly there can be more than 
just two levels. As the structures outside of the country are examined, these discrete 
categories are more of a spectrum. For example, some EPZs may look more like an SEZ, 
while an SEZ may look more like a traditional EPZ in who owns which governance 
institutions. However, these categories provide a useful framework for looking at 
differences between typical governance ownership structures. The categories also display 
the hallmarks of the different ownership structures even if they are slightly different in 
practice. 
Table 4.1 below summarizes the institutional ownership structures under 
comparison. The analysis begins with the country as the baseline zone. A country 
maintains control over all governance institutions. The power over each governance 
institution may be wielded by different entities, but it still remains under the control of 
the country. Additionally, these governance institutions may be under the control of the 
country using a constitution or by force of power. The critical assumption is that the 
government retains control over all of the governance institutions and is responsible for 
their quality. 
In the federalist state, the country controls voice and accountability, but shares 
responsibility for other institutions with the sub-national units. This responsibility sharing 
is represented by “&” in Table 4.1. The “&” symbolizes that both entities control the 
governance structure or that either entity may control the governance structure. In a  
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Table 4.1. Institutional ownership structure in principle 
Institution Country Federalist 
State 
Colony Banana 
Republic 
EPZ SEZ LEAP 
Voice and 
Accountability 
       
- Type of political 
system 
Ca C CPCa C & Co.a C C LEAPa 
- “Bill of Rights” 
freedoms 
C C CPC C & Co. C C C 
- Citizenship 
decisions 
C C CPC C C C C 
Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence 
       
- Military C C CPC C & Co. C C C 
- Police C C & Sa CPC & 
C 
C & Co. C & 
Co. 
C LEAP 
Government 
Effectiveness 
       
- Infrastructure C C & S CPC & 
C 
C & Co. C & 
Co. 
C & 
SEZa 
LEAP 
- Education C C & S CPC & 
C 
C & Co. N/A C LEAP 
- Bureaucratic 
implementation 
C C & S CPC & 
C 
C & Co. C C & 
SEZ 
LEAP 
Regulatory Quality        
- Anti-competition 
regulation 
C C & S CPC C & Co. C C & 
SEZ 
LEAP 
- Trade policies C C CPC C & Co. C C & 
SEZ 
LEAP 
- Tax policies C C & S CPC & 
C 
C & Co. C C & 
SEZ 
LEAP 
Rule of Law        
- Contract 
enforcement 
C C & S CPC & 
C 
C & Co. C C LEAP 
- Judicial 
administration 
C C & S CPC & 
C 
C & Co. C C LEAP 
- Equal treatment of 
foreigners 
C C CPC & 
C 
C & Co. C C LEAP 
- Expropriation with 
compensation 
C C & S CPC & 
C 
C & Co. C C LEAP 
- Private property 
protection 
C C & S CPC & 
C 
C & Co. C C LEAP 
Control of Corruption C C CPC & 
C 
C & Co. C C LEAP 
a. C – Country, S – Country’s subunit, CPC – Colony’s Parent Country, Co. – Company, SEZ – Special 
economic zone, LEAP – LEAP zone 
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sense, the country sets the rules of the game, and the sub-national units help enforce and 
make minor modifications to those rules. From the literature on decentralization and 
federalism, this setup may allow for better provision of services and may make the 
government more responsive to their citizens. 
There is a dramatic shift in control moving from the country and federalist state to 
the colony ownership structure. Here, the ultimate rule comes from the colony’s parent 
country (CPC). There may be some sharing of control between the CPC and the colony. 
A federalist structure may be set up in some respects. In some cases a governance 
institution is administered or controlled by the CPC, the colony, or shard by both. Banana 
Republic areas resemble something more like a colony with the company maintaining a 
large degree of control. Companies involved in Banana Republic structures often 
intervened in domestic policies and politics (Kentor & Boswell, 2003). Therefore, despite 
the countries de jure control of the area and even the entire country, the companies may 
have had much more de facto control. 
Shifting from more historical ownership structures back to present day structures, 
EPZs represent the basic economic zone. Under this ownership structure, the country is 
control of everything. The business or businesses within an EPZ receive a financial 
incentive for being there, but they have little control over the governance of the area. As 
an exception, some EPZs offer housing and private security like an apartment complex 
with special rules like a three strikes policy. In this regard, the companies may control 
some governance institutions within the area they own, but that is because they own the 
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property not because of some inherent control over policy. They are subordinate to 
country laws in performing these functions. 
The SEZ is a step up from an EPZ in the complexity of the economic policies and 
reform. The size and purpose may vary significantly across SEZs, but the control over 
governance institutions is similar. The country retains ownership over voice and 
accountability, political stability and violence prevalence, and control of corruption. The 
SEZ or country may control economic regulations, infrastructure and bureaucracy 
decisions, property rights protection, and equal treatment of foreigners. 
The last zone to consider is the LEAP zone. A LEAP zone is in control of all 
governance institutions except for the military, citizenship rules, and “Bill of Rights” 
freedoms. The LEAP zone will share tax revenue with the country for these larger 
services.42 The LEAP zone has the freedom to change the political system; the legal 
environment; and economic, fiscal, and, to a large degree, social policies in the area. This 
freedom is given to the LEAP zone to experiment with far reaching reforms that could 
not be successfully implemented in the rest of the country. These reforms, economic and 
otherwise, are designed to bring in foreign investment and provide beneficial services 
local residents. These, in turn, spur development that spreads to surrounding areas and the 
rest of the country. 
LEAP zones have been compared to colonies because of the extraordinary 
autonomy that they have and their ability to obtain government services, like the use of 
courts, from other countries. However, Table 4.1 shows the critical difference. The 
                                                 
42 The exact revenue sharing will be dictated by the specific LEAP zone law put in place. Likely, income 
tax revenue will be shared, but usage fees will not be shared. 
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country in which the LEAP zone is located retains control over the governance 
institutions that make a country a truly sovereign state. The country still controls the 
military; it still decides who can and cannot be citizens of its country; and, it ensures all 
people in the LEAP zone have the same or better “Bill of Rights” freedoms as the rest of 
the country. 
Each of the economic zones differs from the other because of the scope of the 
autonomy given to the zone’s administrators. The focus on economic reform makes the 
SEZ distinct from the EPZ. The EPZ focuses on providing economic incentives, while 
the SEZ experiments with economic reforms that may prove beneficial. Moreover, if the 
economic reforms in the SEZ spread through the rest of the country, the whole country 
may be better off because all might enjoy the same reforms. The extreme degree of 
autonomy is what separates LEAP zones from EPZs and SEZs. This difference is clear 
from the table. Most EPZs and SEZs have their policies set by the rest of the country. 
These policies set for EPZs and SEZs are unique to the area, but often they may be 
changed by the country, not the EPZ or SEZ itself. In contrast the LEAP zone is in 
control of nearly all of its policies. Additionally, because the LEAP zone can set its own 
policies, the LEAP zone is dynamic. It can adjust its policies and administration to adapt 
to new economic conditions and residential demands. The EPZ and SEZ model is static 
from within the zone. They must wait for the country to change the policies affecting 
these zones. The SEZ and LEAP zone structures may allow for benefits to accrue through 
mechanisms discussed in the federalism and decentralization literature above. 
4.4.1 Benefits and Costs of LEAP Zones and other SEZs 
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EPZs, SEZs, and LEAP zones have their place in attracting foreign investment. However, 
the costs and difficulty in implementing each zone and the benefits from each are 
different. This subsection discusses these benefits and costs drawing on the discussion of 
the previously reviewed literature. These benefits and costs point to a rudimentary 
prescription for when each should be used. 
EPZs provide benefits by facilitating international trade. These benefits accrue in 
Krugman-like fashion by taking advantages of economies of scale and gains from trade. 
Additionally, these areas may facilitate agglomeration creation. These benefits include 
increased employment, wages, and economic output. These benefits ideally spillover to 
surrounding areas and ripple through the rest of the economy. The costs associated with 
these zones are physical costs associated with creating the zone (e.g., port construction, 
administration, infrastructure, etc.), costs from economic policy changes (e.g., subsidy 
payments, foregone taxes, etc.), and costs of creating geographic, and potentially sector 
specific, winners and losers. Also, necessary to their success is an underlying structure of 
infrastructure, markets, and governance institutions. 
SEZs provide benefits by improving economic policies and economic governance 
institutions. These proposed improvements are intended to increase domestic and foreign 
investment and facilitate trade. These benefits accrue through the same channels as EPZs 
while also opening up channels along the lines of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
(2001) and Globerman and Shapiro (2002) by improving the underlying institutional 
framework. The same costs are present as those with the EPZs, but may be larger in 
magnitude because an SEZ often covers more area and more sectors. Additionally, a 
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“political” cost is incurred. This political cost represents the cost that a government 
experiences when it implements the SEZ reforms that may not be in its interest or 
particularly popular, but is put in place to make the SEZ successful. 
LEAP zones may provide benefits by improving legal, economic, administrative, 
and political governance institutions and policies. These improvements are intended to 
increase foreign and domestic investment, promote trade, and improve the lives of its 
residents. In addition to the channels discussed in the EPZ and SEZ paragraphs above, 
benefits accrue through federalist (Oates, 1999) and decentralization channels (Faguet, 
2014). The same costs of implementation for EPZs and SEZs are also present for LEAP 
zones. Additional costs occur due to the new federalist structure and decentralization. 
From the federalism literature, these costs may include the loss of economies of scale in 
providing public goods and services and creating a race to the bottom. From the 
decentralization literature, these costs include another type of political cost due to the 
central government giving up some of its powers. 
4.4.2 Prescriptions for LEAP Zones and other SEZs 
The prescription of when to implement each zone can be seen in three steps. First, only 
the benefits from each zone are analyzed. Second, the economic costs of implementing 
the zone are introduced. Finally, the political costs of implementing the zone are 
included. Each step is discussed in turn below. 
The above analysis of benefits points to a rough prescription of when to 
implement each zone. This is summarized in Figure 4.1.43 The transition from a  
                                                 
43 The specifics of any particular situation will blur which zone should be recommended. The hierarchy 
presented in Figure 4.1 represents a simplified model of reality. 
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Figure 4.1. Economic zone hierarchy 
representative country area to an area setup as an EPZ, to one set up as an SEZ, to a 
LEAP zone can be seen as a hierarchy. If the country is well functioning with sound 
economic policies, then no special zone is needed. If economic policies need reforming, 
but good governance institutions are in place, then an EPZ may be implemented. If the 
economic institutions are weak, then an SEZ may be tried to experiment with new 
economic reforms. Finally, if a near complete overhaul of governance institutions need to 
be undertaken, a LEAP zone may be created to be a laboratory for potential economic, 
legal, and political reforms. 
This prescription is overly simplistic, however, because it ignores the costs 
involved. If there were only economic costs, the prescription can be easily extended as 
these are fairly easy to project. Each zone should be undertaken given the projected 
  121 
benefits outweigh the projected costs. This category of costs should not be understated, 
but the process of calculating economic costs associated with a proposed project is not a 
new one. 
The prescription becomes much more realistic when political costs are included. 
These costs are transaction costs rather than direct and indirect economic costs of 
implementing the zone. These political costs may be so high that the zone will not be 
implemented or will be implemented in a way that prevents any potential benefits from 
materializing. The costs of a zone implemented poorly may significantly outweigh any 
benefits. 
These costs are especially important for the broad reaching LEAP zones. To 
illustrate this and the political costs discussed above, consider an example. Suppose there 
is a country in which a proposed LEAP zone has higher benefits than economic costs – 
there are weak governance institutions and little foreign investment. However, the 
governance institutions may be so weak that a true LEAP zone is impossible to 
implement due to the political costs. A corrupt central government may not have the 
incentives to implement a true LEAP zone because the direct benefits it receives (e.g., 
larger budgets, side payments, etc.) are much smaller than the political costs it will 
experience, such as less control. Instead of a LEAP zone, the government may introduce 
an EPZ with high proposed benefits and low economic costs. In execution, the 
government receives side payments, while purporting job growth and an increase in 
investment. 
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This example is admittedly pessimistic. However, it illustrates the difficulty in 
implementing these zones when seen through a political economy lens. Nobel laureate 
James Buchanan’s work on public choice is relevant here (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962).44 
When trying to change the economic rules of the game, one is changing the constitution. 
However, economic zones are typically policies – not constitutional changes – embedded 
within the overarching constitution. EPZs and many SEZs are in fact policy changes 
because the rules of the game are not modified – only economic policies are changed. 
When they fail, it is because the benefit-cost analysis was incorrect or another zone was 
called for. However, far-reaching SEZs and LEAP zones create fundamentally new 
political structures and are therefore changing the rules of the game. Therefore, these 
zones call for proper constitutional changes. These constitutional changes, however, are 
difficult to implement as they are made within a context of weak governance institutions. 
Additionally, the zones are designed to benefit specific areas while a constitution is 
designed to be all encompassing. 
This analysis of the political costs leaves a pressing question. How can the 
reforms needed to strengthen weak governance institutions be implemented in the face of 
weak governance institutions? The subsequent conceptual analysis of firm decision-
making takes the benefits and costs from the LEAP zone as given. Additionally, this 
analysis is from the perspective of the firm, not from the country looking to introduce a 
LEAP zone. 
4.5 Multinational Firm International Decision Process 
                                                 
44 This reference is to the body of Buchanan’s work. Perhaps the most fundamental and well-known is 
(Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). 
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When a multinational firm looks to solve a problem, take advantage of a new 
opportunity, or, generally, execute a new transaction, it may look to do so in a foreign 
country. In looking to execute this transaction in a foreign country, it faces different risk 
levels compared to its home country. These risks can be broken into several categories: 
financial, political, economic, legal, and so on. However, the most important categories, 
without knowing the transaction, are short-run and long-run risks. Short-run risks affect 
the success of the transaction in buying, making, moving, and selling a firm’s products 
and services with a short time horizon. Long-run risks are associated with structural 
issues in a location. These affect future operational success (i.e., how well the transaction 
is performed), and the underlying success of the strategy (i.e., how the transaction is 
performed). 
Examples of short-run risks include infrastructure quality, skilled labor 
availability, bureaucratic hurdles, production uncertainty, exchange rate fluctuations, and 
tax and trade policies. Examples of long-run risks include contract enforcement, political 
stability, the prevalence of corruption, education policy, and the strength of the rule of 
law. Additionally, some short-run risks are also long-run risks like infrastructure quality – 
current quality affects current payoffs, but there may be long-run, structural problems in 
the infrastructure system that affects long-run success. 
These risks have several features. First, governance institutional quality affects 
the magnitude of these risks, and each governance institution may affect each risk 
differently. For example, production risk is likely to be directly affected by research and 
development institutions but is unlikely to be affected by exchange rate policies directly. 
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Moreover, research and development institutions are unlikely to affect bureaucratic 
hurdles. Second, risks may be interrelated by governance institutions and other 
underlying factors. For example, high inflation may affect short-run risks by creating 
uncertain financial returns and long-run risks by putting pressure on the government to 
implement policies to control the high inflation. Finally, foreign country risks affect 
different aspects of the firm’s decision. For example, risks due to poor infrastructure may 
affect where a firm locates because it affects how much product it can produce, but it 
may play less of a role in how it executes the transaction as this risk is present regardless 
of how the firm executes the transaction. In contrast, contract enforcement may affect the 
decision of where a firm locates operations and how the firm executes the transaction 
because contract enforcement affects how the firm interacts with other companies. 
Both short- and long-run risks combine to affect the expected potential profits of 
potential foreign-country-partner firms and the multinational firm. The risks factor into 
the probabilities of successfully executing the transaction and achieving various profit 
forecasts. Importantly, these risks also vary by location because governance institutional 
quality varies. Therefore, the risks factor into the multinational firm’s location and 
“make-or-buy” (MB) decisions.45 Whether the multinational firm “makes in” the foreign 
country or “buys from” foreign-country-partner firms determines the impact these risks 
have on each probability.46 
                                                 
45 In the short-run, from the perspective of the country, it will want to attract the companies regardless of 
their MB decision. However, in the long-run, the country will want to improve the governance institutions 
such that local firms can compete and work with multinational firms via the “buy” decision. 
46 The buy option of the MB decision requires that there is a local firm to “buy from”. This essay assumes 
that this local firm will “sell to” the multinational firm if the multinational firm wants to “buy from” it. The 
local firm’s decision process to “sell to” the multinational firm is an area for future research. 
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Figure 4.2. Multinational firm international location decision process 
Risks in each risk category affect these probabilities differently. Typically, short-
run risks play an important role in determining income from the transaction because they 
affect production levels and prices received and paid. If the probability of having high 
income is higher when the transaction is executed by “buying”, the local firm is more 
likely to own it, holding all else equal. Long-run risks play an important role in 
determining asset values. If the probability of retaining an asset with high value is higher 
when the asset is owned locally, the local firm is more likely to own it, holding all else 
equal. Each combination of location and MB provides a level of investment, income, and 
asset value based on the location’s risk profile. The profit-seeking multinational firm 
chooses the combination which provides the highest income and asset values above 
investment costs. 
The preceding discussion points to a decision process that models a firm’s 
decision to expand internationally. Figure 4.2 presents this process. The first step is to 
identify the problem or opportunity the firm is facing. This creates the transaction that the 
firm wants to execute and potential locations in which it can take place. The nature of the 
transaction predisposes the firm to either execute it by making or by buying. If the 
transaction involves very unique and potentially patented products, making it very costly 
to determine the true cost and quality of the product or service in the transaction, or 
requires firms to invest in relationship-specific assets, then the transaction is more likely 
to be executed by making rather than buying. 
Transaction 
identification
Risk identification
Location & MB 
decision evaluation 
& selection
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However, the institutional environment in which the transaction is taking place 
affects the make-or-buy decision as well. The institutional environment of each location 
identified in this step affects the short- and long-run risks faced by the multinational firm. 
The locations identified may be at various levels, such as country, state, or city. 
Importantly, at any level, various economic zone options must be considered when they 
change the institutional ownership structure because this changes the risks faced by the 
firm. 
The next steps identify and evaluate these risks and the options the multinational 
firm has to execute the transaction. The second step of the process is to identify the most 
important risks to the transaction. In this step the multinational firm takes into account 
the nature of the transaction and determines which risks must be evaluated. These will 
include overall risk factors for the success of the transaction and risk factors specific to 
the mode of the transaction. In the third and final step, the firm evaluates and selects the 
location-MB combination. It begins by evaluating the option to “make or buy” for each 
location in the context of the location and transaction risks. This determines how the 
transaction will occur – within the firm (make) or with another firm (buy) – and where it 
will occur. This evaluation is done for each location taking into account both the location 
risks and the nature of the transaction. Given this evaluation, a location and a mode for 
the transaction are selected based on this evaluation. The location-MB decision 
combination in which the transaction provides the highest payoff is selected. 
4.5.1 Decision Process Applied to the Multinational Food Economy Firm 
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There are two cases to consider when applying the general firm decision process 
presented above to the case of the multinational food economy firm (MFEF). In the first 
case, the international location is the final market for the MFEF’s final products. These 
final products often involve manufacturing and processing of raw inputs that may be 
sourced from the foreign country or imported. An example of this case is Cargill’s feed 
and animal agriculture operations in Central America. In the second case, the 
international location is the source of the MFEF’s inputs or final products, but not a 
major market for these products. These products may be exported in a raw or processed 
form. An example of this case is Dole Food Company which has pineapple and other fruit 
plantations in Central America. Some MFEFs fit into both categories. Consider the case 
of Nestle for inputs, such as sugar, dairy products, etc., sourced in the United States for 
final products sold in the United States. 
The MB decisions available to the MFEF are different depending on each case. 
For the case one MFEF, the buy decision implies that the MFEF works with a local 
partner to import its product(s) into the target country. The make decision implies that the 
MFEF locates production facilities within the target country and makes the final product 
there. A hybrid option is that the MFEF works directly with a local manufacturer to 
produce the MFEF’s products in a type of licensing agreement. For the case two MFEF, 
the buy decision implies that the MFEF works with a local partner to export products 
from the target country. The make decision implies that the MFEF owns land, grows the 
product, and exports the product itself. In the second case, there is also a hybrid decision 
in which the MFEF contracts directly with growers and maintains its own export and/or  
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Figure 4.3. MFEF MB decision 
Source: Adapted from (Bensako, Dranove, Shanley, & Schaefer, 2010, p. 145) 
processing facilities. Figure 4.3 summarizes these options for the MFEF. It adapts a 
decision framework for the MB decision based solely on the nature of the transaction 
from Economics of Strategy (Bensako, Dranove, Shanley, & Schaefer, 2010, p. 145). 
As in the general process, the MFEF begins by identifying a problem or 
opportunity. In case one, the MFEF identifies an opportunity by expanding into an 
international market with a product or set of products. This market may be a specific 
country, or it may be regional (e.g., Southeast Asia, Central America, etc.). In case two, 
the MFEF typically identifies a problem in its sourcing operations. The broadest problem 
in this context is that the MFEF needs a new source of an agricultural product. The 
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potential locations capable of providing the product are those that can physically (e.g., 
climatologically, geographically, etc.) produce it. 
In the second step, the MFEF identifies short- and long-run risks in order to 
evaluate the MB and location decisions. However, in each case the MFEF has risks that 
are present that directly affect the success of the transaction due to the nature of the 
transaction regardless of the MB decision. In the first case, the MFEF faces risks 
affecting demand for their product regardless of the MB decision. This is because the 
ultimate driver of success is having an international market for your product. Some 
country risks most relevant to final demand include labor risks, education levels, 
macroeconomic factors, brand reputation, urbanization trends, and political crises. 
The MFEF in the second case faces risks affecting supply of their product 
regardless of the MB decision. This is because the entire exercise is to find a reliable, 
long-term source for the product they need. Some of the risks most relevant to supply are 
production risks, infrastructure quality, trade policy, labor issues, urbanization trends, and 
political instability. 
In both cases, for step two, the MFEF analyzes short-run and long-run risks in 
detail in order to evaluate the make-or-buy options in the next step. There are some 
nuances between both cases, but the most important location-specific risks that affect the 
MB decision are those around property rights protection, private contract enforcement, 
and production. As contract enforcement and product risks decrease, the MFEF tends to 
“buy”, ceteris paribus. As property rights protection increases, the MFEF tends to 
“make”, ceteris paribus. 
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The case one MFEF is most concerned about the relative risks of private contract 
enforcement between itself and the local firm, importing risks, and production by the 
local firm in the buy option versus own-production of final products and property rights 
protection in the make option. The case two MFEF is most concerned about the relative 
risks of contracting production and exporting risks in the buy option versus own-
production of agricultural products risks and property rights protection in the make 
option. 
The third step evaluates potential partnerships with firms in the target countries 
and potential production locations. MFEFs typically commit to locations for the long-
term. Therefore, in evaluating the MB options, long-term payoffs and relationships are 
considered. After the evaluation, the MFEF firm decides which location-MB 
combination(s) to pursue, if any. The option chosen is the one that provides the highest 
long-term payoff. 
An additional risk for case two MFEFs importing into the United States that 
deserves special attention is the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA). FSMA requires 
MFEFs ensure that any products they import into the United States have been grown, 
processed, and stored at the same standard that firms in the U.S. must use. There are 
current risks at each stage from farm to processor to warehouse to ship to port. These 
risks include weather, production, labor, health and safety, environmental, and legal risks. 
Moreover, these risks are in play all over the world. Traditionally, the nature of the 
agricultural product supply transaction pushes it into contracting or making 
arrangements. 
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Recently, case two MFEFs have increased supplier monitoring and traceability to 
address some of the risks more fully and consumers’ desires to know about where their 
food comes from. FSMA now requires this for all MFEFs importing into the United 
States. This is an enormous task as current MFEF supply chains are large and complex. 
For example, Nestle operates in nearly every country and has factories in 86 of them 
(Nestle, 2014). 
The changes in FSMA increase the supply risk for case two MFEFs. This 
increases risk from importing products because there are higher standards that now must 
be met, from producing the products itself because of new standards, and from 
contracting because they must verify the practices of each farmer. In light of FSMA, 
location risks associated with the case two MFEF with agricultural production and 
processing for imports have become particularly important. 
4.6 A Case Study: Honduran ZEDEs 
This section discusses the Honduran ZEDEs as a case study for LEAP zones. In this 
section, the ZEDE concept is placed in context with LEAP zones and the other economic 
zones discussed. Also, it uses the MFEF decision framework to determine if MFEFs are 
more likely to locate in the ZEDEs relative to another area in Honduras and how they 
might do this (i.e., make or buy). 
4.6.1 Background of Honduras 
Honduras is located in central Central America with coastlines on both the Pacific Ocean 
and Caribbean Sea. Figure 4.4 provides a map of Honduras. In 2015, Honduras had 
approximately 8.75 million residents with 1.1 million in the capital of Tegucigalpa and  
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Figure 4.4. Map of Honduras 
Source: The World Factbook (2015) 
just over 0.85 million in the major, northern commercial center San Pedro Sula. The 
population is split approximately evenly between urban and rural areas (The World 
Factbook, 2015). These geographic and demographic factors point to the potential a 
charter city or LEAP zone may have. There are many residents that may move to a city as 
the urbanization trend is not complete. Additionally, with access to both the Pacific 
Ocean and Caribbean Sea, there is a great potential for trade in a LEAP zone that offers 
better institutions and lower risks. 
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Additional economic factors point to the opportunities a LEAP zone may create. 
The Honduran economy has officially been strong with GDP growth between 3% and 4% 
over the past three years, unemployment at 4.5% in 2013 and 2014, and real-GDP growth 
per capita of 4.5% between 2012 and 2014. However, 60% of Hondurans lives in poverty 
and approximately one-third are underemployed (The World Factbook, 2015). The 
combination of these factors show that a LEAP zone may be successful. From the firm 
side, firms may be interested in the LEAP zone because the GDP growth and low 
unemployment point to positive economic factors that support demand for final products. 
From the labor side, workers may be interested in the LEAP zone because the 
underemployment and the wide-spread poverty point to a desire for more and better jobs. 
The agricultural industry is a significant driver of success in a Honduran LEAP 
zone because of Honduras’s mix of sectors. Agriculture accounts for 14% of GDP with 
industry accounting for 27% and services accounting for 59%. However, agriculture has a 
disproportionate share of employment: the agriculture employs 39% of the labor force 
(industry – 21% and services – 40%). Within agriculture, the most important sectors are 
sugar, coffee, bananas and other tropical fruit, and timber products (The World Factbook, 
2015). This shows that agriculture is an important driver of the economy and that many 
workers are familiar with agriculture. Additionally, Table 4.2 shows the importance of 
Honduran exports in the region. Table 4.2 presents the value of Honduran exports to the 
United States and its share of total Central American exports to the U.S. for selected 
product categories. Within these categories, Honduras dominates particular products. For  
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Table 4.2. Value and shares of Honduran exports to the U.S., 2008-2014 
Product 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Bananas and 
Plantains 
 
153,511 
(19.2%) 
157,050 
(18.9%) 
175,783 
(17.5%) 
182,473 
(15.0%) 
200,818 
(15.4%) 
221,828 
(16.4%) 
223,255 
(15.8%) 
Coffee, 
Unroasted 
 
131,618 
(13.6%) 
74,440 
(9.7%) 
76,957 
(9.9%) 
230,703 
(15.5%) 
281,685 
(19.5%) 
158,581 
(15.4%) 
198,363 
(19.4%) 
Fresh 
Vegetables 
 
21,240 
(14.0%) 
23,565 
(15.2%) 
20,565 
(13.0%) 
21,699 
(11.6%) 
24,875 
(13.2%) 
26,180 
(12.1%) 
30,206 
(14.1%) 
Other Fresh 
Fruit 
 
39,761 
(6.5%) 
44,364 
(7.0%) 
44,247 
(6.8%) 
56,081 
(8.3%) 
56,619 
(8.1%) 
57,438 
(7.6%) 
58,034 
(6.8%) 
Processed 
Fruit and 
Vegetables 
20,271 
(10.9%) 
24,404 
(15.3%) 
22,034 
(14.4%) 
25,417 
(13.4%) 
27,352 
(12.3%) 
31,052 
(12.8%) 
32,401 
(11.7%) 
Notes: Value of exports are in thousands of 2014 USD. Shares of Central American exports to the United 
States are in parentheses under values. Central American countries include Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Belize, and Panama. 
example, nearly 65% of organic bananas from Central America came from Honduras in 
2014. A Honduran LEAP zone will likely tap into this sector in order to be successful. 
The political setting in Honduras points to why a LEAP zone is a potential avenue 
for development. Honduras is a democracy but has experienced political instability since 
democratic elections were first held in the 1980s. Additionally, illegal drug trafficking 
has contributed to Honduras having the highest murder rate in the world. Finally, 
corruption has plagued the country (The World Factbook, 2015). These all point to a 
LEAP zone, independent of the current political system, as a potentially successful way 
to experiment with and implement new reforms. However, as discussed in the literature 
above, how this may be accomplished by a country with poor institutions is an area of 
future research. 
4.6.2 Description of ZEDEs 
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Honduras first experimented with economic zones by implementing EPZs called 
Macquilas. These were very successful at attracting manufacturing firms especially in the 
textiles sector. These Macquilas generated many jobs and increased FDI significantly. 
However, many investors in these zones are attracted to the economic advantages (e.g., 
low labor costs, tax breaks, etc.), rather than the structural changes of the zone. 
Therefore, these investors often leave to take advantage of other zones in other countries. 
As the Macquilas become inferior to zones in other countries, Honduras has 
looked to the next generation SEZs. For several of the previously discussed reasons, 
Honduras is a country in which LEAP zones may be very successful. ZEDEs are not the 
first attempt at LEAP zones or charter cities. Honduras attempted to create REDs, or 
model cities, with direct involvement from Romer. The law authorizing these REDs was 
passed in 2010 by the Honduran Congress and then-President Lobo. However, in 2012, 
the RED law was struck down by the Honduran Supreme Court. 
ZEDEs are Honduras’s follow-on attempt at LEAP zones. These ZEDEs are 
promoted by Mark Klugman who was a former student under Romer. The ZEDE law was 
passed in September 2013, and was found to be constitutional by the Honduran Supreme 
Court. Bell, Marin, and Landgrave (2015) translate the ZEDE law to English. 
The ZEDEs are designed to help Honduras’s economy grow and integrate with 
the world economy. In order to do this, each ZEDE is created for a specific purpose. 
These include financial centers, logistics hubs, special tourism areas, and agribusiness 
zones. These special areas are carved out of Honduras’s current territory. In a low-density 
area, no consent must be obtained from the current residents. However, if the ZEDE will 
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be in a high-density area, the residents must vote in favor of the ZEDE’s creation. Once 
the ZEDE is created, any residents may continue to live there or sell their land if they do 
not wish to live in the ZEDE. The ZEDE has the right to take property with compensation 
to the resident if the resident does not wish to be part of the ZEDE or sell their property. 
This is similar to the eminent domain concept in the United States. Unlike in the U.S., 
however, the purchase need not be used directly for public goods or services. 
The ZEDE law specifies that the laws enacted within the ZEDE should be 
international best practices that help the ZEDE become a destination for investment. The 
ZEDE is given a tremendous amount of autonomy to do this. In its administration, the 
ZEDE may create its own economic policies, enact its own fiscal policy including 
levying taxes, provide public services like education and police, enforce laws with 
Honduran judges or through the use of another country’s court system, and enter into 
international trade agreements independently from the rest of Honduras. The ZEDE law 
specifies that 12% of tax revenues are shared with Honduras for national public goods, 
such as the military, and economic development projects to improve other areas of 
Honduras. In the hierarchy of which laws take precedence, the Honduran Constitution is 
the most important, then international treaties, then the ZEDE law, and then laws made 
within the ZEDE. No national laws, except the Constitution and the ZEDE law, apply to 
the ZEDE. 
In order to implement these best practices, the ZEDE law sets up a Committee of 
Best Practices (CBP) that has complete control over laws within the ZEDE. The CBP is 
composed of 21 members with the first 12 being appointed by the Honduran president 
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and the remaining being appointed by the initial 12 members of the committee. The CBP 
appoints a Technical Secretary as an administrator of the zone for a seven year term. This 
Technical Secretary is responsible to the CBP.47 Importantly, the administrative setup 
does not create any feedback from the stakeholders of the ZEDE to the CBP and 
Technical Secretary. This is a potentially major flaw that is discussed in the subsequent 
section. 
The ZEDE law provides some guidance and parameters on the economic policies 
that the CBP may put in place. First, the ZEDE is established as a free trade, low-tax 
zone. Personal income taxes may not be more than 12%, business taxes no more than 
16%, and value-added tax no more than 5%. In free trade, the ZEDE must allow any 
country’s goods and services to enter and these goods and services will not be taxed. 
From the labor side, the citizens of the ZEDE have the same rights as other 
citizens in Honduras according to the Honduran Constitution and cannot be discriminated 
against. At least 90% of a firm’s employees must be Honduran, and they must make 85% 
of the wages. Exemptions to these ratios may be made by the Honduran Congress. 
Importantly, any Honduran citizen is free to enter, reside in, and exit the ZEDE. This 
allows the residents to vote with their feet. The ZEDE will grow if people find it 
attractive, and the ZEDE will shrink if residents do not like it. 
Figure 4.5 provides a map of three potential ZEDEs. The first ZEDE will be in 
Southern Honduras on the Gulf of Fonseca. The first three sites developed in this zone, 
Amapala, Alianza, and Nacaome, are represented by white dots in the southern part of  
                                                 
47 The Technical Secretary must be a Honduran by birth, but no one is required to be Honduran on the CBP. 
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Figure 4.5. Potential ZEDE locations in Honduras 
Source: https://file.ejatlas.org/img/Conflict/zonas-de-empleo-y-desarrollo-econmico-zede-ciudades-
modelo-o-charter-cities-honduras/dt.common.streams.StreamServer.jpg 
Honduras. The Honduran government has invested $4.5 milllion to complete feasibility 
studies for this ZEDE completed by the Korean Development Agency. 
Each site within this ZEDE serves a specific purpose. In Amapala, a deep water 
port and major bridge will be built. In support of this, a logistics corridor will connect this 
port to the major Atlantic port in Puerto Cortes. This logistics corridor will create a dry 
canal which is a transportation corridor with a superhighway. This dry canal may take up 
to 5% of the traffic from the Panama Canal. Alianza will represent the logistics hub for 
this ZEDE connecting it to the dry canal and thus, the rest of Honduras. Figure 4.6 shows  
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Figure 4.6. Honduras’s location in relation to other countries 
Source: https://bostontohonduras.files.wordpress.com/2008/07/honduras-map-context.jpg 
that Honduras may be a good candidate for a dry canal because of its location relative to 
Panama and major United States ports like New Orleans and Miami. 
The Nacaome valley is part of a dry desert corridor in Central America. This area 
may generate particular interest for agribusiness exporters if irrigation systems are 
installed in the area as proposed. Dry land with artificial irrigation would allow 
agribusinesses to easily export fresh produce and fresh aquaculture products to the United 
States market. Examples of such products include melon, mangoes, oriental vegetables, 
shrimp, and tilapia. This strategy has been used in Peru which is among the biggest 
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exporters of asparagus, and very important exporters of mangoes, organic bananas, 
avocados, artichokes, chili peppers, and other crops. 
4.6.3 ZEDEs in Context 
This subsection places the ZEDEs in context with the other economic zones in the 
institutional ownership structure section. After doing so, the proposed benefits and costs 
are discussed and, given the Honduran setting, determine if these benefits and costs are 
likely to accrue. 
Table 4.3 adds the ZEDE to the institutional ownership structure table above and 
compares it to EPZs, SEZs, LEAP zones, and the country (as the baseline). Table 4.3 
shows that the ZEDE is setup as a LEAP zone in that Honduras retains and relinquishes 
control over the same governance institutions. However, there is a difference in what 
controls those ceded governance institutions. In a ZEDE, all control is given to the CBP. 
There is no direct feedback mechanism to the CBP except in a provision to abolish the 
ZEDE by popular vote if there is a sufficient number of people in the ZEDE. In contrast, 
in a LEAP zone, the LEAP controls the governance institutions. This implicitly assumes 
some sort of feedback mechanism between those who control the governance institutions 
and those who live, work, or invest in the LEAP. 
The lack of direct feedback in the ZEDE implies that many of the potential 
benefits from decentralization and federalism may not occur. This is because these 
benefits rely on political accountability of the ruling entity. Additionally, this feedback 
mechanism does not fit within the research by Moberg (2014) which recommends  
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Table 4.3. Institutional ownership structure of ZEDEs in principle 
Institution Country EPZ SEZ LEAP ZEDE 
Voice and Accountability      
- Type of political system Ca C C LEAPa CBPa 
- “Bill of Rights” freedoms C C C C Ha 
- Citizenship decisions C C C C H 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence 
     
- Military C C C C H 
- Police C C & 
Co.a 
C LEAP CBP 
Government Effectiveness      
- Infrastructure C C & 
Co. 
C & 
SEZa 
LEAP CBP 
- Education C N/A C LEAP CBP 
- Bureaucratic implementation C C C & 
SEZ 
LEAP CBP 
Regulatory Quality      
- Anti-competition regulation C C C & 
SEZ 
LEAP CBP 
- Trade policies C C C & 
SEZ 
LEAP CBP 
- Tax policies C C C & 
SEZ 
LEAP CBP 
Rule of Law      
- Contract enforcement C C C LEAP CBP 
- Judicial administration C C C LEAP CBP 
- Equal treatment of foreigners C C C LEAP CBP 
- Expropriation with 
compensation 
C C C LEAP CBP 
- Private property protection C C C LEAP CBP 
Control of Corruption C C C LEAP CBP 
a. C – Country, Co. – Company, SEZ – Special economic zone, LEAP – LEAP zone, CBP – Committee of 
Best Practices, H – Honduras 
democratic political institutions or privatization. These two options provide a mechanism 
for accountability through an electorate or the market. 
However, Tiebout (1956) provides some hope. In his model, there are no 
feedback mechanisms other than the population voting with their feet. The underlying 
assumptions of this model are unlikely to be met, but the intuitive idea from Tiebout 
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provides an alternative mechanism for some decentralization and federalism benefits to 
still accrue. Additionally, the decentralization literature indicates that political stability is 
an important benefit from decentralization. This may be provided because the political 
power is controlled by the CBP alone. 
4.6.4 MFEF Decision Process for the Gulf of Fonseca ZEDE 
In applying the MFEF decision framework to the Gulf of Fonseca ZEDE, this essay 
assumes that the MFEF has identified a problem or opportunity that may be solved or 
capitalized on in Honduras. The two alternative locations are the Gulf of Fonseca ZEDE 
(referred to as the ZEDE) and the area of Honduras outside of the Gulf of Fonseca ZEDE 
(referred to as Honduras). This discussion focuses on step three of the decision 
framework. Step one was performed in the general discussion about MFEF cases and in 
this paragraph. Step two was performed for the MFEF cases in the general discussion  
above. Step three entails determining risk levels in Honduras and the ZEDE and 
evaluating the MB decision in each location for both cases of the MFEF. 
Step three begins with assessing the risk levels in Honduras and the ZEDE. Tables 
4.4 and 4.5 present two quantitative business environment assessments for Honduras 
from the World Bank and BMI Research. Table 4.4 presents the World Bank Doing 
Business (DB) report rankings and distance to the frontier (DTF) measure for Honduras 
in several topic areas for domestic companies and the average for Latin American and 
Caribbean countries (World Bank, 2015). Table 4.5 presents the Business Monitor 
International (BMI) Research Country Risk Assessment (CRA) for Honduras, an 
Emerging Markets average, and a Global Markets average (Business Monitor  
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Table 4.4. Doing Business in Honduras: 2016, World Bank 
Topics Rank DTF Latin America 
Overall 110 58.06 - 
Starting a Business 150 74.92 78.52 
Dealing with Construction Permits 87 69.24 65.83 
Getting Electricity 143 53.39 70.59 
Registering Property 88 64.24 54.86 
Getting Credit 7 85 50 
Protecting Minority Investors 134 43.33 48.70 
Paying Taxes 155 57.28 62.75 
Trading Across Borders 136 55.98 66.02 
Enforcing Contracts 150 45.54 54.18 
Resolving Insolvency 139 31.67 39.25 
Notes: Rank is out of 189 countries. The lower the number the better (1 is best). 
DTF is the distance-to-frontier measure. It is on a scale of 0-100. Higher is better (100 is best). It measures 
the percentage of Honduras’s score relative to the best country’s score. 
International Research, 2015). These CRA indicators evaluate short- and long-term 
political, economic, and operational risks. The DB and CRA indicators combine to 
inform the short- and long-run risks present in Honduras. 
The indices and rankings show that Honduras is a risky developing country. 
Overall it has low scores, and few scores exceed the emerging country average in Table 
4.5. In the Overall Country Risk Index, Honduras ranks poorly relative to other Central 
American countries with Nicaragua being the only country that is riskier than Honduras 
(Business Monitor International Research, 2015). Additionally, it ranks in the bottom 30th 
percentile for 7 of 10 topics in Table 4.4. Also, Table 4.4 shows that Honduras does not 
perform well compared to the Latin American average. Honduras is in the middle of the 
pack for Central American countries in overall scores with Belize and Nicaragua being 
the only lower ranked countries (World Bank, 2015). 
However, Honduras has two strong areas: the economy and financial markets. 
The overall economy in Honduras is growing steadily as discussed above, and the short-  
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Table 4.5. Country Risk Assessment in Honduras: Nov. 2015, BMI Research 
Risk Index Honduras Emerging Markets Global Markets 
Short Term Political Risk 44.4 61.7 64 
- Policy-making process 46.7 63.8 65.6 
- Social stability 47.5 54.9 57.5 
- Security/external threats 43.3 64.1 66.3 
- Policy continuity 40.0 64.2 66.4 
Long Term Political Risk 51.1 58.2 61.3 
- Characteristics of polity 49.4 55.6 59.9 
- Characteristics of society 57.5^ 56.1 59.3 
- Scope of State 45.0 60.1 62.7 
- Policy Continuity 50.0 64.1 65.9 
Short Term Economic Risk 51.3^ 47.7 49.9 
- Economic Growth 63.3^ 45.7 45.5 
- Monetary Policy 55.0 64.3 66.1 
- Fiscal Policy 40.0 47.5 49.7 
- External Factors 46.7^ 45.3 47.3 
- Financial Markets 47.5^ 45.3 50.4 
Long Term Economic Risk 49.1^ 48.5 50.9 
- Structural Characteristics 49.1 50 52.7 
- Economic Growth 75^ 45.3 45.3 
- Monetary Policy 45.0 67 69.6 
- Fiscal Policy 43.3 48.8 50.3 
- External Factors 30.0 43.9 45.8 
- Financial Markets 47.5^ 45.3 50.4 
Operational Risk 41.7 47.2 49.9 
- Labor Market Risk 41.1 48.5 50.5 
- Logistics Risk 47.8^ 46.3 49.4 
- Trade and Investment Risk 46.5 47.5 49.9 
- Crime and Security Risk 31.5 46.6 50 
Country Risk Index 46.2 51.8 54.4 
Notes: ^ indicates a risk measure for Honduras that is better than the emerging market average. Numbers 
are scores on a scale of 0-100. Higher scores are better (100 is best). 
and long-run risks associated with the economy are accordingly low as seen in Table 4.5. 
Additionally from Table 4.5, financial market risks are low in the short- and long-term.48 
Table 4.4’s DB indicators show similar strength from the getting credit indicator. 
                                                 
48 This may be due to the strong link between the Honduran Lempira and the U.S. Dollar despite the 
Honduran Lempira being a floating currency.  
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Table 4.4 indicates that Honduras has problems enforcing contracts, protecting 
minority investors, providing electricity, facilitating trade, and administering taxes. Each 
of these indicators is more than forty percentage points away from the best country and 
ranks in the bottom 30th percentile of countries. CRA indicators in Table 4.5 indicate that 
Honduras has particularly high political and social risks that appear to be a structural 
issue. The CRA indicators for short-run political risks are very low in comparison to even 
the emerging market average. Long-run political risks are also very low except for the 
characteristics of society measure. Additionally, labor market and crime and security 
risks are much lower than other emerging markets. These point to potential structural, 
societal issues that increase short-run and long-run risks. 
Because the ZEDE does not yet exist, quantitative risk measures are not available. 
However, in assessing LEAP zones and the ZEDEs specifically, one can determine the 
risks relative to Honduras and why they are different. An important caveat is that these 
relative risks are theoretical ones. Actual relative risks may be different. The reasons for 
differences and how they may differ in reality are discussed in addition to the theoretical 
risk differences. 
In theory, the ZEDE reduces many short- and long-run risks such as economic 
policy risk, contract enforcement and arbitration risk, and political stability risks in some 
respects. First, the ZEDE law specifically addresses economic policy instituting a low tax 
environment and free trade. Second, the ZEDE law also specifies that English common 
law should be used and sets up formal arbitration rules. Additionally, the ZEDE may use 
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courts in other countries to provide more credibility and quicker decisions.49 These 
address risks around property rights protections and contract enforcement. Third, the 
ZEDE law creates a policy making body, the CBP and the ZEDE’s Technical Secretary, 
independent of the Honduran political system. This provides political stability and 
isolates it from corruption from the Honduran political system. 
In practice, the ZEDE may not achieve these risk reductions or they may not 
accumulate significantly for three reasons. First, the ZEDE may be dissolved at any time 
by the Honduran congress and the residents. In the law, two factors mitigate this risk. 
First, there is an “evergreen” provision that keeps the ZEDE structure in place for ten 
years after the vote to dissolve it. Second, the ZEDE law can only be changed with a two-
thirds majority, rather than a simple majority. Additionally, if there are 100,000 residents, 
they must also vote, by simple majority, to dissolve or change the ZEDE law. 
Second, there is no guarantee that the policies put in place by the CBP and the 
ZEDE’s Technical Secretary will be better than Honduran policy. This may be due to 
incompetence. However, the larger issue is the lack of direct feedback between the ZEDE 
success and the CBP. Not only does this bring up issues discussed in the previous sub-
section, it also implies that the CBP may change policy at any time. This is possible in 
theory in Honduras, but is less likely due to the democratic process. 
Finally, who and which firms are attracted to the ZEDE determine much of the de 
facto risk levels like those related to violence prevalence and property rights protections. 
This alludes to an adverse selection problem. If the ZEDE attracts firms and citizens that 
                                                 
49 The details of these arrangements are made on a case by case basis. For example, Mauritius uses the 
Privy Council in the United Kingdom as its highest court of appeal. 
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are there to only take advantage of the new policies, the structural problems within the 
society may not be resolved. This risk is compounded due to the lack of direct feedback 
between the ZEDE and its governing body, the CBP. 
Shifting gears to evaluating the location and MB decisions for the MFEF cases in 
both Honduras and the ZEDE. This discussion is organized as follows. The location risks 
for overall success are evaluated for both Honduras and the ZEDE for the case one 
MFEF. Then, the risks most relevant to the MB decision are evaluated for the case one 
MFEF. With this information, a selection is made for the case one MFEF. These steps are 
repeated for the case two MFEF. Because these decisions are very general, no 
profitability analysis can be done. Therefore, selections can only be made based on the 
risks contingent on equal risk-free profits. 
4.6.4.1 Case one: Locate in the ZEDE because of contract enforcement 
In case one, the location risks related to final demand drive overall success. Honduras’s 
strong overall economy pushes the final demand risk lower. However, labor and political 
risks are high indicating this strong economic growth may disappear, in turn negatively 
affecting final demand. These three factors combine to give moderate final demand risk 
in Honduras. The ZEDE itself will likely have a small population relative to the rest of 
Honduras. This indicates that the MFEF will likely sell its product(s) to Honduras even if 
it locates in the ZEDE. Therefore, the most relevant final demand risks are those of 
Honduras regardless of location decision. 
In case one, the location risks affecting the MB decision are property rights 
protection, contract enforcement, production risks, and potential trade policy risks. For 
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Honduras, the buy decision of importing carries moderate risk. Honduras has many free 
trade agreements with other countries, but the political instability and potential corruption 
mean there is still considerable risk in trade especially when exporting perishable food 
products to Honduras. The make decision carries with it moderate risk. Property rights 
are enforced fairly well and direct control over relationships with local suppliers and 
labor pushes this option’s risk down. However, the risk of holdup is high because you 
have sunk assets in the country and contract enforcement is weak. The hybrid decision of 
licensing has high risks. Intellectual property rights like ingredient formulations and 
proprietary processes are weak; arbitration avenues are slow and convoluted; and contract 
enforcement is poor. 
The ZEDE has moderate risks for the buy decision. It is setup as a free trade zone 
and this cannot change without changing in the underlying ZEDE law. However, there is 
likely a tax to transport goods into Honduras. Additionally, the ZEDE is relatively far 
from the major population centers so infrastructure risks in Honduras are high even 
though infrastructure within the ZEDE is of high quality. The make decision has low-
moderate risks. In comparison to Honduras, the ZEDE has special arbitration rules and 
better contract enforcement. Additionally, production risks are likely lower than 
Honduras because of the ZEDE’s improved infrastructure. However, the distance to 
major population centers keeps the risks from being low. Finally, the hybrid decision has 
moderate risks in the ZEDE. Contract and intellectual property rights are enforced better 
in the ZEDE compared to Honduras. However, the MFEF is ceding control to another 
firm where labor and holdup may still be an issue. 
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From a risk perspective the best options for the case one MFEF are to locate in the 
ZEDE. The best MB option is to make, which takes full advantage of the better contract 
enforcement, property rights protection, and higher quality infrastructure. Additionally, 
this minimizes trade risks and allows the MFEF to reduce in-country production risks. 
The make option is the strategy pursued by Cargill in Central America, but 
currently outside of the ZEDE. Therefore, Cargill or a similar company likely would find 
the ZEDE beneficial in relocating or locating their facilities. SABMiller may use this 
strategy in a similar way to protect its beer recipes and re-locate facilities within the 
ZEDE. A case one MFEF like Wal-Mart may find the ZEDE beneficial for importing 
products because it must import many products like electronics, furniture, and medicine. 
However, they must locate their stores throughout Honduras to meet local demand. 
Therefore, locating a distribution center (i.e., a make decision) in the ZEDE is a good 
strategy for a MFEF retailer like Wal-Mart to pursue. An agricultural input supplier like 
DuPont Pioneer which cannot source inputs from the country may also use this 
distribution center strategy. 
4.6.4.2 Case two: Locate in the ZEDE because of coordination benefits 
In case two, the location risks related to supply are the most important to overall success. 
Honduras’s location in Central America provides an ideal location for growing tropical 
fruits while being close to major North American markets as seen in Figure 4.6. In 
Honduras, the northern regions have traditionally had most of the tropical fruit 
production. This was particularly advantageous because of the climate and the proximity 
to the United States market. The central, mountainous regions have temperate climates 
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which support timber, coffee, and beef production. The southern region has a tropical 
climate, but is drier than the north. This southern region produces sugar cane, melons, 
and other crops. 
Supply risk for the case two MFEF can be broken down into agricultural risk, 
transportation risk, and exporting risk. For the most part, agricultural risks are the same 
across Honduras because major weather events likely affect the whole country, not 
particular regions. Therefore, agricultural risks are the same for Honduras and the ZEDE. 
Major risks facing Honduran agriculture are extreme weather events like droughts or 
hurricanes. However, this is offset by the ideal climate for growing fruits and vegetables. 
Thus, agricultural risk is moderate because of the offsetting risks of ideal climate versus 
rare, major weather events. 
Transportation risk varies based on location because of the poor infrastructure in 
Honduras. The longer the crop must be transported the higher the risk for spoilage or 
damage. Moreover, this induces firms to build processing facilities close to the growing 
area to reduce this risk losing out on potential economies of scale. Large MFEFs may 
need agricultural products from both inside and outside of the ZEDE regardless of their 
location decision. The major port in Honduras has been the Puerto Cortes on the 
Caribbean Sea. Thus, risks were traditionally lower in northern Honduras. However, with 
the proposed investments in irrigation in Nacaome, the world-class port in Amapala, and 
the logistics hub in Alianza, the risks in southern Honduras near or in the ZEDE have 
reduced significantly. Now, MFEFs may shift much of their production to areas in or near 
the ZEDE to take advantage of this new infrastructure. The risk difference between 
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Honduras and the ZEDE is now small with both being low-moderate. The ZEDE may 
have slightly lower transportation risks because of the updated infrastructure. 
Exporting risk is moderate for Honduras and low-moderate for the ZEDE. These 
are similar to the trade policy reasons in case one. Honduras has fairly good trade policy, 
but exporters are left with a fair amount of holdup risk when wanting to export highly 
perishable agricultural products. The ZEDE has low-moderate risk because of its policy 
and updated infrastructure. These infrastructure improvements are particularly important 
as FSMA requires higher standards for processing and storage that other ports in 
Honduras may not be able to meet as readily. 
In case two, the location risks affecting the MB decision are property rights 
protection, contract enforcement, and production risks. For Honduras, the buy decision of 
exporting in the MB decision carries moderate risk. The make decision carries with it 
low-moderate risk. Property rights are enforced fairly well and direct control over land, 
equipment, and labor pushes this option’s risk down. However, the risk of holdup is 
moderate because the MFEF has sunk assets in the country and as seen above production 
risks are moderate. The hybrid decision of contracting with growers and processing its 
own products has low-moderate risks. Contract enforcement is weak and so this option 
exposes the MFEF to more of this risk. However, this option lowers the risks of own-
production. Additionally, having relationships with growers directly and controlling the 
processing reduces risks associated with complying with FSMA. 
The ZEDE has low-moderate risks for the buy decision. The make decision has 
low-moderate risks. Much of the production must take place in Honduras, so there is not 
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any risk reduction here in locating in the ZEDE. Some small risk reduction is gained in 
using the infrastructure of the new ZEDE. However, this is countered by needing to 
potentially transport products from far reaches of Honduras increasing infrastructure 
risks. Finally, the hybrid decision has low risks in the ZEDE. The same contract 
enforcement is an issue with growers, but with the better infrastructure, it has lower risks 
of complying with FSMA during the processing and storage stages. 
From a risk perspective the best options for the case two MFEF are to locate in 
the ZEDE. The best MB option is the hybrid which takes full advantage of the better 
infrastructure and minimizes its exposure to production risks and poor property rights in 
the rest of Honduras. This option involves the case two MFEF investing in processing 
facilities within the ZEDE. Additionally, this minimizes risks associated with complying 
with FSMA. Companies like Dole Fruit, Chiquita, and Del Monte pursue similar 
strategies in Central America. Several of these companies directly contract with growers 
and have storage and processing facilities in the Central American country. The particular 
attraction of the ZEDE is improved infrastructure, free trade setup, and better property 
rights and contract enforcement. These companies also typically have land and grow their 
own products. The attraction of the ZEDE in this strategy may also shift production to the 
ZEDE or very close to it to take advantage of the infrastructure improvements. 
4.6.4.3 Summary 
Both case one and two MFEFs will likely find the new ZEDE in Honduras attractive. The 
ZEDE’s better infrastructure minimizes production risks. Additionally, the ZEDE will 
likely better enforce contracts and property rights in the long-run which will allow the 
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MFEFs to more easily work with other firms and protect their assets especially 
intellectual property. The case two MFEF may find the ZEDE particularly interesting 
because of new standards and regulations put in place by FSMA.  
4.7 Conclusions 
LEAP zones are new economic zones designed to alter the legal, economic, 
administrative, and political institutional landscape. They are a generalized concept of 
Romer’s charter cities. The first economic zones in this vein are being created in 
Honduras, locally called ZEDEs. This essay addresses several topics in this area. 
First, this essay finds that LEAP zones are fundamentally different from other economic 
zones because of the dynamic policy-making the LEAP zone has. Additionally, the LEAP 
zone is different from colonies and Banana Republics because the areas must still obey 
the constitution of the country. The best approximation to true LEAP zones is sub-
national areas in federalist countries. These areas have their own policy-making ability, 
but must still follow the national government’s main laws. 
Second, this essay finds that the benefits from LEAP zones may be much larger 
than from other economic zones. These benefits accrue through decentralization and the 
creation of a federalist structure, not just through facilitating trade (EPZs) and 
implementing economic reforms (SEZ). These benefits include better services for 
residents and better governance institutions. However, the costs may also be larger. The 
significant costs come from political transaction costs in setting up the LEAP zone as 
well as typical physical, economic costs. These consist of giving up control over the zone 
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and potential side benefits. LEAP zones should be implemented when both economic 
policies need reform and governance institutions are weak. 
Third, this essay shows that multinational firms looking to locate some operations 
in international areas may find LEAP zones attractive because they reduce short- and 
long-run risks. Some risks affect the decision of where to locate such as infrastructure 
quality, production risks, and the strength of the economy. Others affect the decision of 
how to enter the location such as contract enforcement and property rights protections. 
These risks combine in the firm’s decision process in which it selects the location-
strategy combination that provides the best payoff. In applying this process to 
multinational food economy firms, two cases were discussed. The international location 
represented a new market and a source for products for cases one and two, respectively. 
Demand and supply risks were the most important risks for overall success for each case, 
respectively. Both cases were concerned with contract enforcement, property rights 
protections and production risks in evaluating the make-or-buy decision. 
Fourth, in analyzing the case study of Honduran ZEDES, this essay provides two 
findings. First, the LEAP zone may be difficult to implement fully in practice. The entity 
in charge of the Honduran ZEDEs’ is the Committee of Best Practices which has no 
direct oversight from the ZEDE participants (i.e., residents or firms). Moreover, the CBP 
has no direct oversight from the Honduran government. Although the ZEDEs are 
independent from the central government, the lack of check and balance on the CBP 
implies many of the benefits from the ZEDEs may not accrue. The second finding is that 
if the ZEDE is setup properly, despite the structural, governance issues, MFEFs will 
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likely find the ZEDE an attractive area to locate. The ZEDE is especially attractive for 
United States MFEFs who export food products from Honduras as the United States has 
implemented the Food Safety Modernization Act. 
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